Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Kejiang Chen

Publications and source records attributed to Kejiang Chen.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

TrafficInstruct: A Multi-Task Network Traffic Dataset and Benchmark for Instruction Tuning

Instruction tuning for multi-task network traffic analysis requires data with clearly defined sources, supervision targets, and evaluation conditions. We introduce TrafficInstruct, a newly collected dataset comprising raw packet captures and 55,000 structured supervised fine-tuning records across ten tasks: malware traffic detection, botnet detection, malicious DNS-over-HTTPS detection, Web attack detection, advanced persistent threat detection, encrypted VPN detection, Tor behavior detection, encrypted application/service classification, website fingerprinting, and application classification under concept drift. An automated workflow captures traffic from controlled software executions, attack experiments, and application activities. Labels are supported by task-specific collection evidence, including process or socket attribution, activity records, and execution outcomes. Filtering, sanitization, and task-specific transformations produce instructions, traffic observations, and structured answers. We verify sample sources and partition the dataset by complete collection sessions, keeping all samples from the same session within one partition. The benchmark defines allowed inputs, deterministic label mappings, fixed training/validation/test partitions, and task-wise scoring rules. We evaluate majority-class, random-forest, and ET-BERT baselines, an unadapted 27B language model, and independently trained task-specific LoRA adapters on a shared frozen base. Adapters are selected using validation data and evaluated on the corresponding test sets. Task-specific adaptation improves classification performance, supporting instruction tuning across diverse traffic-analysis tasks.

cs.CR↗

Breadcrumbing Search Agents: Per-Turn Scheming Over Long-Horizon Trajectories

LLM-based search agents are widely used for information-seeking tasks, but their reliance on external tool returns introduces a critical security risk: web content retrieved during execution is untrusted, exposing agents to prompt injection and goal hijacking. Prior work on search-agent safety primarily focuses on static web-content injection, but modern agents issue follow-up queries and cross-check competing sources, so a single injected page is often diluted or rejected. We show that the channel delivering search and page observations is a fragile security boundary: beyond exposing the agent to a single poisoned page, a mediated search interface can repeatedly steer how the agent gathers evidence and forms its final answer. Under a constrained tool-intermediary threat model, appending only one controlled result per query can substantially increase attack success when the evidence is coordinated across the agent's trajectory. We study this setting with a strategy-driven long-horizon attack system and introduce Authority-Chain Hijack (ACH), an expert-refined strategy that turns isolated search-result and page-content manipulations into a coherent evidence chain across seemingly corroborating sources. ACH achieves the highest Overall ASR among all baselines, reaching 55.9% / 83.3% ASR / MaxN ASR on the full SafeSearch test split. We further introduce Trace-Guided Strategy Evolution (TGSE), which automatically improves attacker strategies from execution traces, replacing manual redesign with trace-driven refinement; its strongest single setting reaches 71.4% / 95.0% in held-out evaluation. Code is available at https://github.com/MBOSSLESS/Breadcrumbing-Search-Agents.

cs.CR↗

SpanGuard: Decoupling Instruction Localization from Authorization for Lightweight IPI Defense

LLM-based guardrails are effective against indirect prompt injection (IPI), but their performance depends heavily on model capability: as the guardrail model becomes smaller or weaker, detection degrades substantially. This raises a natural question: can we retain strong IPI defense while relying only on a small LLM? To understand why, we revisit what an LLM guardrail actually does. Detecting IPI requires simultaneously locating potentially injected instructions within heterogeneous tool outputs and judging whether they are authorized by the user's request. We find that the difficulty for small models arises largely from satisfying both requirements jointly, rather than from either subproblem alone. This suggests a different path to lightweight defense: explicitly decoupling localization from decision-making. In particular, localization needs no strong language-model reasoning, since injected instructions are often semantically discontinuous with their surrounding content and can be partitioned into local regions via lightweight unsupervised segmentation. Once the observation is partitioned this way, the remaining authorization check becomes a localized judgment that a small LLM can handle. Building on this insight, we design a lightweight IPI guardrail that performs attack-agnostic localization followed by block-level authorization judgment with a small language model. By separating where to look from what to decide, our approach substantially reduces the capability required of the guardrail model while preserving strong defense performance. Empirically, our guardrail achieves a 0.32% attack success rate with negligible loss in benign utility while remaining effective with substantially smaller models. These results show that strong IPI defense need not rely on strong LLMs when localization and decision-making are explicitly decoupled.

