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Kaya Alpturer

Publications and source records attributed to Kaya Alpturer.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

AetherWeave: Sybil-Resistant Robust Peer Discovery with Stake

Peer-discovery protocols within P2P networks are often vulnerable: because creating network identities is essentially free, adversaries can eclipse honest nodes or partition the overlay. This threat is especially acute for blockchains, whose security depends on resilient peer connectivity. We present AetherWeave, a stake-backed peer-discovery protocol that ties network participation to deposited stake, raising the cost of large-scale attacks. We prove that, with high probability, either the honest overlay remains connected or a $(1{-}δ)$-fraction of nodes in every smaller component raise an attack-detection flag -- even against a very powerful adversary. To our knowledge, AetherWeave is the first peer-discovery protocol to simultaneously provide Sybil resistance and privacy: nodes prove they hold valid stake without revealing which deposit they own, and gossiping does not expose peer-table contents. A cryptographic commitment scheme rate-limits discovery requests per round; exceeding the limit yields a publicly verifiable misbehavior proof that triggers on-chain slashing. Beyond deposit and slashing, the protocol requires no on-chain interaction, with per-node communication scaling as $O(s\sqrt{n})$. We validate our design through a mean-field analysis with closed-form convergence bounds, extensive adversarial simulations, and an end-to-end prototype built by forking Prysm, a leading Ethereum consensus client.

cs.CR

Optimality of Simultaneous Consensus with Limited Information Exchange (Extended Abstract)

Work on the development of optimal fault-tolerant Agreement protocols using the logic of knowledge has concentrated on the "full information" approach to information exchange, which is costly with respect to message size. Alpturer, Halpern, and van der Meyden (PODC 2023) introduced the notion of optimality with respect to a limited information exchange, and studied the Eventual Agreement problem in the sending omissions failure model. The present paper studies the Simultaneous Agreement problem for the crash failures model, and a number of limited information exchanges from the literature. In particular, the paper considers information exchanges from a FloodSet protocol (Lynch, Distributed Algorithms 1996), a variant of this in which agents also count the number of failures (Castañeda et al, NETYS 2017), and a variant in which agents associate each agent with a value (Raynal, PRDC 2002). A new information exchange is also introduced that enables decisions to be made at worst one round later than the optimal protocol of Dwork and Moses (I&C 88), but with lower computation cost and space requirements. By determining implementations of a knowledge based program, protocols are derived that are optimal amongst protocols for each of these information exchanges.

cs.DC

Timing Games in Responsive Consensus Protocols

Optimistic responsiveness -- the ability of a consensus protocol to operate at the speed of the network -- is widely used in consensus protocol design to optimize latency and throughput. However, blockchain applications incentivize validators to play timing games by strategically delaying their proposals, since increased block time correlates with greater rewards. Consequently, it may appear that responsiveness (even under optimistic conditions) is impossible in blockchain protocols. In this work, we develop a model of timing games in responsive consensus protocols and find a prisoner's dilemma structure, where cooperation (proposing promptly) is in the validators' best interest, but individual incentives encourage validators to delay proposals selfishly. To attain desirable equilibria, we introduce dynamic block rewards that decrease with round time to explicitly incentivize faster proposals. Delays are measured through a voting mechanism, where other validators vote on the current leader's round time. By carefully setting the protocol parameters, the voting mechanism allows validators to coordinate and reach the cooperative equilibrium, benefiting all through a higher rate-of-reward. Thus, instead of responsiveness being an unattainable property due to timing games, we show that responsiveness itself can promote faster block proposals. One consequence of moving from a static to dynamic block reward is that validator utilities become more sensitive to latency, worsening the gap between the best- and worst-connected validators. Our analysis shows, however, that this effect is minor in both theoretical latency models and simulations based on real-world networks.

