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K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao

Publications and source records attributed to K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao.

11 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2026

Coalition strategy-proof anonymous binary social choice in a countably infinite society

We study anonymous binary social choice functions on the universal weak-preference domain when the society of voters is countably infinite. Voters may strictly support one of the two alternatives or be indifferent, and non-manipulability is required in the form of coalitional strategy-proofness. Full anonymity reduces the relevant information about a coalition not to its cardinality alone, but to its cardinality signature: finite of size \(k\), infinite with infinite complement, or cofinite with complement of size \(k\). Recording the signatures of the two strict-support coalitions yields an infinite triangular grid, ordered by increasing support for one alternative and decreasing support for the other. We prove that anonymous coalition strategy-proof binary social choice functions are exactly those obtained from super order closed subsets, i.e. upper sets, of this grid. We then give a geometric classification of these subsets. Unlike in the finite-voter case, they need not be generated by their minimal elements: countable infinity creates missing-boundary regions corresponding to finite opposition or cofinite strict support. We prove an exact representation of these subsets by genuine or missing-boundary corners, and derive a nonredundant parametrization by an antichain and, when necessary, one exceptional missing-boundary region. This yields four generalized zigzag forms and completes the infinite-society counterpart of the known geometric representation for finite electorates.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2024

The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives

We consider classes of non-manipulable social choice functions with range of cardinality at most two within a set of at least two alternatives. We provide the functional form for each of the classes we consider. This functional form is a characterization that explicitly describes how a social choice function of that particular class selects the collective choice corresponding to a profile. We provide a unified formulation of these characterizations using the new concept of "character". The choice of the character, depending on the class of social choice functions, gives the functional form of all social choice functions of the class.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2022

Complements and Improvements Regarding Distributivity of the Product for $σ$-Algebras with Respect to the Intersection

We present a variety of refined conditions for $σ$ algebras $\mathcal{A}$ (on a set $X$), $\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{G}$ (on a set $U$) such that the distributivity equation $$(\mathcal{A}\otimes\mathcal{F})\cap(\mathcal{A}\otimes\mathcal{G})=\mathcal{A}\otimes\left(\mathcal{F}\cap\mathcal{G}\right),$$ holds -- or is violated. \\ The article generalizes the results in arXiv:2007.06095 and includes a positive result for $σ$ algebras generated by at most countable partitions, was not covered before. We also present a proof that counterexamples may be constructed whenever $X$ is uncountable and there exist two $σ$-algebras on $X$ which are both countably separated, but their intersection is not. We present examples of such structures. In the last section, we extend Theorem 3.3 of arXiv:2007.06095 from analytic to the setting of Blackwell spaces.

math.PR↗
arXiv2021

On the relation between Preference Reversal and Strategy-Proofness

We analyze the relation between strategy-proofness and preference reversal in the case that agents may declare indifference. Interestingly, Berga and Moreno (2020), have recently derived preference reversal from group strategy-proofness of social choice functions on strict preferences domains if the range has no more than three elements. We extend this result and at the same time simplify it. Our analysis points out the role of individual strategy-proofness in deriving the preference reversal property, giving back to the latter its original individual nature (cfr. Eliaz, 2004). Moreover, we show that the difficulties Berga and Moreno highlighted relaxing the assumption on the cardinality of the range, disappear under a proper assumption on the domain. We introduce the concept of complete sets of preferences and show that individual strategy-proofness is sufficient to obtain the preference reversal property when the agents' feasible set of orderings is complete. This covers interesting cases like single peaked preferences, rich domains admitting regular social choice functions, and universal domains. The fact that we use individual rather than group strategy-proofness, allows to get immediately some of the known, and some new, equivalences between individual and group strategy-proofness. Finally, we show that group strategy-proofness is only really needed to obtain preference reversal if there are infinitely many voters.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2020

Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof

Let $V$ be society whose members express preferences about two alternatives, indifference included. Identifying anonymous binary social choice functions with binary functions $f=f(k,m)$ defined over the integer triangular grid $G=\{(k,m)\in \mathbb{N}_0\times\mathbb{N}_0 : k+m\le |V|\} $, we show that every strategy-proof, anonymous social choice function can be described geometrically by listing, in a sequential manner, groups of segments of G, of equal (maximum possible) length, alternately horizontal and vertical, representative of preference profiles that determine the collective choice of one of the two alternatives. Indeed, we show that every function which is anonymous and strategy-proof can be described in terms of a sequence of nonnegative integers $(q_1, q_2, \cdots, q_s)$ corresponding to the cardinalities of the mentioned groups of segments. We also analyze the connections between our present representation with another of our earlier representations involving sequences of majority quotas. A Python code is available with the authors for the implementation of any such social choice function.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2020

The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference

We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provide this in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to express indifference and the domain consists of profiles of preferences over a society of arbitrary cardinality. The theorem, that takes the form of a representation formula, can be used to construct all functions under consideration.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2020

Anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social choice

Let V be a finite society whose members express weak orderings (hence also indifference, possibly) about two alternatives. We show a simple representation formula that is valid for all, and only, anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social choice functions on V . The number of such functions is $2^{n+1}$ if V contains $n$ agents.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2016

On strictly nonzero integer-valued charges

A charge (finitely additive measure) defined on a Boolean algebra of sets taking values in a group $G$ is called a strictly nonzero (SNZ) charge if it takes the identity value in $G$ only for the zero element of the Boolean algebra. A study of such charges was initiated by Rudiger Göbel and K.P.S. Bhaskara Rao in 2002. Our main result is a solution to one of the questions posed in that paper: we show that for every cardinal $\aleph$, the Boolean algebra of clopen sets of $\{0,1\}^\aleph$ has a strictly nonzero integer-valued charge. The key lemma that we prove is that there exists a strictly nonzero integer-valued permutation-invariant charge on the Boolean algebra of clopen sets of $\{0,1\}^{\aleph_0}$. Our proof is based on linear-algebraic arguments, as well as certain kinds of polynomial approximations of binomial coefficients. We also show that there is no integer-valued SNZ charge on ${\mathcal{P}}(N)$. Finally, we raise some interesting problems on integer-valued SNZ charges.

math.LO↗
arXiv2009

On Zumkeller Numbers

Generalizing the concept of a perfect number, Sloane's sequences of integers A083207 lists the sequence of integers $n$ with the property: the positive factors of $n$ can be partitioned into two disjoint parts so that the sums of the two parts are equal. Following Clark et al., we shall call such integers, Zumkeller numbers. Generalizing this, Clark et al., call a number n a half-Zumkeller number if the positive proper factors of n can be partitioned into two disjoint parts so that the sums of the two parts are equal. An extensive study of properties of Zumkeller numbers, half-Zumkeller numbers and their relation to practical numbers is undertaken in this paper. Clark et al., announced results about Zumkellers numbers and half-Zumkeller numbers and suggested two conjectures. In the present paper we shall settle one of the conjectures, prove the second conjecture in some special cases and prove several results related to the second conjecture. We shall also show that if there is an even Zumkeller number that is not half-Zumkeller it should be bigger than 7233498900.

math.NT↗
arXiv2007

The Minimum Rank Problem: a counterexample

We provide a counterexample to a recent conjecture that the minimum rank of every sign pattern matrix can be realized by a rational matrix. We use one of the equivalences of the conjecture and some results from projective geometry. As a consequence of the counterexample, we show that there is a graph for which the minimum rank over the reals is strictly smaller than the minimum rank over the rationals. We also make some comments on the minimum rank of sign pattern matrices over different subfields of $\mathbb R$.

math.CO↗