cs.CR↗

LoOPSD: On-Policy Self-Distillation with Looped Teachers

On-policy self-distillation improves a model using guidance from the model itself, but it still requires a teacher that provides more useful predictions than the student. Existing approaches obtain such guidance by giving the teacher additional context or instructions. We ask whether it can instead come from changing how the same model uses its own layers. To address this, we introduce LoOPSD, which searches over a model's layer execution order to construct a stronger teacher and distills its advantage into the student. Specifically, we keep the model weights unchanged while searching for layers to repeat, and use the resulting teacher's predictions on student-generated prefixes to guide learning. We then alternate search and distillation, rebuilding the teacher from the updated student in each round so that the student progressively absorbs the gains from alternative layer execution. Experiments on mathematical and logical reasoning tasks show improvements across models. On GSM8K with a 400-token thinking budget, LoOPSD raises Qwen3-1.7B accuracy from 42.30% to 79.61%; subsequent distillation rounds yield further gains beyond the first round. Together, these findings show that by searching layer execution to construct teachers, we can turn a model's additional computation into improved student capabilities, opening a new avenue for self-distillation to derive supervision from the model's own computation.

cs.LG↗

Ariadne's Thread of LipSync: Unraveling Forgeries via Inconsistency between Lip Motions and Head Poses

Recent advances in LipSync generation technology have led to the creation of highly realistic videos, posing severe societal risks. However, existing defense strategies struggle against LipSync forgeries, as advanced LipSync generation methods not only achieve better lip synchronization but also eliminate visual artifacts. An important reason is that they overlook an inherent biological coupling between lip movements and head poses in natural speech videos. In this paper, we propose LipDA, a novel framework for joint LipSync Detection and Attribution, which takes advantage of the inconsistency between head and lip. For detection, the framework learns to quantify this discrepancy by contrasting lip and pose features from authentic versus forged videos. For attribution, our method is designed to capture the unique temporal dynamics and audio-visual synchronization patterns that act as the fingerprint of models, enabling source tracing. We conduct extensive experiments on two challenging LipSync datasets as well as our own proposed large-scale and multi-generator dataset. LipDA achieves over 97\% AUC in detection and 97.5\% accuracy in model attribution, significantly outperforming existing methods. Code and the proposed LipSync-A dataset are available at https://github.com/AnsonShe/LipDA.

cs.CV↗

Controlling risks of AI in chemical science with agents

Artificial intelligence is rapidly advancing scientific discovery, but this progress carries risks of misuse, such as the creation of harmful substances, or circumvention of established regulations. In this paper, we first demonstrate the risks by highlighting real-world examples of AI misuse in chemical science, which underscore the need for effective safety alignment for these AI models. In response, we propose SciGuard, an agent-based guardrail that employs large language models, tools and external knowledge to assess and control risks in scientific AI interactions. For a fair comparison, we introduce a benchmark SciMT (Scientific Multi-Task) to assess both the safety and utility of different AI systems. SciGuard achieves a state-of-the-art harmlessness score on red-teaming queries, while maintaining high performance on benign tasks, without sacrificing scientific knowledge. Finally, we call for continued research and dialogue to ensure the safe deployment of AI in science.

