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Kartik Nayak

Publications and source records attributed to Kartik Nayak.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Ambulance: saving BFT through racing

Today's practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) state machine replication deployments are vulnerable to slowdowns. The main culprit is timeouts. Aggressive timeouts spuriously trigger expensive leader changes, while conservative timeouts leave the system idle and let slowdowns severely inflate latency. Two main alternatives exist: hedging, which improves recovery from slow leaders but still incurs a time-based hedging delay, and cooperative asynchronous protocols, which recover quickly from slowdowns but suffer from high common-case latency and low throughput. This paper presents Ambulance: a BFT state machine replication protocol that sidesteps this trade-off through protocol-rigged races, where replicas, rather than race against the clock, race against each other by executing protocol steps. This enables Ambulance to achieve high throughput and low latency comparable to state-of-the-art timeout-based BFT, while matching the robustness of cooperative approaches.

cs.DC↗

Censorship-Resistant Sealed-Bid Auctions on Blockchains

Auctions are now central to blockchain markets, settling NFT sales, token launches, DeFi liquidations, and arbitrage opportunities. Each on-chain bid is a public transaction whose inclusion is decided by a single consensus proposer per block. The proposer can observe pending bids, exclude competitors, and submit bids of their own, breaking the fairness guarantees of classical sealed-bid auctions. To enable latency-sensitive sealed-bid auctions in blockchain settings, we formalize four properties -- each necessary to prevent a concrete attack -- and design a protocol achieving all four: hiding bid contents, existence, and bidder identity until reveal (Hiding); counting all timely honest bids and rejecting late adversarial bids (Simultaneous Release); preventing silent withdrawal of committed bids (No Free Bid Withdrawal); and charging on-chain fees only to winners (Auction Participation Efficiency). Our protocol uses a timestamping oracle (instantiated with a committee of 2f_ts+1 timestampers) and a censorship-resistant inclusion predicate (instantiated using a FOCIL-based inclusion list), with only the winning bid settled on-chain. Our construction relies on two zero-knowledge proofs: an eligibility proof that anonymously proves deposit membership to the timestamping committee, and an auction proof that binds a bid to a specific auction for the inclusion list committee. We implement both using Groth16 over BN254 with Poseidon hashing in arkworks/Rust: the auction proof generates in 13 ms and verifies in under 1 ms; eligibility proofs for Merkle trees up to 2^32 bidders generate in 47-159 ms and verify in about 1 ms. Together, this yields a sealed-bid auction primitive practical for high-value, time-sensitive blockchain settings.

cs.CR↗

Perils of Parallelism: Transaction Fee Mechanisms under Execution Uncertainty

Modern blockchains increasingly rely on parallel execution to improve throughput. We show several industry and academic transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) struggle to simultaneously account for execution parallelism while remaining performant and fair. First, if parallelism affects fees, adversarial protocol manipulations that offset possible benefits to throughput by introducing fake transactions become rational: users can insert functionally useless parallel transactions solely to reduce fees, and schedulers can create useless sequential transactions to increase revenue. Execution contingency, a core feature of expressive programming languages, both exacerbates the aforementioned threats and introduces new ones: (1) users may overpay for unused resources, and (2) scheduler revenue is harmed when reserved scheduling slots go unused due to contingency. We introduce a framework for this challenging setting, and prove an impossibility, highlighting an inherent tension: both parallelism and contingency involve a trade-off between minimizing risks for users and schedulers, as favoring one comes at the expense of the other. To complete the picture, we introduce a fee mechanisms and prove that they achieve the boundaries of this trade-off. Our results provide rigorous foundations for evaluating designs advanced by notable blockchains, such as Sui and Monad.

