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Katherine J. Strandburg

Publications and source records attributed to Katherine J. Strandburg.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Algorithmic Opacity as a Principal-Agent Problem

Concerns about gaming and trade secrecy, frequently invoked to justify algorithmic opacity, can also mask self-serving strategic behavior by decision-makers, who may prioritize private benefits over social welfare. We develop a principal-agent test for when algorithmic decision-making should trigger disclosure obligations even when concerns about gaming or trade secrecy exist. The test, which is anchored in decision quality, relies on two diagnostics that can be disclosed without enabling gaming or revealing trade secrets: the error profile (false positive and false negative rates, overall and for each group) and the distribution of decision outcomes across groups. These diagnostics make visible whether decision-makers align design and implementation with the public interest or instead use opacity to obscure bias, inefficiency, or strategic shirking. Strong disparities across social groups, and asymmetries in the distribution of decision errors across outcome types, should trigger rebuttable presumptions favoring further disclosure. Where ground-truth error rates are unavailable, outcome distributions across groups can support the same presumption, and a decision-maker's inability to produce an error profile is itself diagnostic. The test thus treats fairness metrics as triggers for further disclosure and extends to generative and agentic systems through analogous metrics. The framework informs differentiated disclosure regimes (staged, partial, mediated, or audience-segmented). Once such regimes are considered, the domain of justifiable algorithmic opacity is significantly narrower than commonly assumed: when gaming or trade secrecy risks are legitimate, actionable disclosures (such as training data characteristics and key system design parameters) ordinarily can be mandated without compromising innovation or enabling gaming, even for technically inscrutable algorithms.

cs.CY↗

Taxonomizing Synthetic Data for Law

Synthetic data is increasingly important in data usage and AI design, creating novel legal and policy dilemmas. All too often, discussions of synthetic data treat it as entirely distinct from "real," collected data, overlooking the risks posed by different kinds and uses of synthetic data. We build on Michal Gal and Orla Lynskey's argument that synthetic data will transform information privacy, market competition, and data quality. While the risks posed by synthetic data depend on its connection to collected data, we argue that background knowledge and assumptions about ground truth used to create it are at least as important. We bring that focus to Gal and Lynskey's taxonomy of synthetic data, arguing that this focus is essential to grasp synthetic data's legal and policy implications. As such, we divide synthetic data into (1) transformed data, which modifies collected data to preserve certain statistical properties for an end use; (2) augmented data, which relies on assumptions to bolster a collected dataset's fidelity to the ground truth; and (3) simulated data, which relies almost entirely on background knowledge and ground-truth assumptions. Applying this taxonomy, we show that no category of synthetic data prevents privacy harms from group-based inferences, that augmented and simulated data can amplify bias while making a dataset look more complete, and that synthetic data rarely lets smaller competitors overcome incumbents' data advantages. As policymakers weigh whether to incentivize, mandate, or discourage the use of synthetic data, they should consider the validity of the ground-truth assumptions used in producing that data.

cs.CY↗