cs.AI↗

Fingerprinting Multimodal Large Language Models

While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) enable a wide range of image-text reasoning tasks, recent incidents indicate that they are vulnerable to illicit deployment and unauthorized distillation. Existing solutions for model provenance are typically confounded by shared language backbones in MLLMs and struggle to detect violations of distillation. To bridge this gap and safeguard model ownership, we present the first study on multimodal model fingerprinting. Inspired by recent findings that self-attention acts as a low-pass filter and that its low-frequency components are informative, we develop AttnPrint for white-box provenance. Specifically, we extract cross-modal attention distributions and isolate their low-frequency components to serve as model fingerprints. To facilitate black-box auditing, we further introduce DistillTrace, which employs hypothesis testing of MLLM outputs to identify potential model infringement. We conduct extensive experiments on 154 model instances across 19 multimodal architectures. Notably, AttnPrint achieves strong derivative-model detection performance while remaining robust to five downstream modification techniques. DistillTrace also provides evidence of distillation relationships under three parameter-independent techniques.

cs.CR↗

PURA: Provably Unbiased and Robust Multi-Bit Watermarking for AI-Generated Text Attribution

Fine-grained attribution of AI-generated text is becoming increasingly important for accountability and auditing, yet existing multi-bit watermarking methods still struggle to simultaneously preserve the base generation distribution, support high-capacity payloads, and remain recoverable after editing. We present PURA, a provably unbiased and robust multi-bit watermarking method for text attribution. Instead of perturbing token probabilities directly, PURA embeds payloads in the latent sampling space via keyed inverse transform sampling, and recovers them by treating observed tokens as soft interval evidence and aggregating such evidence across the sequence. This design preserves the base generation distribution exactly while substantially improving recovery stability under post-editing and channel perturbations. Building on this recovery paradigm, we further develop a unified robustness analysis and show that, under bounded attack strength, the per-bit error probability decays exponentially with sequence length. Extensive experiments show that PURA substantially outperforms existing unbiased baselines in the high-payload regime. For example, when embedding 36 bits in 200 tokens, PURA achieves a 91.7\% message match rate, more than three times that of the strongest unbiased baseline, while preserving text quality and remaining statistically close to unwatermarked text, and incurring only millisecond-level verification overhead. Our code is available at

cs.CR↗

Beyond the Text: Verifying That Agent-Written Papers Are Backed by Their Artifacts

Large language model agents are increasingly capable of conducting research autonomously, producing research documents alongside the code and experiments that ostensibly support them. Yet whether the reported findings are consistently supported by corresponding implementations and execution evidence remains largely unexplored: existing review practices primarily assess textual quality and cannot reliably identify inconsistencies such as hard-coded metrics, unimplemented methods, or unsupported experimental results. We present ReAgent, an automated auditing framework for assessing the consistency between agent-generated research documents and their associated repositories. ReAgent constructs structured representations of scientific claims from research documents and uses them to guide repository analysis and evidence collection. Static auditing examines whether claimed methodologies, implementations, and experimental configurations are consistently reflected in the repository, while dynamic auditing executes relevant experiments and collects execution evidence to assess empirical findings. By combining static analysis with dynamic evidence, ReAgent identifies inconsistencies that may remain hidden under either perspective alone, such as experiments that reproduce reported numbers while deviating from the claimed methodology. The collected evidence and audit decisions are organized into a structured repository-level audit report, enabling transparent evidence traceability. We evaluate ReAgent on a manually curated benchmark of agent-generated research document--repository pairs and compare it against representative static and reproduction-based baselines. Experimental results demonstrate that ReAgent effectively identifies inconsistencies between reported research findings and their supporting repository evidence.

