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Katerina Sotiraki

Publications and source records attributed to Katerina Sotiraki.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

Certified but Private: Scalable Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Neural Network Guarantees

With the growing deployment of machine learning models, formal guarantees of the robustness and fairness of these models have become increasingly important in safety-critical and legal-compliance settings. However, model parameters are often commercial secrets that cannot be disclosed to auditors or end users. To this end, we present PANDA, a scalable system that uses zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to prove the robustness and fairness properties of a model without revealing its private parameters. PANDA is built on top of CROWN, an efficient robustness certification framework that is used in many state-of-the-art formal verification tools for neural networks. The core contribution of PANDA is a novel algorithm for proving linear relaxation bounds for non-linear activation layers, yielding simple, lightweight proofs. Remarkably, our system can generate proofs of local robustness for neural networks with more than 2.9M parameters in 5 minutes, and can verify them in 10 seconds. Prior ZKP-based robustness system rely on exponential-time algorithms that cannot scale to nontrivial networks. In contrast, PANDA scales polynomially in the number of neurons in a network, allowing us to support neural networks 4 orders of magnitude larger than previous approaches with significantly reduced prover overhead.

cs.LG↗

Maverick: Private and Verifiable LLM Inference Made Practical via Matrix-Vector Multiplication Delegation

Open-source large language models (LLMs) are increasingly competitive with closed-source models while offering transparency and the ability to run inference without exposing user inputs to a service provider. However, running large-scale models locally requires substantial computational resources. In practice, users may still resort to a third-party provider, giving rise to privacy and correctness concerns. Existing solutions that address these problems often impose substantial server overhead or introduce additional trust assumptions. In this paper, we present Maverick, a novel approach to private and verifiable LLM inference based on a protocol for delegating matrix-vector multiplication, a dominant operation in LLMs. At its core, Maverick provides, to our knowledge, the first information-theoretically sound verification protocol for matrix-vector multiplication delegation with transparent preprocessing, efficient (batch) verification, and virtually no server overhead. We combine this verification primitive with LPN-based pseudorandom masking to provide input privacy. We implement our matrix-vector delegation primitive and use it to build an end-to-end prototype of Maverick, which we evaluate on Qwen3-4B by measuring throughput in tokens per second. We evaluate client configurations with 1-8 threads. With one client thread and a CPU server using up to 128 threads, Maverick achieves throughput gains over local inference of up to 17x when privacy masks are generated online, 45x when they are precomputed, and 44x when only verification is required. With four client threads, the corresponding gains are 13x, 18x, and 17x. When server computation is no longer the bottleneck, client-side microbenchmarks with simulated network delay show speedups of 12x-20x, 34x-135x, and 38x-157x.

cs.CR↗

Injecting Undetectable Backdoors in Obfuscated Neural Networks and Language Models

As ML models become increasingly complex and integral to high-stakes domains such as finance and healthcare, they also become more susceptible to sophisticated adversarial attacks. We investigate the threat posed by undetectable backdoors, as defined in Goldwasser et al. (FOCS '22), in models developed by insidious external expert firms. When such backdoors exist, they allow the designer of the model to sell information on how to slightly perturb their input to change the outcome of the model. We develop a general strategy to plant backdoors to obfuscated neural networks, that satisfy the security properties of the celebrated notion of indistinguishability obfuscation. Applying obfuscation before releasing neural networks is a strategy that is well motivated to protect sensitive information of the external expert firm. Our method to plant backdoors ensures that even if the weights and architecture of the obfuscated model are accessible, the existence of the backdoor is still undetectable. Finally, we introduce the notion of undetectable backdoors to language models and extend our neural network backdoor attacks to such models based on the existence of steganographic functions.

cs.LG↗

Consensus-Halving: Does It Ever Get Easier?

In the $\varepsilon$-Consensus-Halving problem, a fundamental problem in fair division, there are $n$ agents with valuations over the interval $[0,1]$, and the goal is to divide the interval into pieces and assign a label "$+$" or "$-$" to each piece, such that every agent values the total amount of "$+$" and the total amount of "$-$" almost equally. The problem was recently proven by Filos-Ratsikas and Goldberg [2019] to be the first "natural" complete problem for the computational class PPA, answering a decade-old open question. In this paper, we examine the extent to which the problem becomes easy to solve, if one restricts the class of valuation functions. To this end, we provide the following contributions. First, we obtain a strengthening of the PPA-hardness result of [Filos-Ratsikas and Goldberg, 2019], to the case when agents have piecewise uniform valuations with only two blocks. We obtain this result via a new reduction, which is in fact conceptually much simpler than the corresponding one in [Filos-Ratsikas and Goldberg, 2019]. Then, we consider the case of single-block (uniform) valuations and provide a parameterized polynomial time algorithm for solving $\varepsilon$-Consensus-Halving for any $\varepsilon$, as well as a polynomial-time algorithm for $\varepsilon=1/2$. Finally, an important application of our new techniques is the first hardness result for a generalization of Consensus-Halving, the Consensus-$1/k$-Division problem [Simmons and Su, 2003]. In particular, we prove that $\varepsilon$-Consensus-$1/3$-Division is PPAD-hard.

