Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Kangjie Chen

Publications and source records attributed to Kangjie Chen.

31 records · Page 2Linked to original sources
arXiv2025

HRAvatar: High-Quality and Relightable Gaussian Head Avatar

Reconstructing animatable and high-quality 3D head avatars from monocular videos, especially with realistic relighting, is a valuable task. However, the limited information from single-view input, combined with the complex head poses and facial movements, makes this challenging. Previous methods achieve real-time performance by combining 3D Gaussian Splatting with a parametric head model, but the resulting head quality suffers from inaccurate face tracking and limited expressiveness of the deformation model. These methods also fail to produce realistic effects under novel lighting conditions. To address these issues, we propose HRAvatar, a 3DGS-based method that reconstructs high-fidelity, relightable 3D head avatars. HRAvatar reduces tracking errors through end-to-end optimization and better captures individual facial deformations using learnable blendshapes and learnable linear blend skinning. Additionally, it decomposes head appearance into several physical properties and incorporates physically-based shading to account for environmental lighting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HRAvatar not only reconstructs superior-quality heads but also achieves realistic visual effects under varying lighting conditions.

cs.CV↗
arXiv2025

Picky LLMs and Unreliable RMs: An Empirical Study on Safety Alignment after Instruction Tuning

Large language models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for addressing a wide range of general inquiries and tasks. Despite this, fine-tuning aligned LLMs on smaller, domain-specific datasets, critical to adapting them to specialized tasks, can inadvertently degrade their safety alignment, even when the datasets are benign. This phenomenon makes models more susceptible to providing inappropriate responses. In this study, we systematically examine the factors contributing to safety alignment degradation in benign fine-tuning scenarios. Our analysis identifies three critical factors affecting aligned LLMs: answer structure, identity calibration, and role-play. Additionally, we evaluate the reliability of state-of-the-art reward models (RMs), which are often used to guide alignment processes. Our findings reveal that these RMs frequently fail to accurately reflect human preferences regarding safety, underscoring their limitations in practical applications. By uncovering these challenges, our work highlights the complexities of maintaining safety alignment during fine-tuning and offers guidance to help developers balance utility and safety in LLMs. Datasets and fine-tuning code used in our experiments can be found in https://github.com/GuanlinLee/llm_instruction_tuning.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2024

ART: Automatic Red-teaming for Text-to-Image Models to Protect Benign Users

Large-scale pre-trained generative models are taking the world by storm, due to their abilities in generating creative content. Meanwhile, safeguards for these generative models are developed, to protect users' rights and safety, most of which are designed for large language models. Existing methods primarily focus on jailbreak and adversarial attacks, which mainly evaluate the model's safety under malicious prompts. Recent work found that manually crafted safe prompts can unintentionally trigger unsafe generations. To further systematically evaluate the safety risks of text-to-image models, we propose a novel Automatic Red-Teaming framework, ART. Our method leverages both vision language model and large language model to establish a connection between unsafe generations and their prompts, thereby more efficiently identifying the model's vulnerabilities. With our comprehensive experiments, we reveal the toxicity of the popular open-source text-to-image models. The experiments also validate the effectiveness, adaptability, and great diversity of ART. Additionally, we introduce three large-scale red-teaming datasets for studying the safety risks associated with text-to-image models. Datasets and models can be found in https://github.com/GuanlinLee/ART.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2024

BadEdit: Backdooring large language models by model editing

Mainstream backdoor attack methods typically demand substantial tuning data for poisoning, limiting their practicality and potentially degrading the overall performance when applied to Large Language Models (LLMs). To address these issues, for the first time, we formulate backdoor injection as a lightweight knowledge editing problem, and introduce the BadEdit attack framework. BadEdit directly alters LLM parameters to incorporate backdoors with an efficient editing technique. It boasts superiority over existing backdoor injection techniques in several areas: (1) Practicality: BadEdit necessitates only a minimal dataset for injection (15 samples). (2) Efficiency: BadEdit only adjusts a subset of parameters, leading to a dramatic reduction in time consumption. (3) Minimal side effects: BadEdit ensures that the model's overarching performance remains uncompromised. (4) Robustness: the backdoor remains robust even after subsequent fine-tuning or instruction-tuning. Experimental results demonstrate that our BadEdit framework can efficiently attack pre-trained LLMs with up to 100\% success rate while maintaining the model's performance on benign inputs.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2024

MIP: CLIP-based Image Reconstruction from PEFT Gradients

Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP) model, as an effective pre-trained multimodal neural network, has been widely used in distributed machine learning tasks, especially Federated Learning (FL). Typically, CLIP-based FL adopts Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) for model training, which only fine-tunes adapter parameters or soft prompts rather than the full parameters. Although PEFT is different from the traditional training mode, in this paper, we theoretically analyze that the gradients of adapters or soft prompts can still be used to perform image reconstruction attacks. Based on our theoretical analysis, we propose Multm-In-Parvo (MIP), a proprietary reconstruction attack method targeting CLIP-based distributed machine learning architecture. Specifically, MIP can reconstruct CLIP training images according to the gradients of soft prompts or an adapter. In addition, MIP includes a label prediction strategy to accelerate convergence and an inverse gradient estimation mechanism to avoid the vanishing gradient problem on the text encoder. Experimental results show that MIP can effectively reconstruct training images according to the gradients of soft prompts or adapters of CLIP models.