cs.CL↗

FARI: Robust One-Step Inversion for Watermarking in Diffusion Models

Inversion-based watermarking is a promising approach to authenticate diffusion-generated images, yet practical use is bottlenecked by inversion that is both slow and error-prone. While the primary challenge in the watermarking setting is robustness against external distortions, existing approaches over-optimize internal truncation error, and because that error scales with the sampler step size, they are inherently confined to high-NFE (number of function evaluations) regimes that cannot meet the dual demands of speed and robustness. In this work, we have two key observations: (i) the inversion trajectory has markedly lower curvature than the forward generation path does, making it highly compressible and amenable to low-NFE approximation; and (ii) in inversion for watermark verification, the trade-off between speed and truncation error is less critical, since external distortions dominate the error. A faster inverter provides a dual benefit: it is not only more efficient, but it also enables end-to-end adversarial training to directly target robustness, a task that is computationally prohibitive for the original, lengthy inversion trajectories. Building on this, we propose \textbf{FARI} (\textbf{F}ast \textbf{A}symmetric \textbf{R}obust \textbf{I}nversion), a one-step inversion framework paired with lightweight adversarial LoRA fine-tuning of the denoiser for watermark extraction. While consolidation slightly increases internal error, FARI delivers large gains in both speed and robustness: with approximately 20 minutes of fine-tuning on a single NVIDIA RTX A6000 GPU, it surpasses 50-step DDIM inversion on watermark-verification robustness while dramatically reducing inference time. Code and pretrained models are available at https://github.com/0xD009/FARI.

cs.CR↗

Between Safe Boundaries: Exploiting Temporal Consistency for Jailbreaking Text-To-Video Generation Models

Recently, text-to-video (T2V) models have been widely deployed, sparking growing concerns over their robustness against jailbreak attacks. Existing jailbreak methods, mostly adapted from text-to-image attacks, suffer notable drawbacks when applied to T2V systems. They fail to fully leverage temporal consistency, an inherent characteristic of video generation. Besides, these methods demand heavy video query optimization, which is infeasible in practical black-box scenarios. Their adversarial prompt search is also driven by heuristic local signals, lacking principled structured exploration strategies. To tackle these limitations, we propose BSB, a structured, query-efficient jailbreak framework for T2V models. BSB harnesses temporal consistency by encoding harmful intent as the transition between two individually harmless boundary states. Under this paradigm, the attack targets boundary-state pairs whose interpolation tends to produce unsafe intermediate frames during video generation. Directly evaluating all candidate pairs within the video space incurs prohibitive computation cost. Instead, BSB conducts Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) in a cheaper textual proxy space and regularly calibrates search outcomes with sparse video-level evaluations. We conduct comprehensive experiments on mainstream commercial T2V models including Veo 3.1, Sora 2, Seedance and Kling v1. Results show BSB surpasses all existing jailbreak baselines, delivering an average 18.6% relative gain in attack success rate over the strongest competitor across evaluated models. Our findings identify temporal consistency as an understudied yet vital attack surface for T2V models and verify that structured search facilitates effective vulnerability discovery under constrained query budgets.

cs.CR↗

DNA: Dual-stage Native Attribution for Generated Image Source Tracing

The rapid evolution of image generation has produced numerous within-family variants, making source-model attribution of suspect images increasingly important for digital forensics. Existing proactive methods rely on watermark embedding or model modification, which may degrade visual quality and limit deployment flexibility. Passive methods often rely on large-scale supervised training or a single reconstruction signal, limiting their ability to handle unknown sources and distinguish highly similar within-family variants. We observe that attribution signals in latent generative models are naturally stratified across architectural levels: VAE-level cues reflect family-shared information, whereas backbone-level cues capture variant-specific behaviors. Motivated by this insight, we propose Dual-stage Native Attribution (DNA), a coarse-to-fine framework that follows this hierarchy without additional neural-network training. The coarse-grained stage uses Autoencoder Double-Reconstruction (AEDR) for efficient open-set family-level screening. The fine-grained stage performs closed-set model-level attribution with Native Prediction Consistency (NPC), which compares native prediction errors of within-family variants across multiple noise levels under semantic conditioning and attributes the source via normalized calibrated scores. To enable systematic evaluation, we construct DNA-30K, a benchmark for within-family variant attribution under open-set family-level evaluation. It comprises 30,000 images generated by 24 candidate models across six families spanning both denoising diffusion and flow matching, plus non-candidate generated and natural images as unknown sources. Experiments show that DNA achieves 89.11% end-to-end attribution accuracy on a task where random guessing accuracy is below 1% and outperforms the strongest baseline by 33.81% even when AEDR is used as the coarse-grained stage.