cs.CR↗

Optimistic, Signature-Free Reliable Broadcast and Its Applications

Reliable broadcast (RBC) is a key primitive in fault-tolerant distributed systems, and improving its efficiency can benefit a wide range of applications. This work focuses on signature-free RBC protocols, which are particularly attractive due to their computational efficiency. Existing protocols in this setting incur an optimal 3 steps to reach a decision while tolerating up to $f < n/3$ Byzantine faults, where $n$ is the number of parties. In this work, we propose an optimistic RBC protocol that maintains the $f < n/3$ fault tolerance but achieves termination in just 2 steps under certain optimistic conditions--when at least $\lceil \frac{n+2f-2}{2} \rceil$ non-broadcaster parties behave honestly. We also prove a matching lower bound on the number of honest parties required for 2-step termination. We show that our latency-reduction technique generalizes beyond RBC and applies to other primitives such as asynchronous verifiable secret sharing (AVSS) and asynchronous verifiable information dispersal (AVID), enabling them to complete in 2 steps under similar optimistic conditions. To highlight the practical impact of our RBC protocol, we integrate it into Sailfish++, a new signature-free, post-quantum secure DAG-based Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus protocol. Under optimistic conditions, this protocol achieves a commit latency of 3 steps--matching the performance of the best signature-based protocols. Our experimental evaluation shows that our protocol significantly outperforms existing post-quantum secure and signature-based protocols, even on machines with limited CPU resources. In contrast, signature-based protocols require high CPU capacity to achieve comparable performance. We have open-sourced our Rust implementation of Sailfish++ to facilitate reproducible results.

cs.DC↗

Boost+: Equitable, Incentive-Compatible Block Building

Block space on the blockchain is scarce and must be allocated efficiently through block building. However, Ethereum's current block-building ecosystem, MEV-Boost, has become highly centralized due to integration, which distorts competition, reduces blockspace efficiency, and obscures MEV flow transparency. To guarantee equitability and economic efficiency in block building, we propose $\mathrm{Boost+}$, a system that decouples the process into collecting and ordering transactions, and ensures equal access to all collected transactions. The core of $\mathrm{Boost+}$ is the mechanism $\mathit{M}_{\mathrm{Boost+}}$, built around a default algorithm. $\mathit{M}_{\mathrm{Boost+}}$ aligns incentives for both searchers (intermediaries that generate or route transactions) and builders: Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all builders. For searchers, truthful reporting is dominant whenever the default algorithm dominates competing builders, and it remains dominant for all conflict-free transactions, even when builders may win. We further show that even if a searcher can technically integrate with a builder, non-integration combined with truthful bidding still dominates any deviation for conflict-free transactions. We also implement a concrete default algorithm informed by empirical analysis of real-world transactions and evaluate its efficacy using historical transaction data.

cs.CR↗

QScale: Probabilistic Chained Consensus for Moderate-Scale Systems

Existing distributed ledger protocols either incur a high communication complexity and are thus suited to systems with a small number of processes (e.g., PBFT), or rely on committee-sampling-based approaches that only work for a very large number of processes (e.g., Algorand). Neither of these lines of work is well-suited for moderate-scale distributed ledgers ranging from a few hundred to a thousand processes, which are common in production (e.g, Redbelly, Sui). The goal of this work is to design a distributed ledger with sub-linear communication complexity per process, sub-quadratic total communication complexity, and low latency for finalizing a block into the ledger, such that it can be used for moderate-scale systems. We propose QScale, a protocol in which every process incurs only $\widetilde{O}(κ\sqrt{n})$ communication complexity per-block in expectation, $\widetilde{O}(nκ)$ total communication complexity per-block in expectation, and a best-case latency of $O(κ)$ rounds while ensuring safety and liveness with overwhelming probability, with $κ$ being a small security parameter.