cs.CV↗
arXiv2023

Omnipotent Adversarial Training in the Wild

Adversarial training is an important topic in robust deep learning, but the community lacks attention to its practical usage. In this paper, we aim to resolve a real-world challenge, i.e., training a model on an imbalanced and noisy dataset to achieve high clean accuracy and adversarial robustness, with our proposed Omnipotent Adversarial Training (OAT) strategy. OAT consists of two innovative methodologies to address the imperfection in the training set. We first introduce an oracle into the adversarial training process to help the model learn a correct data-label conditional distribution. This carefully-designed oracle can provide correct label annotations for adversarial training. We further propose logits adjustment adversarial training to overcome the data imbalance issue, which can help the model learn a Bayes-optimal distribution. Our comprehensive evaluation results show that OAT outperforms other baselines by more than 20% clean accuracy improvement and 10% robust accuracy improvement under complex combinations of data imbalance and label noise scenarios. The code can be found in https://github.com/GuanlinLee/OAT.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2023

Boosting Black-box Attack to Deep Neural Networks with Conditional Diffusion Models

Existing black-box attacks have demonstrated promising potential in creating adversarial examples (AE) to deceive deep learning models. Most of these attacks need to handle a vast optimization space and require a large number of queries, hence exhibiting limited practical impacts in real-world scenarios. In this paper, we propose a novel black-box attack strategy, Conditional Diffusion Model Attack (CDMA), to improve the query efficiency of generating AEs under query-limited situations. The key insight of CDMA is to formulate the task of AE synthesis as a distribution transformation problem, i.e., benign examples and their corresponding AEs can be regarded as coming from two distinctive distributions and can transform from each other with a particular converter. Unlike the conventional \textit{query-and-optimization} approach, we generate eligible AEs with direct conditional transform using the aforementioned data converter, which can significantly reduce the number of queries needed. CDMA adopts the conditional Denoising Diffusion Probabilistic Model as the converter, which can learn the transformation from clean samples to AEs, and ensure the smooth development of perturbed noise resistant to various defense strategies. We demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of CDMA by comparing it with nine state-of-the-art black-box attacks across three benchmark datasets. On average, CDMA can reduce the query count to a handful of times; in most cases, the query count is only ONE. We also show that CDMA can obtain $>99\%$ attack success rate for untarget attacks over all datasets and targeted attack over CIFAR-10 with the noise budget of $ε=16$.

cs.CV↗
arXiv2023

Multi-target Backdoor Attacks for Code Pre-trained Models

Backdoor attacks for neural code models have gained considerable attention due to the advancement of code intelligence. However, most existing works insert triggers into task-specific data for code-related downstream tasks, thereby limiting the scope of attacks. Moreover, the majority of attacks for pre-trained models are designed for understanding tasks. In this paper, we propose task-agnostic backdoor attacks for code pre-trained models. Our backdoored model is pre-trained with two learning strategies (i.e., Poisoned Seq2Seq learning and token representation learning) to support the multi-target attack of downstream code understanding and generation tasks. During the deployment phase, the implanted backdoors in the victim models can be activated by the designed triggers to achieve the targeted attack. We evaluate our approach on two code understanding tasks and three code generation tasks over seven datasets. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach can effectively and stealthily attack code-related downstream tasks.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2023

Extracting Cloud-based Model with Prior Knowledge

Machine Learning-as-a-Service, a pay-as-you-go business pattern, is widely accepted by third-party users and developers. However, the open inference APIs may be utilized by malicious customers to conduct model extraction attacks, i.e., attackers can replicate a cloud-based black-box model merely via querying malicious examples. Existing model extraction attacks mainly depend on the posterior knowledge (i.e., predictions of query samples) from Oracle. Thus, they either require high query overhead to simulate the decision boundary, or suffer from generalization errors and overfitting problems due to query budget limitations. To mitigate it, this work proposes an efficient model extraction attack based on prior knowledge for the first time. The insight is that prior knowledge of unlabeled proxy datasets is conducive to the search for the decision boundary (e.g., informative samples). Specifically, we leverage self-supervised learning including autoencoder and contrastive learning to pre-compile the prior knowledge of the proxy dataset into the feature extractor of the substitute model. Then we adopt entropy to measure and sample the most informative examples to query the target model. Our design leverages both prior and posterior knowledge to extract the model and thus eliminates generalizability errors and overfitting problems. We conduct extensive experiments on open APIs like Traffic Recognition, Flower Recognition, Moderation Recognition, and NSFW Recognition from real-world platforms, Azure and Clarifai. The experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our attack. For example, our attack achieves 95.1% fidelity with merely 1.8K queries (cost 2.16$) on the NSFW Recognition API. Also, the adversarial examples generated with our substitute model have better transferability than others, which reveals that our scheme is more conducive to downstream attacks.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2022

