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Justin Stark

Publications and source records attributed to Justin Stark.

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Digital Sovereignty as a Quality Attribute for Software Architectures

Digital sovereignty (DS) is an increasingly important concept and political agenda throughout the world, including in the European Union (EU). However, the concept is also regrettably vague. With this critical point in mind, the paper presents an analysis of digital sovereignty as a quality attribute for software architectures in the context of cloud computing and the EU's policy frameworks for it. The analysis reveals that DS can be sharpened analytically by conceptualizing it as a quality attribute. The analysis further demonstrates how DS satisfies many of the classical properties of quality attributes for software architectures, including their measurability and validation, the trade-offs they involve, and the scenario-based methodology commonly used for analyzing them.

cs.SE

Sovereign 2.0: Control-Plane Sovereignty for Cloud Systems Under Disruption

Cloud sovereignty can no longer be defined by data residency or infrastructure location alone. Under conditions of geopolitical disruption, legal exposure, and expanding service boundaries, sovereignty must be understood as enforceable control over how digital services are governed, operated, and recovered. This paper introduces Sovereign 2.0, a control-plane-centric model that extends sovereignty beyond localisation to include governance authority, privileged access, cryptographic trust, data lifecycle control, observability, and incident response across federated environments. We define management sovereignty as the sovereign ability to govern, operate, evidence, and recover services regardless of underlying infrastructure dependencies. To operationalise this model, we propose a three-layer risk-assurance framework spanning governance, operational, and technical controls, enabling sovereign outcomes to be specified and continuously evidenced under both steady-state and crisis conditions. We further position post-quantum-ready cryptographic control, particularly TLS and key custody, as foundational to long-term sovereign trust. These contributions reframe sovereignty as an evidence-backed control system rather than a property of location, with implications for cloud architecture, procurement, and resilience design.

cs.CR