cs.CV↗

BareWave: Waveform-Native Flow-Matching Text-to-Speech

Removing intermediate representations and separately trained decoding stages has become an important direction in generative modeling. In text-to-speech, however, high-quality systems are still commonly built through an intermediate acoustic representation before waveform synthesis. In this work, we present BareWave, a fully waveform-native framework for direct text-to-wave generation in flow-matching TTS. We consider this setting to raise three training challenges: raw-waveform modeling lacks a strong pretrained representational scaffold, different stages of training benefit from different noise schedules, and data-space perceptual objectives do not automatically share the temporal structure of the velocity-space flow objective. As a result, direct waveform training is hard to optimize efficiently, hard to push toward a strong final operating point with a fixed recipe, and hard to integrate effective perceptual refinement. Guided by this view, we develop a direct text-to-wave training framework that combines training-time representation alignment, staged noise scheduling, and velocity-aware perceptual alignment (VAPA), while preserving a single waveform-native inference path without pretrained components at test time. Experiments on zero-shot voice cloning show that strong intelligibility, speaker similarity, and naturalness can be achieved under a fully waveform-native inference path, supporting waveform-native flow-matching TTS as a practical direction. Project page with audio demos is available at https://barewave.github.io/.

eess.AS↗

Provably Secure Agent Guardrail

As large language models transition from bounded generative engines to agents with expansive execution privileges, AI going out of control precipitates a fundamental crisis in artificial intelligence security. Existing defense architectures heavily rely on empirical semantic guardrails and probabilistic large model adjudicators, mechanisms that fail to provide deterministic security lower bounds when facing complex semantic symbol decoupling attacks. To overcome this empirical semantic guardrail dilemma, this paper proposes a new security paradigm for agents based on the fundamental limitations of logical reasoning. Based on this paradigm, we further introduce an executable Proof-Constrained Action (ePCA) framework with a neural symbolic isolation architecture. This framework abandons semantic trust in natural language, forcing agents to losslessly formalize their intentions into first-order logical mathematical constraints before performing physical operations. Empirical evaluations of macroscopic and microscopic two-dimensional dynamic adversarial systems demonstrate that our formal verification mechanism achieves zero attack success rate and zero false positive rate across the evaluated scenarios, with extremely low computational latency. This research provides a conditional formal foundation under explicit system assumptions and an engineering paradigm for constructing the underlying defense foundation for future intelligent systems.

cs.AI↗

Membership Inference Attacks on Tokenizers of Large Language Models

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are widely used to assess the privacy risks associated with machine learning models. However, when these attacks are applied to pre-trained large language models (LLMs), they encounter significant challenges, including mislabeled samples, distribution shifts, and discrepancies in model size between experimental and real-world settings. To address these limitations, we introduce tokenizers as a new attack vector for membership inference. Specifically, a tokenizer converts raw text into tokens for LLMs. Unlike full models, tokenizers can be efficiently trained from scratch, thereby avoiding the aforementioned challenges. In addition, the tokenizer's training data is typically representative of the data used to pre-train LLMs. Despite these advantages, the potential of tokenizers as an attack vector remains unexplored. To this end, we present the first study on membership leakage through tokenizers and explore five attack methods to infer dataset membership. Extensive experiments on millions of Internet samples reveal the vulnerabilities in the tokenizers of state-of-the-art LLMs. To mitigate this emerging risk, we further propose an adaptive defense. Our findings highlight tokenizers as an overlooked yet critical privacy threat, underscoring the urgent need for privacy-preserving mechanisms specifically designed for them.