cs.DC↗

Decentralization of Ethereum's Builder Market

Blockchains protect an ecosystem worth more than $500bn with strong security properties derived from the principle of decentralization. Is today's blockchain decentralized? In this paper, we empirically studied one of the least decentralized parts of Ethereum, its builder market. The builder market was introduced to fairly distribute Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) among validators and avoid validator centralization. As of the time of writing, two builders produced more than 85% of blocks in Ethereum, creating a concerning centralization factor. However, a common belief is that such centralization "is okay," arguing that builder centralization will not lead to validator centralization. In this empirical study, we quantify the significant proposer losses within the centralized builder market and challenge the belief that this is acceptable. The significant proposer losses, if left uncontrolled, could undermine the goal of PBS. Moreover, MEV mitigation solutions slated for adoption are affected too because they rely on the builder market as an "MEV oracle," which is made inaccurate by centralization. Our investigation reveals the incentive issue within the current MEV supply chain and its implications for builder centralization and proposer losses. Finally, we analyze why the proposed mitigation cannot work and highlight two properties essential for effective solutions.

cs.CR↗

Attacking and Improving the Tor Directory Protocol

The Tor network enhances clients' privacy by routing traffic through an overlay network of volunteered intermediate relays. Tor employs a distributed protocol among nine hard-coded Directory Authority (DA) servers to securely disseminate information about these relays to produce a new consensus document every hour. With a straightforward voting mechanism to ensure consistency, the protocol is expected to be secure even when a minority of those authorities get compromised. However, the current consensus protocol is flawed: it allows an equivocation attack that enables only a single compromised authority to create a valid consensus document with malicious relays. Importantly the vulnerability is not innocuous: We demonstrate that the compromised authority can effectively trick a targeted client into using the equivocated consensus document in an undetectable manner. Moreover, even if we have archived Tor consensus documents available since its beginning, we cannot be sure that no client was ever tricked. We propose a two-stage solution to deal with this exploit. In the short term, we have developed and deployed TorEq, a monitor to detect such exploits reactively: the Tor clients can refer to the monitor before updating the consensus to ensure no equivocation. To solve the problem proactively, we first define the Tor DA consensus problem as the interactive consistency (IC) problem from the distributed computing literature. We then design DirCast, a novel secure Byzantine Broadcast protocol that requires minimal code change from the current Tor DA code base. Our protocol has near-optimal efficiency that uses optimistically five rounds and at most nine rounds to reach an agreement in the current nine-authority system. We are communicating with the Tor security team to incorporate the solutions into the Tor project.

cs.CR↗

Granular Synchrony

Today's mainstream network timing models for distributed computing are synchrony, partial synchrony, and asynchrony. These models are coarse-grained and often make either too strong or too weak assumptions about the network. This paper introduces a new timing model called granular synchrony that models the network as a mixture of synchronous, partially synchronous, and asynchronous communication links. The new model is not only theoretically interesting but also more representative of real-world networks. It also serves as a unifying framework where current mainstream models are its special cases. We present necessary and sufficient conditions for solving crash and Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus in granular synchrony. Interestingly, consensus among $n$ parties can be achieved against $f \geq n/2$ crash faults or $f \geq n/3$ Byzantine faults without resorting to full synchrony.

cs.DC↗

Lumiere: Making Optimal BFT for Partial Synchrony Practical

The view synchronization problem lies at the heart of many Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) State Machine Replication (SMR) protocols in the partial synchrony model, since these protocols are usually based on views. Liveness is guaranteed if honest processors spend a sufficiently long time in the same view during periods of synchrony, and if the leader of the view is honest. Ensuring that these conditions occur, known as Byzantine View Synchronization (BVS), has turned out to be the performance bottleneck of many BFT SMR protocols. A recent line of work has shown that, by using an appropriate view synchronization protocol, BFT SMR protocols can achieve $O(n^2)$ communication complexity in the worst case after GST, thereby finally matching the lower bound established by Dolev and Reischuk in 1985. However, these protocols suffer from two major issues: (1) When implemented so as to be optimistically responsive, even a single Byzantine processor may infinitely often cause $Ω(nΔ)$ latency between consecutive consensus decisions. (2) Even in the absence of Byzantine action, infinitely many views require honest processors to send $Ω(n^2)$ messages. Here, we present Lumiere, an optimistically responsive BVS protocol which maintains optimal worst-case communication complexity while simultaneously addressing the two issues above: for the first time, Lumiere enables BFT consensus solutions in the partial synchrony setting that have $O(n^2)$ worst-case communication complexity, and that eventually always (i.e., except for a small constant number of "warmup" decisions) have communication complexity and latency which is linear in the number of actual faults in the execution.

