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Katrina Ligett

Publications and source records attributed to Katrina Ligett.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

The Fast Mixing Mechanism for Differential Privacy

Randomized sketching is a central tool for compressing large-scale optimization problems while preserving accuracy. In particular, sketches that are based on structured matrices, such as the Hadamard matrix, can be applied efficiently and often yield solutions that approximate those of the original problem at much lower computational cost. In differential privacy (DP), Gaussian sketching has been used to solve DP linear regression, beginning with \citet{sheffet2017differentially, sheffet2019old} and later refined by \citet{lev2025gaussianmix, lev2026near}. However, although these methods achieve strong utility guarantees, they usually do not improve runtime over classical DP approaches. In this work, we introduce a new DP sketching mechanism based on fast transforms, which, in certain cases, matches the runtime of classical fast sketching methods. We prove state-of-the-art privacy guarantees for this mechanism and show that, in favorable regimes, they match those of the Gaussian sketch up to a constant factor. As an application, we combine this mechanism with recent sketch-based methods for DP linear regression to obtain a new algorithm with strong utility and improved runtime. We establish privacy and accuracy guarantees for this algorithm, yielding, to the best of our knowledge, the first fast method for DP ordinary least squares.

cs.LG

Fair Decisions from Calibrated Scores: Achieving Optimal Classification While Satisfying Sufficiency

Binary classification based on predicted probabilities (scores) is a fundamental task in supervised machine learning. While thresholding scores is Bayes-optimal in the unconstrained setting, using a single threshold generally violates statistical group fairness constraints. Under independence (statistical parity) and separation (equalized odds), such thresholding suffices when the scores already satisfy the corresponding criterion. However, this does not extend to sufficiency: even perfectly group-calibrated scores -- including true class probabilities -- violate predictive parity after thresholding. In this work, we present an exact solution for optimal binary (randomized) classification under sufficiency, assuming finite sets of group-calibrated scores. We provide a geometric characterization of the feasible pairs of positive predictive value (PPV) and false omission rate (FOR) achievable by such classifiers, and use it to derive a simple post-processing algorithm that attains the optimal classifier using only group-calibrated scores and group membership. Finally, since sufficiency and separation are generally incompatible, we identify the classifier that minimizes deviation from separation subject to sufficiency, and show that it can also be obtained by our algorithm, often achieving performance comparable to the optimum.

cs.LG

Near-Optimal Private Linear Regression via Iterative Hessian Mixing

We study differentially private ordinary least squares (DP-OLS) with bounded data $(X,Y)$ via sketching-based mechanisms. While Gaussian sketching approaches have been explored for DP-OLS \citep{sheffet2017differentially}, they are typically viewed as less competitive than the Adaptive Sufficient Statistics Perturbation (AdaSSP) method \citep{wang_adassp}, which directly perturbs the sufficient statistics $(X^{\top}X, X^{\top}Y)$. This method was shown to be close to information-theoretically optimal, while also exhibiting strong empirical performance. In this work, we propose the \emph{Iterative Hessian Mixing} (IHM), an algorithm that builds on Gaussian sketching approaches to DP-OLS and is inspired by the Iterative Hessian Sketch of \citet{pilanci_hessiansketch}. We prove that IHM is differentially private and provide utility guarantees in the form of excess empirical risk bounds. These bounds improve upon those of AdaSSP by removing a multiplicative factor that can be as large as the square root of the data dimension. The design of the IHM is based on new accuracy guarantees that we present for prior Gaussian sketching approaches for DP-OLS, which clarify when these methods are expected to perform well and how IHM circumvents their inherent limitations. We also conduct a rigorous empirical evaluation on a large suite of datasets, demonstrating that IHM consistently outperforms prior baselines, including AdaSSP.

cs.LG

Differentially Private Nonparametric Confidence Intervals Under Minimal Distributional Assumptions

We consider the problem of constructing differentially private nonparametric confidence intervals (CIs) for an arbitrary quantity using resampling. A growing body of work has adapted resampling ideas to the private setting, including private bootstrap methods \cite{brawner2018bootstrap, wang2025differentially,dette2025gaussian} and BLB-based subsample-and-aggregate approaches \cite{covington2025unbiased, chadha2024resampling}. However, existing methods typically rely on strong assumptions, such as asymptotic normality, or are tied to specific privacy mechanisms such as noise addition, and can be impractical in finite-sample regimes. We address these problems by introducing a simple, general framework that can convert any differentially private estimator satisfying mild conditions into a differentially private nonparametric CI for arbitrary target quantities. Our method repeatedly subsamples the data, applies the private estimator to each subset, and post-processes the resulting empirical CDF into a CI. The framework is black-box, and does not require a specific limiting distribution. We prove that the empirical CDF induced by our procedure converges to the sampling distribution of the private statistic, which implies that the resulting CI is asymptotically valid and tight, and provide heuristic guidance for choosing the hyperparameters. Empirically, our method outperforms competing general approaches, especially for non-smooth functionals and more challenging distributions.

cs.CR

How Well Can Differential Privacy Be Audited in One Run?

