arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Karin U. Katz.
Felix Klein and Abraham Fraenkel each formulated a criterion for a theory of infinitesimals to be successful, in terms of the feasibility of implementation of the Mean Value Theorem. We explore the evolution of the idea over the past century, and the role of Abraham Robinson's framework therein.
Procedures relying on infinitesimals in Leibniz, Euler and Cauchy have been interpreted in both a Weierstrassian and Robinson's frameworks. The latter provides closer proxies for the procedures of the classical masters. Thus, Leibniz's distinction between assignable and inassignable numbers finds a proxy in the distinction between standard and nonstandard numbers in Robinson's framework, while Leibniz's law of homogeneity with the implied notion of equality up to negligible terms finds a mathematical formalisation in terms of standard part. It is hard to provide parallel formalisations in a Weierstrassian framework but scholars since Ishiguro have engaged in a quest for ghosts of departed quantifiers to provide a Weierstrassian account for Leibniz's infinitesimals. Euler similarly had notions of equality up to negligible terms, of which he distinguished two types: geometric and arithmetic. Euler routinely used product decompositions into a specific infinite number of factors, and used the binomial formula with an infinite exponent. Such procedures have immediate hyperfinite analogues in Robinson's framework, while in a Weierstrassian framework they can only be reinterpreted by means of paraphrases departing significantly from Euler's own presentation. Cauchy gives lucid definitions of continuity in terms of infinitesimals that find ready formalisations in Robinson's framework but scholars working in a Weierstrassian framework bend over backwards either to claim that Cauchy was vague or to engage in a quest for ghosts of departed quantifiers in his work. Cauchy's procedures in the context of his 1853 sum theorem (for series of continuous functions) are more readily understood from the viewpoint of Robinson's framework, where one can exploit tools such as the pointwise definition of the concept of uniform convergence. Keywords: historiography; infinitesimal; Latin model; butterfly model
Philosopher Benardete challenged both the conventional wisdom and the received mathematical treatment of zero, dot, nine recurring. An initially puzzling passage in Benardete on the intelligibility of the continuum reveals challenging insights into number systems, the foundations of modern analysis, and mathematics education. A key concept here is, in Terry Tao's terminology, that of an ultralimit. Keywords: real analysis; infinitesimals; decimal notation; procedures vs ontology
Cauchy's sum theorem is a prototype of what is today a basic result on the convergence of a series of functions in undergraduate analysis. We seek to interpret Cauchy's proof, and discuss the related epistemological questions involved in comparing distinct interpretive paradigms. Cauchy's proof is often interpreted in the modern framework of a Weierstrassian paradigm. We analyze Cauchy's proof closely and show that it finds closer proxies in a different modern framework. Keywords: Cauchy's infinitesimal; sum theorem; quantifier alternation; uniform convergence; foundational paradigms.
In relation to a thesis put forward by Marx Wartofsky, we seek to show that a historiography of mathematics requires an analysis of the ontology of the part of mathematics under scrutiny. Following Ian Hacking, we point out that in the history of mathematics the amount of contingency is larger than is usually thought. As a case study, we analyze the historians' approach to interpreting James Gregory's expression ultimate terms in his paper attempting to prove the irrationality of pi. Here Gregory referred to the last or ultimate terms of a series. More broadly, we analyze the following questions: which modern framework is more appropriate for interpreting the procedures at work in texts from the early history of infinitesimal analysis? as well as the related question: what is a logical theory that is close to something early modern mathematicians could have used when studying infinite series and quadrature problems? We argue that what has been routinely viewed from the viewpoint of classical analysis as an example of an "unrigorous" practice, in fact finds close procedural proxies in modern infinitesimal theories. We analyze a mix of social and religious reasons that had led to the suppression of both the religious order of Gregory's teacher degli Angeli, and Gregory's books at Venice, in the late 1660s.
The space of matrices of positive determinant GL^+_n inherits an extrinsic metric space structure from R^{n^2}. On the other hand, taking the infimum of the lengths of all paths connecting two points in GL^+_n gives an intrinsic metric. We prove bilipschitz equivalence for intrinsic and extrinsic metrics on GL^+_n, exploiting the conical structure of the stratification of the space of n by n matrices by rank.