cs.DC↗

TrustBoost: Boosting Trust among Interoperable Blockchains

Currently there exist many blockchains with weak trust guarantees, limiting applications and participation. Existing solutions to boost the trust using a stronger blockchain, e.g., via checkpointing, requires the weaker blockchain to give up sovereignty. In this paper, we propose a family of protocols in which multiple blockchains interact to create a combined ledger with boosted trust. We show that even if several of the interacting blockchains cease to provide security guarantees, the combined ledger continues to be secure - our TrustBoost protocols achieve the optimal threshold of tolerating the insecure blockchains. This optimality, along with the necessity of blockchain interactions, is formally shown within the classic shared memory model, tackling the long standing open challenge of solving consensus in the presence of both Byzantine objects and processes. Furthermore, our proposed construction of TrustBoost simply operates via smart contracts and require no change to the underlying consensus protocols of the participating blockchains, a form of ``consensus on top of consensus''. The protocols are lightweight and can be used on specific (e.g., high value) transactions; we demonstrate the practicality by implementing and deploying TrustBoost as cross-chain smart contracts in the Cosmos ecosystem using approximately 3,000 lines of Rust code, made available as open source. Our evaluation shows that using 10 Cosmos chains in a local testnet, TrustBoost has a gas cost of roughly $2 with a latency of 2 minutes per request, which is in line with the cost on a high security chain such as Bitcoin or Ethereum

cs.CR↗

Empirical Analysis of EIP-1559: Transaction Fees, Waiting Time, and Consensus Security

A transaction fee mechanism (TFM) is an essential component of a blockchain protocol. However, a systematic evaluation of the real-world impact of TFMs is still absent. Using rich data from the Ethereum blockchain, the mempool, and exchanges, we study the effect of EIP-1559, one of the earliest-deployed TFMs that depart from the traditional first-price auction paradigm. We conduct a rigorous and comprehensive empirical study to examine its causal effect on blockchain transaction fee dynamics, transaction waiting times, and consensus security. Our results show that EIP-1559 improves the user experience by mitigating intrablock differences in the gas price paid and reducing users' waiting times. However, EIP-1559 has only a small effect on gas fee levels and consensus security. In addition, we find that when Ether's price is more volatile, the waiting time is significantly higher. We also verify that a larger block size increases the presence of siblings. These findings suggest new directions for improving TFMs.

econ.GN↗

Brief Note: Fast Authenticated Byzantine Consensus

Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) state machine replication (SMR) has been studied for over 30 years. Recently it has received more attention due to its application in permissioned blockchain systems. A sequence of research efforts focuses on improving the commit latency of the SMR protocol in the common good case, including PBFT with $3$-round latency and $n\geq 3f+1$ and FaB with $2$-round latency and $n\geq 5f+1$. In this paper, we propose an authenticated protocol that solves $2$-round BFT SMR with only $n\geq 5f-1$ replicas, which refutes the optimal resiliency claim made in FaB for needing $n \geq 5f+1$ for $2$-round PBFT-style BFT protocols. For the special case when $f=1$, our protocol needs only $4$ replicas, and strictly improves PBFT by reducing the latency by one round (even when one backup is faulty).

cs.DC↗

Good-case Latency of Byzantine Broadcast: A Complete Categorization

This paper explores the problem good-case latency of Byzantine fault-tolerant broadcast, motivated by the real-world latency and performance of practical state machine replication protocols. The good-case latency measures the time it takes for all non-faulty parties to commit when the designated broadcaster is non-faulty. We provide a complete characterization of tight bounds on good-case latency, in the authenticated setting under synchrony, partial synchrony and asynchrony. Some of our new results may be surprising, e.g., 2-round PBFT-style partially synchronous Byzantine broadcast is possible if and only if $n\geq 5f-1$, and a tight bound for good-case latency under $n/3<f<n/2$ under synchrony is not an integer multiple of the delay bound.

