Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Katherine Betz

Publications and source records attributed to Katherine Betz.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Inaccessibility in public transit networks: A study of the London and New York City subway networks

The study of networks derived from infrastructure systems has received considerable attention, yet the accessibility of such systems, remains comparatively underexplored. This study examines infrastructure-based accessibility in two major legacy transit systems, the London Underground and the New York City Subway. We construct accessibility-restricted subnetworks in which nodes represent accessible stations and edges represent connections between them, and compare them with the corresponding full transit networks. We analyze the cyclomatic number, betweenness, and closeness centrality to identify key accessible hubs and differences in network organization. London has a larger share of accessible stations, and its accessible network retains more of the alternative routes of its full network, whereas New York City has a more compact accessible core concentrated around central Manhattan and major interchanges. Comparing the observed accessible stations with random sets of the same size, we find that in London they have higher betweenness centrality than random allocations, but more of their stations are beyond two stops of an accessible station, consistent with accessibility concentration at major interchanges and along fully step-free lines. In New York City, their higher betweenness centrality is fully explained by their concentration at interchanges, and their coverage is similar to that of random allocations. We also examine income and daytime activity around accessible stations. In both systems, several of the most central accessible stations are in high-activity locations, whereas accessible stations show no consistent relationship with median income. Our findings highlight substantial differences in accessibility between and within the two systems and demonstrate the utility of network-theoretic methods for understanding and improving transit infrastructure.

cs.SI↗

Evolutionary games on networks with negative edge-based environmental feedback

Environmental feedback can fundamentally alter the game payoff structure underlying the evolution of cooperation. How feedback-evolving games interact with population structure under non-weak selection remains incompletely understood. We study an evolutionary game on networks in which each edge has a binary environmental state that determines the payoff matrix used by the two connected individuals. By assumption, cooperation tends to improve the local environment, which in turn favors defection, thereby creating negative feedback between strategies coupled with the environmental condition. We analyze the model under strong selection using a mean-field approximation, a pair approximation that tracks both strategy pairs and edge environments, and agent-based simulations. In well-mixed populations, the feedback can generate bistability between full cooperation and full defection, as well as sustained oscillations arising through a Hopf bifurcation. Sparse networks (i.e., with low nodes' degrees) can eliminate bistability, suppress oscillations, and produce stable intermediate levels of cooperation. The pair approximation captures these effects and generally agrees more closely with simulations on sparse networks than the mean-field approximation. Our results show that edge-based environmental feedback and network structure, such as density of edges, interact to determine whether the fraction of cooperators stabilizes or oscillates over time.

physics.soc-ph↗

Evolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback in a network with two communities

Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying population dynamics in various manners. We propose and analyze an eco-evolutionary game dynamics model on a network with two communities such that players interact with other players in the same community and those in the opposite community at different rates. In our model, we consider two-person matrix games with pairwise interactions occurring on individual edges and assume that the environmental state depends on edges rather than on nodes or being globally shared in the population. We analytically determine the equilibria and their stability under a symmetric population structure assumption, and we also numerically study the replicator dynamics of the general model. The model shows rich dynamical behavior, such as multiple transcritical bifurcations, multistability, and anti-synchronous oscillations. Our work offers insights into understanding how the presence of community structure impacts the eco-evolutionary dynamics within and between niches.

physics.soc-ph↗