Karthik Sivachandran | Searcharxiv

arXiv2026

Mitigating Retaliatory Algorithmic Collusion in Repeated Games

Reinforcement learning agents trained to maximize their own reward in repeated interactions can converge to supra-competitive outcomes resembling explicit collusion, without communication or shared design. Existing mitigation approaches are largely tied to specific economic settings, like two-sided platforms and auctions, leaving open how to design interventions for general repeated games. We address this gap by formalizing the connection between empirical observations from prior work on Q-learning collusion and classical theory of Simple Penal Codes (SPCs). We show any non-trivial SPC induces a quantifiable conditional dependence in agents' policies, detectable via the total variation distance between an agent's action distributions across cooperation and defection histories. Building on this connection, we propose CURB (Collusion Unwinding via Reward shaping and Belief injection), a reward-shaping framework that penalizes this Total Variation (TV) distance signal during Q-learning and is guaranteed to convert any SPC fixed point of the dynamics into a trivial one, thus precluding collusive equilibria sustained by punishment threats. Empirically, CURB substantially reduces collusion by Q-learning agents in both Bertrand and Cournot Competition Repeated Games. We further demonstrate that CURB extends to deep Q-network agents in Bertrand competition, suggesting the mechanism generalizes beyond tabular Q-learning.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Differentiable Belief-based Opponent Shaping

Human coordination often relies on the ability to influence the beliefs of others through strategic action. In multi-agent reinforcement learning, opponent shaping attempts to replicate this influence, though existing methods typically operate within an opponent's parameter, policy, or value space. Meanwhile, belief-manipulation techniques in hidden-role games often rely on hard-coded objectives, such as deception or belief saturation. We propose Differentiable Belief-based Opponent Shaping (D-BOS), a first-order method that treats each observer's belief as the shaped opponent state and differentiates through $k$-step softmax-Bayes belief dynamics. Rather than explicitly rewarding deceptive or cooperative behavior, our method treats the belief state as the target for shaping. This allows the optimal strategy to emerge naturally from the environment's reward structure. This belief-space formulation provides an opponent-shaping signal by differentiating through opponent belief updates, and naturally extends to multiple observers by aggregating gradients over their individual inferred belief trajectories. Empirically, D-BOS outperforms PPO and BBM in hidden-role games, with the largest gains in mixed-motive settings.

cs.AI↗