cs.CC↗

A Topological Characterization of Modulo-$p$ Arguments and Implications for Necklace Splitting

The classes PPA-$p$ have attracted attention lately, because they are the main candidates for capturing the complexity of Necklace Splitting with $p$ thieves, for prime $p$. However, these classes were not known to have complete problems of a topological nature, which impedes any progress towards settling the complexity of the Necklace Splitting problem. On the contrary, topological problems have been pivotal in obtaining completeness results for PPAD and PPA, such as the PPAD-completeness of finding a Nash equilibrium [Daskalakis et al., 2009, Chen et al., 2009b] and the PPA-completeness of Necklace Splitting with 2 thieves [Filos-Ratsikas and Goldberg, 2019]. In this paper, we provide the first topological characterization of the classes PPA-$p$. First, we show that the computational problem associated with a simple generalization of Tucker's Lemma, termed $p$-polygon-Tucker, as well as the associated Borsuk-Ulam-type theorem, $p$-polygon-Borsuk-Ulam, are PPA-$p$-complete. Then, we show that the computational version of the well-known BSS Theorem [Barany et al., 1981], as well as the associated BSS-Tucker problem are PPA-$p$-complete. Finally, using a different generalization of Tucker's Lemma (termed $\mathbb{Z}_p$-star-Tucker), which we prove to be PPA-$p$-complete, we prove that $p$-thief Necklace Splitting is in PPA-$p$. This latter result gives a new combinatorial proof for the Necklace Splitting theorem, the only proof of this nature other than that of Meunier [2014]. All of our containment results are obtained through a new combinatorial proof for $\mathbb{Z}_p$-versions of Tucker's lemma that is a natural generalization of the standard combinatorial proof of Tucker's lemma by Freund and Todd [1981]. We believe that this new proof technique is of independent interest.

cs.CC↗

On the Complexity of Modulo-q Arguments and the Chevalley-Warning Theorem

We study the search problem class $\mathrm{PPA}_q$ defined as a modulo-$q$ analog of the well-known $\textit{polynomial parity argument}$ class $\mathrm{PPA}$ introduced by Papadimitriou '94. Our first result shows that this class can be characterized in terms of $\mathrm{PPA}_p$ for prime $p$. Our main result is to establish that an $\textit{explicit}$ version of a search problem associated to the Chevalley--Warning theorem is complete for $\mathrm{PPA}_p$ for prime $p$. This problem is $\textit{natural}$ in that it does not explicitly involve circuits as part of the input. It is the first such complete problem for $\mathrm{PPA}_p$ when $p \ge 3$. Finally we discuss connections between Chevalley-Warning theorem and the well-studied $\textit{short integer solution}$ problem and survey the structural properties of $\mathrm{PPA}_q$.

cs.CC↗

PPP-Completeness with Connections to Cryptography

Polynomial Pigeonhole Principle (PPP) is an important subclass of TFNP with profound connections to the complexity of the fundamental cryptographic primitives: collision-resistant hash functions and one-way permutations. In contrast to most of the other subclasses of TFNP, no complete problem is known for PPP. Our work identifies the first PPP-complete problem without any circuit or Turing Machine given explicitly in the input, and thus we answer a longstanding open question from [Papadimitriou1994]. Specifically, we show that constrained-SIS (cSIS), a generalized version of the well-known Short Integer Solution problem (SIS) from lattice-based cryptography, is PPP-complete. In order to give intuition behind our reduction for constrained-SIS, we identify another PPP-complete problem with a circuit in the input but closely related to lattice problems. We call this problem BLICHFELDT and it is the computational problem associated with Blichfeldt's fundamental theorem in the theory of lattices. Building on the inherent connection of PPP with collision-resistant hash functions, we use our completeness result to construct the first natural hash function family that captures the hardness of all collision-resistant hash functions in a worst-case sense, i.e. it is natural and universal in the worst-case. The close resemblance of our hash function family with SIS, leads us to the first candidate collision-resistant hash function that is both natural and universal in an average-case sense. Finally, our results enrich our understanding of the connections between PPP, lattice problems and other concrete cryptographic assumptions, such as the discrete logarithm problem over general groups.

cs.CC↗