cs.CR↗

ReTokSync: Self-Synchronizing Tokenization Disambiguation for Generative Linguistic Steganography

Generative linguistic steganography (GLS) enables covert communication by embedding secret messages into the natural language generation process. In practical deployment, however, GLS is vulnerable to tokenization ambiguity: the same surface text may be re-tokenized into a different token sequence at the receiver, breaking the shared decoding state between the communicating parties so that a single local mismatch can propagate into complete extraction failure. Existing solutions either remove ambiguous tokens -- distorting the generation distribution and compromising security -- or preserve the distribution at the cost of substantially reduced embedding capacity or prohibitive runtime overhead. To address this issue, we propose ReTokSync (Re-Tokenization Synchronization), a self-synchronizing disambiguation framework that monitors the receiver-view tokenization during generation and triggers a corrective reset only when ambiguity actually occurs. By confining the effect of tokenization ambiguity to sparse residual bit errors rather than global desynchronization, ReTokSync leaves ambiguity-free positions entirely untouched and remains compatible with the underlying steganographic algorithm. Experiments on both English and Chinese settings show that ReTokSync stays closest to the steganographic baseline in distributional security (zero KL divergence), text quality, embedding capacity, and runtime, while achieving extraction accuracy above 99.7\%. Building on this property, we further develop a two-channel covert communication mechanism in which ReTokSync serves as the primary channel and a reliable auxiliary channel corrects the remaining errors, achieving 100\% end-to-end recovery across all evaluated configurations.

cs.CR↗

Revisiting Entropy Regularization: Adaptive Coefficient Unlocks Its Potential for LLM Reinforcement Learning

Reasoning ability has become a defining capability of Large Language Models (LLMs), with Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) emerging as a key paradigm to enhance it. However, RLVR training often suffers from policy entropy collapse, where the policy becomes overly deterministic, hindering exploration and limiting reasoning performance. While entropy regularization is a common remedy, its effectiveness is highly sensitive to the fixed coefficient, making it unstable across tasks and models. In this work, we revisit entropy regularization in RLVR and argue that its potential has been largely underestimated. Our analysis shows that (i) tasks of varying difficulty demand distinct exploration intensities, and (ii) balanced exploration may require the policy entropy to be maintained within a moderate range below its initial level. Therefore, we propose Adaptive Entropy Regularization (AER)--a framework that dynamically balances exploration and exploitation via three components: difficulty-aware coefficient allocation, initial-anchored target entropy, and dynamic global coefficient adjustment. Experiments on multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks show that AER consistently outperforms baselines, improving both reasoning accuracy and exploration capability.

cs.LG↗

Into the Gray Zone: Domain Contexts Can Blur LLM Safety Boundaries

A central goal of LLM alignment is to balance helpfulness with harmlessness, yet these objectives conflict when the same knowledge serves both legitimate and malicious purposes. This tension is amplified by context-sensitive alignment: we observe that domain-specific contexts (e.g., chemistry) selectively relax defenses for domain-relevant harmful knowledge, while safety-research contexts (e.g., jailbreak studies) trigger broader relaxation spanning all harm categories. To systematically exploit this vulnerability, we propose Jargon, a framework combining safety-research contexts with multi-turn adversarial interactions that achieves attack success rates exceeding 93% across seven frontier models, including GPT-5.2, Claude-4.5, and Gemini-3, substantially outperforming existing methods. Activation space analysis reveals that Jargon queries occupy an intermediate region between benign and harmful inputs, a gray zone where refusal decisions become unreliable. To mitigate this vulnerability, we design a policy-guided safeguard that steers models toward helpful yet harmless responses, and internalize this capability through alignment fine-tuning, reducing attack success rates while preserving helpfulness.

cs.CR↗