cs.GT

Model Checking and Synthesis for Optimal Use of Knowledge in Consensus Protocols

Logics of knowledge and knowledge-based programs provide a way to give abstract descriptions of solutions to problems in fault-tolerant distributed computing, and have been used to derive optimal protocols for these problems with respect to a variety of failure models. Generally, these results have involved complex pencil and paper analyses with respect to the theoretical "full-information protocol" model of information exchange between network nodes. It is equally of interest to be able to establish the optimality of protocols using weaker, but more practical, models of information exchange, or else identify opportunities to improve their performance. Over the last 20 years, automated verification and synthesis tools for the logic of knowledge have been developed, such as the model checker MCK, that can be applied to this problem. This paper concerns the application of MCK to automated analyses of this kind. A number of information-exchange models are considered, for Simultaneous and Eventual variants of Byzantine Agreement under a range of failure types. MCK is used to automatically analyze these models. The results demonstrate that it is possible to automatically identify optimization opportunities, and to automatically synthesize optimal protocols. The paper provides performance measurements for the automated analysis, establishing a benchmark for epistemic model checking and synthesis tools.

cs.DC

Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum

It is well-known that RANDAO manipulation is possible in Ethereum if an adversary controls the proposers assigned to the last slots in an epoch. We provide a methodology to compute, for any fraction $α$ of stake owned by an adversary, the maximum fraction $f(α)$ of rounds that a strategic adversary can propose. We further implement our methodology and compute $f(\cdot)$ for all $α$. For example, we conclude that an optimal strategic participant with $5\%$ of the stake can propose a $5.048\%$ fraction of rounds, $10\%$ of the stake can propose a $10.19\%$ fraction of rounds, and $20\%$ of the stake can propose a $20.68\%$ fraction of rounds.

cs.GT

A Knowledge-Based Analysis of Intersection Protocols

The increasing wireless communication capabilities of vehicles creates opportunities for more efficient intersection management strategies. One promising approach is the replacement of traffic lights with a system wherein vehicles run protocols among themselves to determine right of way. In this paper, we define the intersection problem to model this scenario abstractly, without any assumptions on the specific structure of the intersection or a bound on the number of vehicles. Protocols solving the intersection problem must guarantee safety (no collisions) and liveness (every vehicle eventually goes through). In addition, we would like these protocols to satisfy various optimality criteria, some of which turn out to be achievable only in a subset of the contexts. In particular, we show a partial equivalence between eliminating unnecessary waiting, a criterion of interest in the distributed mutual-exclusion literature, and a notion of optimality that we define called lexicographical optimality. We then introduce a framework to design protocols for the intersection problem by converting an intersection policy, which is based on a global view of the intersection, to a protocol that can be run by the vehicles through the use of knowledge-based programs. Our protocols are shown to guarantee safety and liveness while also being optimal under sufficient conditions on the context. Finally, we investigate protocols in the presence of faulty vehicles that experience communication failures and older vehicles with limited communication capabilities. We show that intersection protocols can be made safe, live and optimal even in the presence of faulty behavior.

cs.DC

Optimal Eventual Byzantine Agreement Protocols with Omission Failures

Work on \emph{optimal} protocols for \emph{Eventual Byzantine Agreement} (EBA) -- protocols that, in a precise sense, decide as soon as possible in every run and guarantee that all nonfaulty agents decide on the same value -- has focused on emph{full-information protocols} (FIPs), where agents repeatedly send messages that completely describe their past observations to every other agent. While it can be shown that, without loss of generality, we can take an optimal protocol to be an FIP, full information exchange is impractical to implement for many applications due to the required message size. We separate protocols into two parts, the \emph{information-exchange protocol} and the \emph{action protocol}, so as to be able to examine the effects of more limited information exchange. We then define a notion of optimality with respect to an information-exchange protocol. Roughly speaking, an action protocol $P$ is optimal with respect to an information-exchange protocol $\mathcal{E}$ if, with $P$, agents decide as soon as possible among action protocols that exchange information according to $\mathcal{E}$. We present a knowledge-based EBA program for omission failures all of whose implementations are guaranteed to be correct and are optimal if the information exchange satisfies a certain safety condition. We then construct concrete programs that implement this knowledge-based program in two settings of interest that are shown to satisfy the safety condition. Finally, we show that a small modification of our program results in an FIP that is both optimal and efficiently implementable, settling an open problem posed by Halpern, Moses, and Waarts (SIAM J. Comput., 2001).

cs.DC