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Karl Kreder

Publications and source records attributed to Karl Kreder.

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Slow and Steady: Preventing MEV with Verifiable Delays

Our work presents a defense mechanism against Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) opportunities in distributed ledgers. The mechanism relies on the idea of enforcing a verifiable delay when generating transactions, such that a block creator cannot react to the appearance of a MEV opportunity without breaking liveness. We present positive results both in the Byzantine setting and in a game theoretic model of rational participants. We additionally present negative bounds that outline the limitations of this line of defense. Finally, we explore real-world implementation details of verifiable delays and show that, based on historical MEV data, our mechanism could realistically help prevent most existing MEV threats.

cs.CR

Optimal Reward Allocation via Proportional Splitting

Following the publication of Bitcoin's arguably most famous attack, selfish mining, various works have introduced mechanisms to enhance blockchain systems' game-theoretic resilience. The only proof-of-work reward rule with a Nash-equilibrium guarantee, FruitChains, demands reward finality on the order of days. The rules that settle in minutes have no such guarantee, and one of them, Reward Splitting, still outperforms FruitChains on most of the metrics that matter in deployment. This paper closes that gap between theory and practice. We introduce FairChain, a two-level transformation for any proof-of-work Nakamoto-style protocol. At the protocol layer, FairChain records low-difficulty samples called workshares alongside blocks. At the reward layer, it applies Proportional Reward Splitting (PRS): each height's reward is divided among the competing work objects in proportion to the intrinsic work behind them, with workshares supplying a fresh power estimate at every height. The fork-choice rule and block-production loop are left untouched, so the host chain's security carries over unchanged. Workshares can be discarded once the corresponding rewards mature, leaving zero on-chain footprint. We prove FairChain is a \r{ho}-coalition-safe {\epsilon}-Nash equilibrium for sufficiently large parameters, matching FruitChains in theory. To evaluate practical performance, we leverage Markov decision processes and compute the optimal adversarial policy under each utility function, rather than the gain of any one attack. At a six-block confirmation window, FairChain raises the deviation threshold to 38% of mining power and beats every mechanism in that framework on incentive compatibility, subversion gain (except FruitChains above 42%), and censorship susceptibility (except FruitChains below 25%).

cs.GT

Majority is Not Required: A Rational Analysis of the Private Double-Spend Attack from a Sub-Majority Adversary

We study the incentives behind double-spend attacks on Nakamoto-style Proof-of-Work cryptocurrencies. In these systems, miners are allowed to choose which transactions to reference with their block, and a common strategy for selecting transactions is to simply choose those with the highest fees. This can be problematic if these transactions originate from an adversary with substantial (but less than 50\%) computational power, as high-value transactions can present an incentive for a rational adversary to attempt a double-spend attack if they expect to profit. The most common mechanism for deterring double-spend attacks is for the recipients of large transactions to wait for additional block confirmations (i.e., to increase the attack cost). We argue that this defense mechanism is not satisfactory, as the security of the system is contingent on the actions of its users. Instead, we propose that defending against double-spend attacks should be the responsibility of the miners; specifically, miners should limit the amount of transaction value they include in a block (i.e., reduce the attack reward). To this end, we model cryptocurrency mining as a mean-field game in which we augment the standard mining reward function to simulate the presence of a rational, double-spending adversary. We design and implement an algorithm which characterizes the behavior of miners at equilibrium, and we show that miners who use the adversary-aware reward function accumulate more wealth than those who do not. We show that the optimal strategy for honest miners is to limit the amount of value transferred by each block such that the adversary's expected profit is 0. Additionally, we examine Bitcoin's resilience to double-spend attacks. Assuming a 6 block confirmation time, we find that an attacker with at least 25% of the network mining power can expect to profit from a double-spend attack.

cs.GT

POEM: Proof of Entropy Minima

Nakamoto consensus has been incredibly influential in enabling robust blockchain systems, and one of its components is the so-called heaviest chain rule (HCR). Within this rule, the calculation of the weight of the chain tip is performed by adding the difficulty threshold value to the previous total difficulty. Current difficulty based weighting systems do not take the intrinsic block weight into account. This paper studies a new mechanism based on entropy differences, named proof of entropy minima (POEM), which incorporates the intrinsic block weight in a manner that significantly reduces the orphan rate of the blockchain while simultaneously accelerating finalization. Finally, POEM helps to understand blockchain as a static time-independent sequence of committed events.

cs.CR

Scalable Multi-Chain Coordination via the Hierarchical Longest Chain Rule

This paper introduces BlockReduce, a Proof-of-Work (PoW) based blockchain system which achieves high transaction throughput through a hierarchy of merged mined blockchains, each operating in parallel on a partition the overall application state. Most notably, the full PoW available within the network is applied to all blockchains in BlockReduce, and cross-blockchain state transitions are enabled seamlessly within the core protocol. This paper shows that, given a hierarchy of blockchains and its associated security model, the protocol scales superlinearly in transaction throughput with the number of blockchains operated by the protocol.

cs.DC