Recent methods for auditing the privacy of machine learning algorithms have improved computational efficiency by simultaneously intervening on multiple training examples in a single training run. Steinke et al. (2024) prove that one-run auditing indeed lower bounds the true privacy parameter of the audited algorithm, and give impressive empirical results. Their work leaves open the question of how precisely one-run auditing can uncover the true privacy parameter of an algorithm, and how that precision depends on the audited algorithm. In this work, we characterize the maximum achievable efficacy of one-run auditing and show that the key barrier to its efficacy is interference between the observable effects of different data elements. We present new conceptual approaches to minimize this barrier, towards improving the performance of one-run auditing of real machine learning algorithms.

cs.LG

Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025

Welcome to the eighth edition of the AI Index report. The 2025 Index is our most comprehensive to date and arrives at an important moment, as AI's influence across society, the economy, and global governance continues to intensify. New in this year's report are in-depth analyses of the evolving landscape of AI hardware, novel estimates of inference costs, and new analyses of AI publication and patenting trends. We also introduce fresh data on corporate adoption of responsible AI practices, along with expanded coverage of AI's growing role in science and medicine. Since its founding in 2017 as an offshoot of the One Hundred Year Study of Artificial Intelligence, the AI Index has been committed to equipping policymakers, journalists, executives, researchers, and the public with accurate, rigorously validated, and globally sourced data. Our mission has always been to help these stakeholders make better-informed decisions about the development and deployment of AI. In a world where AI is discussed everywhere - from boardrooms to kitchen tables - this mission has never been more essential. The AI Index continues to lead in tracking and interpreting the most critical trends shaping the field - from the shifting geopolitical landscape and the rapid evolution of underlying technologies, to AI's expanding role in business, policymaking, and public life. Longitudinal tracking remains at the heart of our mission. In a domain advancing at breakneck speed, the Index provides essential context - helping us understand where AI stands today, how it got here, and where it may be headed next. Recognized globally as one of the most authoritative resources on artificial intelligence, the AI Index has been cited in major media outlets such as The New York Times, Bloomberg, and The Guardian; referenced in hundreds of academic papers; and used by policymakers and government agencies around the world.

cs.AI

Incentives and Outcomes in Bug Bounties

Bug bounty programs have contributed significantly to security in technology firms in the last decade, but little is known about the role of reward incentives in producing useful outcomes. We analyze incentives and outcomes in Google's Vulnerability Rewards Program (VRP), one of the world's largest bug bounty programs. We analyze the responsiveness of the quality and quantity of bugs received to changes in payments, focusing on a change in Google's reward amounts posted in July, 2024, in which reward amounts increased by up to 200% for the highest impact tier. Our empirical results show an increase in the volume of high-value bugs received after the reward increase, for which we also compute elasticities. We further break down the sources of this increase between veteran researchers and new researchers, showing that the reward increase both redirected the attention of veteran researchers and attracted new top security researchers into the program.

cs.SE

The Gaussian Mixing Mechanism: Renyi Differential Privacy via Gaussian Sketches

Gaussian sketching, which consists of pre-multiplying the data with a random Gaussian matrix, is a widely used technique for multiple problems in data science and machine learning, with applications spanning computationally efficient optimization, coded computing, and federated learning. This operation also provides differential privacy guarantees due to its inherent randomness. In this work, we revisit this operation through the lens of Renyi Differential Privacy (RDP), providing a refined privacy analysis that yields significantly tighter bounds than prior results. We then demonstrate how this improved analysis leads to performance improvement in different linear regression settings, establishing theoretical utility guarantees. Empirically, our methods improve performance across multiple datasets and, in several cases, reduce runtime.

