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Junchi Liao

Publications and source records attributed to Junchi Liao.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

Auditing Provenance Sensitivity in LLM Agent Action Selection

LLM agents choose tools and arguments from context that mixes user requests, tool outputs, retrieved records, memory, and untrusted text. Evidence can be relevant without being authorized to determine a decision, so a correct action need not be grounded only in permitted evidence. We introduce a target-specific authorization audit that labels context factors separately for each tool and argument target. Its primary test holds the task, proposition, position, and policy fixed while changing only the proposition's source authority. We then test behavior when valid evidence is weakened and use context-subset interactions as a secondary localization diagnostic. Across 450 controlled next-action tasks and multiple open-weight LLM families, trusted and untrusted variants produce different actions in 5.4 percent of competing cases versus 1.7 percent of supporting cases. Under controlled degradation, unauthorized competition is retained in a full-correct, mixed-error, clean-correct pattern in 2.4 percent of comparisons, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 2.1 to 3.0 percent. These are controlled stress-set rates, not deployment prevalence. The models respond to textual source-authority cues, but this does not prevent untrusted evidence from influencing their actions.

cs.AI↗

CleanVideo: Adaptive Concept Erasure for Text-to-Video Diffusion Models

Concept erasure aims to selectively eliminate undesired visual semantics from pre-trained generative models without compromising their general utility. Extending concept erasure from images to video is nontrivial. Target concepts emerge gradually and vary across frames and denoising steps. As a result, fixed interventions may miss the target or introduce blurring, jitter, and content distortion. We propose CleanVideo, a selective erasure framework that performs low-dimensional subspace intervention controlled by a tri-modal gating mechanism. By jointly processing spatiotemporal visual features, timestep signals, and textual semantics, CleanVideo determines where, when, and whether to intervene, steering erased content toward natural surrogate concepts when such surrogates can be clearly defined while preserving non-target content. Experiments on three video diffusion models show that CleanVideo effectively erases target concepts while maintaining visual fidelity and temporal coherence, outperforming existing baselines under frame-level and video-level evaluations and under concept-recovery attacks when the protected pipeline remains intact.

cs.CV↗

Monitor-Validity Failures: LLM Safety Evidence Paths at Evolving Framework Boundaries

Modern LLM applications rely on runtime monitors that inspect tool calls, traces, streams, detector outputs, and verifier inputs. This creates an interface-reliability problem: a framework path may remain operational while policy-relevant evidence never reaches its decision point. In one representative case, a regex detector returned a positive match, but the framework stranded the result before the block decision. This differs from jailbreaks and detector errors because the evidence is already recognized yet disconnected from enforcement. We study this repair-boundary signature with canary contracts: parent/fixed confirmation units that place a known payload only on the changed evidence surface and record monitor visibility together with the downstream decision for action-boundary cases. Applying the protocol to public framework repairs, we confirm 18 evidence-path failures across 11 LLM or agent safety project groups and four implementation ecosystems. Nine are established-boundary repairs, eight are new-surface policy-coverage gaps, and one is a boundary-only evidence case. Fourteen reach E1 enforcement boundaries: seven native action outcomes, six configured enforcement boundaries, and one synthetic-consumer consequence. The remaining cases affect verifier, safety-prompt, or observability channels. The cases form carrier, adapter, authority, and surface families and show how ordinary application behavior can remain intact while a safety-specific evidence path misses its decision. Exact revisions, deterministic outcomes, negative controls, and a frozen prospective audit document the confirmation rule. Monitor assumptions therefore need regression tests at the schemas, streams, tools, and adapters that frameworks evolve.

cs.AI↗

Defensive Writing in GPT Models

Researchers increasingly use ChatGPT to revise their papers, and when asked to make a paper hold up under review, recent GPT versions often narrow or even retract the authors' claims. We call such changes defensive writing when the given material does not support them, and we test two explanations: the model corrects the authors' overclaiming, or it writes for an anticipated reviewer. We ask GPT versions and models from other developers to rewrite paragraphs from papers written before ChatGPT, or to write from an evidence sheet that lists a paper's method and results. From GPT-5.5 on, GPT versions add clearly more ungrounded qualifications than the authors' originals contain, and GPT-6-astra adds the most and often retracts the authors' claims. Each explanation fits one part. Checked against the full papers, GPT-6-astra's retractions mostly correct overstated claims or explanations, but most added qualifications are redundant. The qualifications follow the request: they are absent under polishing, appear with any request to check the claims, and peak when the prompt names a reviewer's concerns. AI reviewers score such rewrites higher and score them lower once only the qualifications are removed, while human readers in a small study find them harder to read. Combining AI writing with AI review may reward qualifications that readers pay for.

cs.AI↗

Trust the Brand, Lose Control: How Identity Hijacks LLM Agent Orchestration

LLM agents now execute tasks end to end with permission to change real systems and increasingly orchestrate subagents that differ in capability and cost. Prior work treats the choice of subagent as an optimization problem. Yet the orchestrator makes this choice from the identities that subagents display, and an attacker can spoof them. Displayed identity thus decides operational authority, meaning who is trusted to check the work and who is allowed to change it. As a result, a risky subagent can keep authority over execution even after other evidence contradicts it. We introduce TrustFork, an LLM agent safety benchmark with 1,890 tasks and 27,826 valid trajectories across 16 agent systems. These systems run eight orchestrators under the OpenCode, OpenClaw, and Pi harnesses. In each task, one subagent carries a risky goal while the other three stay aligned with the user, so contradicting evidence can exist. A task can also change the identity a subagent displays without changing the model behind it, which lets us trace a shift in authority to the label. Our analysis shows that even when another subagent contradicts the risky response, the orchestrator still acts on it in 72.0% of cases on average, most often in the systems with the least terminal harm. Swapping the family labels nearly triples how often the orchestrator obtains the risky response. A safer response is available in 84.0% of tasks, yet it decides the outcome in only 25.0%. The harness also decides which responses reach the orchestrator. Among three runtime defenses, hiding identity cues helps most consistently, while verifying before action helps only when the harness returns enough evidence. TrustFork shows that production agent orchestration must bind authority to evidence before execution causes harm. Our project is in https://henrymao2004.github.io/agent-orchestration-safety/.