ShiftNAS: Towards Automatic Generation of Advanced Mulitplication-Less Neural Networks

Multiplication-less neural networks significantly reduce the time and energy cost on the hardware platform, as the compute-intensive multiplications are replaced with lightweight bit-shift operations. However, existing bit-shift networks are all directly transferred from state-of-the-art convolutional neural networks (CNNs), which lead to non-negligible accuracy drop or even failure of model convergence. To combat this, we propose ShiftNAS, the first framework tailoring Neural Architecture Search (NAS) to substantially reduce the accuracy gap between bit-shift neural networks and their real-valued counterparts. Specifically, we pioneer dragging NAS into a shift-oriented search space and endow it with the robust topology-related search strategy and custom regularization and stabilization. As a result, our ShiftNAS breaks through the incompatibility of traditional NAS methods for bit-shift neural networks and achieves more desirable performance in terms of accuracy and convergence. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ShiftNAS sets a new state-of-the-art for bit-shift neural networks, where the accuracy increases (1.69-8.07)% on CIFAR10, (5.71-18.09)% on CIFAR100 and (4.36-67.07)% on ImageNet, especially when many conventional CNNs fail to converge on ImageNet with bit-shift weights.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2021

BadPre: Task-agnostic Backdoor Attacks to Pre-trained NLP Foundation Models

Pre-trained Natural Language Processing (NLP) models can be easily adapted to a variety of downstream language tasks. This significantly accelerates the development of language models. However, NLP models have been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where a pre-defined trigger word in the input text causes model misprediction. Previous NLP backdoor attacks mainly focus on some specific tasks. This makes those attacks less general and applicable to other kinds of NLP models and tasks. In this work, we propose \Name, the first task-agnostic backdoor attack against the pre-trained NLP models. The key feature of our attack is that the adversary does not need prior information about the downstream tasks when implanting the backdoor to the pre-trained model. When this malicious model is released, any downstream models transferred from it will also inherit the backdoor, even after the extensive transfer learning process. We further design a simple yet effective strategy to bypass a state-of-the-art defense. Experimental results indicate that our approach can compromise a wide range of downstream NLP tasks in an effective and stealthy way.

cs.CL↗
arXiv2020

Stealing Deep Reinforcement Learning Models for Fun and Profit

This paper presents the first model extraction attack against Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL), which enables an external adversary to precisely recover a black-box DRL model only from its interaction with the environment. Model extraction attacks against supervised Deep Learning models have been widely studied. However, those techniques cannot be applied to the reinforcement learning scenario due to DRL models' high complexity, stochasticity and limited observable information. We propose a novel methodology to overcome the above challenges. The key insight of our approach is that the process of DRL model extraction is equivalent to imitation learning, a well-established solution to learn sequential decision-making policies. Based on this observation, our methodology first builds a classifier to reveal the training algorithm family of the targeted black-box DRL model only based on its predicted actions, and then leverages state-of-the-art imitation learning techniques to replicate the model from the identified algorithm family. Experimental results indicate that our methodology can effectively recover the DRL models with high fidelity and accuracy. We also demonstrate two use cases to show that our model extraction attack can (1) significantly improve the success rate of adversarial attacks, and (2) steal DRL models stealthily even they are protected by DNN watermarks. These pose a severe threat to the intellectual property and privacy protection of DRL applications.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2020

Stealthy and Efficient Adversarial Attacks against Deep Reinforcement Learning

Adversarial attacks against conventional Deep Learning (DL) systems and algorithms have been widely studied, and various defenses were proposed. However, the possibility and feasibility of such attacks against Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) are less explored. As DRL has achieved great success in various complex tasks, designing effective adversarial attacks is an indispensable prerequisite towards building robust DRL algorithms. In this paper, we introduce two novel adversarial attack techniques to \emph{stealthily} and \emph{efficiently} attack the DRL agents. These two techniques enable an adversary to inject adversarial samples in a minimal set of critical moments while causing the most severe damage to the agent. The first technique is the \emph{critical point attack}: the adversary builds a model to predict the future environmental states and agent's actions, assesses the damage of each possible attack strategy, and selects the optimal one. The second technique is the \emph{antagonist attack}: the adversary automatically learns a domain-agnostic model to discover the critical moments of attacking the agent in an episode. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques. Specifically, to successfully attack the DRL agent, our critical point technique only requires 1 (TORCS) or 2 (Atari Pong and Breakout) steps, and the antagonist technique needs fewer than 5 steps (4 Mujoco tasks), which are significant improvements over state-of-the-art methods.

cs.CR↗