cs.LG

The Global AI Vibrancy Tool

This paper presents the latest version of the Global AI Vibrancy Tool (GVT), an interactive suite of visualizations designed to facilitate the comparison of AI vibrancy across 36 countries, using 42 indicators organized into 8 pillars. The tool offers customizable features that allow users to conduct in-depth country-level comparisons and longitudinal analyses of AI-related metrics, all based on publicly available data. By providing a transparent assessment of national progress in AI, it serves the diverse needs of policymakers, industry leaders, researchers, and the general public. Using weights for indicators and pillars developed by AI Index's panel of experts and combined into an index, the Global AI Vibrancy Ranking for 2023 places the United States first by a significant margin, followed by China and the United Kingdom. The ranking also highlights the rise of smaller nations such as Singapore when evaluated on both absolute and per capita bases. The tool offers three sub-indices for evaluating Global AI Vibrancy along different dimensions: the Innovation Index, the Economic Competitiveness Index, and the Policy, Governance, and Public Engagement Index.

cs.CY

Relying on the Metrics of Evaluated Agents

Online platforms and regulators face a continuing problem of designing effective evaluation metrics. While tools for collecting and processing data continue to progress, this has not addressed the problem of "unknown unknowns", or fundamental informational limitations on part of the evaluator. To guide the choice of metrics in the face of this informational problem, we turn to the evaluated agents themselves, who may have more information about how to measure their own outcomes. We model this interaction as an agency game, where we ask: "When does an agent have an incentive to reveal the observability of a metric to their evaluator?" We show that an agent will prefer to reveal metrics that differentiate the most difficult tasks from the rest, and conceal metrics that differentiate the easiest. We further show that the agent can prefer to reveal a metric "garbled" with noise over both fully concealing and fully revealing. This indicates an economic value to privacy that yields Pareto improvement for both the agent and evaluator. We demonstrate these findings on data from online rideshare platforms.

cs.GT

A New Analysis of Differential Privacy's Generalization Guarantees

We give a new proof of the "transfer theorem" underlying adaptive data analysis: that any mechanism for answering adaptively chosen statistical queries that is differentially private and sample-accurate is also accurate out-of-sample. Our new proof is elementary and gives structural insights that we expect will be useful elsewhere. We show: 1) that differential privacy ensures that the expectation of any query on the posterior distribution on datasets induced by the transcript of the interaction is close to its true value on the data distribution, and 2) sample accuracy on its own ensures that any query answer produced by the mechanism is close to its posterior expectation with high probability. This second claim follows from a thought experiment in which we imagine that the dataset is resampled from the posterior distribution after the mechanism has committed to its answers. The transfer theorem then follows by summing these two bounds, and in particular, avoids the "monitor argument" used to derive high probability bounds in prior work. An upshot of our new proof technique is that the concrete bounds we obtain are substantially better than the best previously known bounds, even though the improvements are in the constants, rather than the asymptotics (which are known to be tight). As we show, our new bounds outperform the naive "sample-splitting" baseline at dramatically smaller dataset sizes compared to the previous state of the art, bringing techniques from this literature closer to practicality.

cs.LG

Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2024

The 2024 Index is our most comprehensive to date and arrives at an important moment when AI's influence on society has never been more pronounced. This year, we have broadened our scope to more extensively cover essential trends such as technical advancements in AI, public perceptions of the technology, and the geopolitical dynamics surrounding its development. Featuring more original data than ever before, this edition introduces new estimates on AI training costs, detailed analyses of the responsible AI landscape, and an entirely new chapter dedicated to AI's impact on science and medicine. The AI Index report tracks, collates, distills, and visualizes data related to artificial intelligence (AI). Our mission is to provide unbiased, rigorously vetted, broadly sourced data in order for policymakers, researchers, executives, journalists, and the general public to develop a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the complex field of AI. The AI Index is recognized globally as one of the most credible and authoritative sources for data and insights on artificial intelligence. Previous editions have been cited in major newspapers, including the The New York Times, Bloomberg, and The Guardian, have amassed hundreds of academic citations, and been referenced by high-level policymakers in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, among other places. This year's edition surpasses all previous ones in size, scale, and scope, reflecting the growing significance that AI is coming to hold in all of our lives.