cs.DC↗

IncShrink: Architecting Efficient Outsourced Databases using Incremental MPC and Differential Privacy

In this paper, we consider secure outsourced growing databases that support view-based query answering. These databases allow untrusted servers to privately maintain a materialized view, such that they can use only the materialized view to process query requests instead of accessing the original data from which the view was derived. To tackle this, we devise a novel view-based secure outsourced growing database framework, Incshrink. The key features of this solution are: (i) Incshrink maintains the view using incremental MPC operators which eliminates the need for a trusted third party upfront, and (ii) to ensure high performance, Incshrink guarantees that the leakage satisfies DP in the presence of updates. To the best of our knowledge, there are no existing systems that have these properties. We demonstrate Incshrink's practical feasibility in terms of efficiency and accuracy with extensive empirical evaluations on real-world datasets and the TPC-ds benchmark. The evaluation results show that Incshrink provides a 3-way trade-off in terms of privacy, accuracy, and efficiency guarantees, and offers at least a 7,800 times performance advantage over standard secure outsourced databases that do not support the view-based query paradigm.

cs.DB↗

BFT Protocol Forensics

Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols allow a group of replicas to come to a consensus even when some of the replicas are Byzantine faulty. There exist multiple BFT protocols to securely tolerate an optimal number of faults $t$ under different network settings. However, if the number of faults $f$ exceeds $t$ then security could be violated. In this paper we mathematically formalize the study of forensic support of BFT protocols: we aim to identify (with cryptographic integrity) as many of the malicious replicas as possible and in as a distributed manner as possible. Our main result is that forensic support of BFT protocols depends heavily on minor implementation details that do not affect the protocol's security or complexity. Focusing on popular BFT protocols (PBFT, HotStuff, Algorand) we exactly characterize their forensic support, showing that there exist minor variants of each protocol for which the forensic supports vary widely. We show strong forensic support capability of LibraBFT, the consensus protocol of Diem cryptocurrency; our lightweight forensic module implemented on a Diem client is open-sourced and is under active consideration for deployment in Diem. Finally, we show that all secure BFT protocols designed for $2t+1$ replicas communicating over a synchronous network forensic support are inherently nonexistent; this impossibility result holds for all BFT protocols and even if one has access to the states of all replicas (including Byzantine ones).

cs.CR↗

Classifying Trusted Hardware via Unidirectional Communication

It is well known that Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) consensus cannot be solved in the classic asynchronous message passing model when one-third or more of the processes may be faulty. Since many modern applications require higher fault tolerance, this bound has been circumvented by introducing non-equivocation mechanisms that prevent Byzantine processes from sending conflicting messages to other processes. The use of trusted hardware is a way to implement non-equivocation. Several different trusted hardware modules have been considered in the literature. In this paper, we study whether all trusted hardware modules are equivalent in the power that they provide to a system. We show that while they do all prevent equivocation, we can partition trusted hardware modules into two different power classes; those that employ shared memory primitives, and those that do not. We separate these classes using a new notion we call unidirectionality, which describes a useful guarantee on the ability of processes to prevent network partitions. We show that shared-memory based hardware primitives provide unidirectionality, while others do not.

cs.DC↗

Bucket Oblivious Sort: An Extremely Simple Oblivious Sort

We propose a conceptually simple oblivious sort and oblivious random permutation algorithms called bucket oblivious sort and bucket oblivious random permutation. Bucket oblivious sort uses $6n\log n$ time (measured by the number of memory accesses) and $2Z$ client storage with an error probability exponentially small in $Z$. The above runtime is only $3\times$ slower than a non-oblivious merge sort baseline; for $2^{30}$ elements, it is $5\times$ faster than bitonic sort, the de facto oblivious sorting algorithm in practical implementations.

cs.DS↗