cs.CR↗

Auditing Evidence Use in Medical LLM Diagnosis

Medical LLMs are often evaluated by whether they select the correct diagnosis, but diagnostic accuracy alone does not show whether the model used the case evidence appropriately. We present a behavioral audit of evidence use in medical diagnosis. For each case, we decompose patient information into evidence units, score candidate diagnoses under controlled evidence subsets, and mine low-order interactions in diagnostic margins. Because medical evidence is diagnosis-relative, the audit separates interaction discovery from failure assignment: large or negative interactions can reflect plausible differential diagnosis, while suspicious interactions require robustness checks and clinical review. We evaluate five open-weight LLMs on DDXPlus, CupCase, and MedCase. Across datasets, faithful support and differential conflict or cancellation account for most interaction strength, showing that many evidence interactions are clinically plausible rather than failures. In a DDXPlus-focused blinded five-reviewer 130-item enriched review sample, invalid or shortcut-like cases concentrate in negated or absent findings and clinically local evidence. These results show that accuracy can hide candidate evidence-use failures and motivate role-aware audits for medical LLM evaluation.

cs.AI↗

Code Monitor Red Teaming for Public-Test-Passing Code

Visible tests are a common gate for LLM-generated code, but passing them does not certify specification correctness. We study a deployment-like monitoring problem: after code has passed public tests, can a weaker LLM verifier identify the residual hidden bugs? We introduce Code Monitor Red Teaming, a monitor-red-teaming protocol that fixes a public-check information boundary while varying generator pressure, verifier scaffolding, and weak-to-strong capability. We instantiate it as CodeMonitorBench, spanning function-level, data-science, and workflow code. Across 71,000 generated candidates, 43,677 pass public tests and 23,081 of those fail hidden tests. Weak verifiers improve with scaffolding and model family, but still miss most hidden bugs at 5% false-positive rate. As a robustness stress test, adversarial public-test-overfit pressure lowers verifier AUROC and raises low-FPR miss rates in most cells. A GLM-5.1 verifier recovers part of the gap under the same evidence boundary; an inferability audit shows that remaining misses mix verifier failures with M1 evidence limits.

cs.AI↗

Evidence Interfaces Shape How Retrieval-Augmented Readers Use Support

In multi-hop RAG evaluation, a top-k answer score can hide two different failures: the retrieval window may drop part of the support chain, or it may contain support in a form the adapted reader does not use well. We call this reader-facing form of retrieved evidence an evidence interface. Using three support-annotated multi-hop QA benchmarks, we compare matched adapted readers trained with raw context, retrieval windows, and gold-support diagnostic renderings. These comparisons distinguish support-availability failures from remaining reader-interface effects. Top-k windows become interpretable only after checking whether the complete annotated support chain survives: when it does, short ranked windows can match or improve over raw context; when it does not, missing support explains much of the loss. Gold support-first improves matched readers; on 2Wiki and MuSiQue, a support-supervised ranker raises coverage and recovers raw-context quality at lower prompt cost, while retaining gold headroom. Support-removal checks further show that the gains rely on exposed evidence, not only answer priors. On support-annotated evaluations, top-k answer scores should therefore be reported together with complete-support coverage.

cs.AI↗

VISTA: Auditing Semantic Divergence in Vision-Language Models

Vision-language models can exhibit visual concept-conditioned divergence: given images containing demographic features, corporate logos, or ideological symbols, some models produce unusually uniform responses that differ from what peer models say about the same input. These behaviors evade text-only audits because visual concepts cannot be isolated or substituted the way text tokens can. We present VISTA (Visual Inconsistency Screening Through Analysis), a black-box cross-model audit that couples semantic entropy with distribution-based divergence to flag model-specific anomalies. In a controlled study, we implant concept-conditioned stances in three VLMs via fine-tuning on small biased datasets and confirm that VISTA detects them. Auditing six VLMs across 19 topics, VISTA surfaces 142 high-suspicion cases (1.2%) and identifies selective refusal as a previously unreported divergence pattern, where models refuse demographic queries at rates varying from 0 to 65% across groups.

cs.CV↗

Backdooring CLIP through Concept Confusion

Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to deep learning models by allowing adversaries to implant hidden behaviors that remain dormant on clean inputs but are maliciously triggered at inference. Existing backdoor attack methods typically rely on explicit triggers such as image patches or pixel perturbations, which makes them easier to detect and limits their applicability in complex settings. To address this limitation, we take a different perspective by analyzing backdoor attacks through the lens of concept-level reasoning, drawing on insights from interpretable AI. We show that traditional attacks can be viewed as implicitly manipulating the concepts activated within a model's latent space. This motivates a natural question: can backdoors be built by directly manipulating concepts? To answer this, we propose the Concept Confusion Attack (CCA), a novel framework that designates human-understandable concepts as internal triggers, eliminating the need for explicit input modifications. By relabeling images that strongly exhibit a chosen concept and fine-tuning on this mixed dataset, CCA teaches the model to associate the concept itself with the attacker's target label. Consequently, the presence of the concept alone is sufficient to activate the backdoor, making the attack stealthier and more resistant to existing defenses. Using CLIP as a case study, we show that CCA achieves high attack success rates while preserving clean-task accuracy and evading state-of-the-art defenses.

cs.CR↗