Abraham Robinson's framework for modern infinitesimals was developed half a century ago. It enables a re-evaluation of the procedures of the pioneers of mathematical analysis. Their procedures have been often viewed through the lens of the success of the Weierstrassian foundations. We propose a view without passing through the lens, by means of proxies for such procedures in the modern theory of infinitesimals. The real accomplishments of calculus and analysis had been based primarily on the elaboration of novel techniques for solving problems rather than a quest for ultimate foundations. It may be hopeless to interpret historical foundations in terms of a punctiform continuum, but arguably it is possible to interpret historical techniques and procedures in terms of modern ones. Our proposed formalisations do not mean that Fermat, Gregory, Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy were pre-Robinsonians, but rather indicate that Robinson's framework is more helpful in understanding their procedures than a Weierstrassian framework.
To explore the extent of embeddability of Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus in first-order logic (FOL) and modern frameworks, we propose to set aside ontological issues and focus on procedural questions. This would enable an account of Leibnizian procedures in a framework limited to FOL with a small number of additional ingredients such as the relation of infinite proximity. If, as we argue here, first order logic is indeed suitable for developing modern proxies for the inferential moves found in Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus, then modern infinitesimal frameworks are more appropriate to interpreting Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus than modern Weierstrassian ones. Keywords: First order logic; infinitesimal calculus; ontology; procedures; Leibniz; Weierstrass; Abraham Robinson
We apply Benacerraf's distinction between mathematical ontology and mathematical practice (or the structures mathematicians use in practice) to examine contrasting interpretations of infinitesimal mathematics of the 17th and 18th century, in the work of Bos, Ferraro, Laugwitz, and others. We detect Weierstrass's ghost behind some of the received historiography on Euler's infinitesimal mathematics, as when Ferraro proposes to understand Euler in terms of a Weierstrassian notion of limit and Fraser declares classical analysis to be a "primary point of reference for understanding the eighteenth-century theories." Meanwhile, scholars like Bos and Laugwitz seek to explore Eulerian methodology, practice, and procedures in a way more faithful to Euler's own. Euler's use of infinite integers and the associated infinite products is analyzed in the context of his infinite product decomposition for the sine function. Euler's principle of cancellation is compared to the Leibnizian transcendental law of homogeneity. The Leibnizian law of continuity similarly finds echoes in Euler. We argue that Ferraro's assumption that Euler worked with a classical notion of quantity is symptomatic of a post-Weierstrassian placement of Euler in the Archimedean track for the development of analysis, as well as a blurring of the distinction between the dual tracks noted by Bos. Interpreting Euler in an Archimedean conceptual framework obscures important aspects of Euler's work. Such a framework is profitably replaced by a syntactically more versatile modern infinitesimal framework that provides better proxies for his inferential moves. Keywords: Archimedean axiom; infinite product; infinitesimal; law of continuity; law of homogeneity; principle of cancellation; procedure; standard part principle; ontology; mathematical practice; Euler; Leibniz
Small oscillations evolved a great deal from Klein to Robinson. We propose a concept of solution of differential equation based on Euler's method with infinitesimal mesh, with well-posedness based on a relation of adequality following Fermat and Leibniz. The result is that the period of infinitesimal oscillations is independent of their amplitude. Keywords: harmonic motion; infinitesimal; pendulum; small oscillations
Did Leibniz exploit infinitesimals and infinities `a la rigueur, or only as shorthand for quantified propositions that refer to ordinary Archimedean magnitudes? Chapter 5 in (Ishiguro 1990) is a defense of the latter position, which she reformulates in terms of Russellian logical fictions. Ishiguro does not explain how to reconcile this interpretation with Leibniz's repeated assertions that infinitesimals violate the Archimedean property, viz., Euclid's Elements, V.4. We present textual evidence from Leibniz, as well as historical evidence from the early decades of the calculus, to undermine Ishiguro's interpretation. Leibniz frequently writes that his infinitesimals are useful fictions, and we agree; but we shall show that it is best not to understand them as logical fictions; instead, they are better understood as pure fictions. Keywords: Archimedean property; infinitesimal; logical fiction; pure fiction; quantified paraphrase; law of homogeneity
In a piece published in 1981, H. M. Edwards touts the benefits of reading the masters. A quarter-century later, Edwards takes seriously his own advice by publishing an encomium on Euler's Institutiones (1755). While we agree with Edwards that we shall all do well by studying the masters, we argue that to derive the full benefit, one must read historically important texts without interposing a lens formed by one's own mathematical accomplishments. We show, in particular, that Edwards misses much of the style and substance of Euler's Institutiones by reading the text through a constructivist lens.