cs.AI

Generalization in the Face of Adaptivity: A Bayesian Perspective

Repeated use of a data sample via adaptively chosen queries can rapidly lead to overfitting, wherein the empirical evaluation of queries on the sample significantly deviates from their mean with respect to the underlying data distribution. It turns out that simple noise addition algorithms suffice to prevent this issue, and differential privacy-based analysis of these algorithms shows that they can handle an asymptotically optimal number of queries. However, differential privacy's worst-case nature entails scaling such noise to the range of the queries even for highly-concentrated queries, or introducing more complex algorithms. In this paper, we prove that straightforward noise-addition algorithms already provide variance-dependent guarantees that also extend to unbounded queries. This improvement stems from a novel characterization that illuminates the core problem of adaptive data analysis. We show that the harm of adaptivity results from the covariance between the new query and a Bayes factor-based measure of how much information about the data sample was encoded in the responses given to past queries. We then leverage this characterization to introduce a new data-dependent stability notion that can bound this covariance.

cs.LG

Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2023

Welcome to the sixth edition of the AI Index Report. This year, the report introduces more original data than any previous edition, including a new chapter on AI public opinion, a more thorough technical performance chapter, original analysis about large language and multimodal models, detailed trends in global AI legislation records, a study of the environmental impact of AI systems, and more. The AI Index Report tracks, collates, distills, and visualizes data related to artificial intelligence. Our mission is to provide unbiased, rigorously vetted, broadly sourced data in order for policymakers, researchers, executives, journalists, and the general public to develop a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the complex field of AI. The report aims to be the world's most credible and authoritative source for data and insights about AI.

cs.AI

Efficiency in Collective Decision-Making via Quadratic Transfers

Consider the following collective choice problem: a group of budget constrained agents must choose one of several alternatives. Is there a budget balanced mechanism that: i) does not depend on the specific characteristics of the group, ii) does not require unaffordable transfers, and iii) implements utilitarianism if the agents' preferences are quasilinear and their private information? We study the following procedure: every agent can express any intensity of support or opposition to each alternative, by transferring to the rest of the agents wealth equal to the square of the intensity expressed; and the outcome is determined by the sums of the expressed intensities. We prove that as the group grows large, in every equilibrium of this quadratic-transfers mechanism, each agent's transfer converges to zero, and the probability that the efficient outcome is chosen converges to one.

econ.TH

Gaming Helps! Learning from Strategic Interactions in Natural Dynamics

We consider an online regression setting in which individuals adapt to the regression model: arriving individuals are aware of the current model, and invest strategically in modifying their own features so as to improve the predicted score that the current model assigns to them. Such feature manipulation has been observed in various scenarios -- from credit assessment to school admissions -- posing a challenge for the learner. Surprisingly, we find that such strategic manipulations may in fact help the learner recover the meaningful variables -- that is, the features that, when changed, affect the true label (as opposed to non-meaningful features that have no effect). We show that even simple behavior on the learner's part allows her to simultaneously i) accurately recover the meaningful features, and ii) incentivize agents to invest in these meaningful features, providing incentives for improvement.

cs.LG

Equal Opportunity in Online Classification with Partial Feedback

We study an online classification problem with partial feedback in which individuals arrive one at a time from a fixed but unknown distribution, and must be classified as positive or negative. Our algorithm only observes the true label of an individual if they are given a positive classification. This setting captures many classification problems for which fairness is a concern: for example, in criminal recidivism prediction, recidivism is only observed if the inmate is released; in lending applications, loan repayment is only observed if the loan is granted. We require that our algorithms satisfy common statistical fairness constraints (such as equalizing false positive or negative rates -- introduced as "equal opportunity" in Hardt et al. (2016)) at every round, with respect to the underlying distribution. We give upper and lower bounds characterizing the cost of this constraint in terms of the regret rate (and show that it is mild), and give an oracle efficient algorithm that achieves the upper bound.

cs.LG

Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms

Motivated by the growing prominence of third-party data providers in online marketplaces, this paper studies the impact of the presence of third-party data providers on mechanism design. When no data provider is present, it has been shown that simple mechanisms are "good enough" -- they can achieve a constant fraction of the revenue of optimal mechanisms. The results in this paper demonstrate that this is no longer true in the presence of a third-party data provider who can provide the bidder with a signal that is correlated with the item type. Specifically, even with a single seller, a single bidder, and a single item of uncertain type for sale, the strategies of pricing each item-type separately (the analog of item pricing for multi-item auctions) and bundling all item-types under a single price (the analog of grand bundling) can both simultaneously be a logarithmic factor worse than the optimal revenue. Further, in the presence of a data provider, item-type partitioning mechanisms---a more general class of mechanisms which divide item-types into disjoint groups and offer prices for each group---still cannot achieve within a $\log \log$ factor of the optimal revenue. Thus, our results highlight that the presence of a data-provider forces the use of more complicated mechanisms in order to achieve a constant fraction of the optimal revenue.

cs.GT