We apply a framework developed by C. S. Peirce to analyze the concept of clarity, so as to examine a pair of rival mathematical approaches to a typical result in analysis. Namely, we compare an intuitionist and an infinitesimal approaches to the extreme value theorem. We argue that a given pre-mathematical phenomenon may have several aspects that are not necessarily captured by a single formalisation, pointing to a complementarity rather than a rivalry of the approaches.
We examine prevailing philosophical and historical views about the origin of infinitesimal mathematics in light of modern infinitesimal theories, and show the works of Fermat, Leibniz, Euler, Cauchy and other giants of infinitesimal mathematics in a new light. We also detail several procedures of the historical infinitesimal calculus that were only clarified and formalized with the advent of modern infinitesimals. These procedures include Fermat's adequality; Leibniz's law of continuity and the transcendental law of homogeneity; Euler's principle of cancellation and infinite integers with the associated infinite products; Cauchy's infinitesimal-based definition of continuity and "Dirac" delta function. Such procedures were interpreted and formalized in Robinson's framework in terms of concepts like microcontinuity (S-continuity), the standard part principle, the transfer principle, and hyperfinite products. We evaluate the critiques of historical and modern infinitesimals by their foes from Berkeley and Cantor to Bishop and Connes. We analyze the issue of the consistency, as distinct from the issue of the rigor, of historical infinitesimals, and contrast the methodologies of Leibniz and Nieuwentijt in this connection.
Cauchy's sum theorem of 1821 has been the subject of rival interpretations ever since Robinson proposed a novel reading in the 1960s. Some claim that Cauchy modified the hypothesis of his theorem in 1853 by introducing uniform convergence, whose traditional formulation requires a pair of independent variables. Meanwhile, Cauchy's hypothesis is formulated in terms of a single variable x, rather than a pair of variables, and requires the error term r_n = r_n(x) to go to zero at all values of x, including the infinitesimal value generated by 1/n, explicitly specified by Cauchy. If one wishes to understand Cauchy's modification/clarification of the hypothesis of the sum theorem in 1853, one has to jettison the automatic translation-to-limits.
We prove a systolic inequality for the phi-relative 1-systole of a phi-essential 2-complex, where phi is a homomorphism from the fundamental group of the complex, to a finitely presented group G. Indeed we show that universally for any phi-essential Riemannian 2-complex, and any G, the area of X is bounded below by 1/8 of sys(X,phi)^2. Combining our results with a method of Larry Guth, we obtain new quantitative results for certain 3-manifolds: in particular for Sigma the Poincare homology sphere, we have sys(Sigma)^3 < 24 vol(Sigma).
The view of infinity as a metaphor, a basic premise of modern cognitive theory of embodied knowledge, suggests in particular that there may be alternative ways in which one could formalize mathematical ideas about infinity. We discuss the key ideas about infinitesimals via a proceptual analysis of the meaning of the ellipsis"..." in the real formula .999... = 1. Infinitesimal-enriched number systems accomodate quantities in the half-open interval [0,1) whose extended decimal expansion starts with an unlimited number of repeated digits 9. Do such quantities pose a challenge to the unital evaluation of the symbol ".999..."? We present some non-standard thoughts on the ambiguity of the ellipsis, in the context of the cognitive concept of generic limit of B. Cornu and D. Tall. We analyze the vigorous debates among mathematicians concerning the idea of infinitesimals.