arXiv subjects

Kelechi G. Kalu

Publications and source records attributed to Kelechi G. Kalu.

11 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

ARMS: A Vision for Actor Reputation Metric Systems in the Open-Source Software Supply Chain

Many critical information technology and cyber-physical systems rely on a supply chain of open-source software projects. OSS project maintainers often integrate contributions from external actors. While maintainers can assess the correctness of a pull request, assessing a pull request's cybersecurity implications is challenging. To help maintainers make this decision, we propose that the open-source ecosystem should incorporate Actor Reputation Metrics (ARMS). This capability would enable OSS maintainers to assess a prospective contributor's cybersecurity reputation. To support the future instantiation of ARMS, we identify seven generic security signals from industry standards; map concrete metrics from prior work and available security tools, describe study designs to refine and assess the utility of ARMS, and finally weigh its pros and cons.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Why Johnny Adopts Identity-Based Software Signing: A Usability Case Study of Sigstore

Software signing is the most robust method for ensuring the integrity and authenticity of components in a software supply chain. Legacy key-managed signing tools (e.g., OpenPGP) burdened practitioners with key management and signer identification, creating both usability challenges and security risks. A new class of identity-based signing tools automate many of these concerns, but little is known about their usability and its effect on their adoption and effectiveness in practice. A usability evaluation can clarify the extent to which identity-based designs succeed and highlight priorities for improvement. To fill this gap, we conducted the first usability study of Sigstore, a pioneering and widely adopted exemplar of identity-based signing. Through interviews with 17 industry experts, we examined (1) the problems and advantages associated with practitioners' tooling choices, (2) how and why their signing-tool usage has evolved over time, and (3) the contexts that cause usability concerns. Our findings illuminate the usability factors of identity-based signing tools and yield recommendations for toolmakers, adopting organizations, and the research community. Notably, components of identity-based tooling exhibit different levels of maturity and readiness for adoption, and integration flexibility is a common pain point but potentially mitigable through plugins and APIs. Our results will help identity-based signing toolmakers further strengthen software supply chain security.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2026

A Longitudinal Study of Usability in Identity-Based Software Signing

Identity-based software signing tools aim to make software artifact provenance verifiable while reducing the operational burden of long-lived key management. However, there is limited cross-tool longitudinal evidence about which usability problems arise in practice and how those problems evolve as tools mature. This gap matters because unusable signing and verification workflows can lead to incomplete adoption, misconfiguration, or skipped verification, undermining intended integrity guarantees. We conducted the first mining-software-repositories study of five open-source identity-based signing ecosystems: Sigstore, OpenPubKey, HashiCorp Vault, Keyfactor, and Notary v2. We analyzed approximately 3,900 GitHub issues from Nov. 2021 to Nov. 2025. We coded each issue for the reported usability concern and the implicated architectural component, and compared patterns across tools and over time. Across ecosystems, reported concerns concentrate in verification workflows, policy and configuration surfaces, and integration boundaries. Longitudinal Poisson trend analysis shows substantial declines in reported issues for most ecosystems. However, across usability themes, workflow- and documentation-related concerns decline unevenly across tools and concern types, and verification workflows and configuration surfaces remain persistent friction points. These results indicate that identity-based signing reduces some usability burdens while relocating complexity to verification semantics, policy configuration, and deployment integration. Designing future signing ecosystems therefore requires treating verification semantics and release workflows as first-class usability targets rather than peripheral integration concerns.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2026

Operationalizing Research Software for Supply Chain Security

Empirical studies of research software are hard to compare because the literature operationalizes ``research software'' inconsistently. Motivated by the research software supply chain (RSSC) and its security risks, we introduce an RSSC-oriented taxonomy that makes scope and operational boundaries explicit for empirical research software security studies. We conduct a targeted scoping review of recent repository mining and dataset construction studies, extracting each work's definition, inclusion criteria, unit of analysis, and identification heuristics. We synthesize these into a harmonized taxonomy and a mapping that translates prior approaches into shared taxonomy dimensions. We operationalize the taxonomy on a large community-curated corpus from the Research Software Encyclopedia (RSE), producing an annotated dataset, a labeling codebook, and a reproducible labeling pipeline. Finally, we apply OpenSSF Scorecard as a preliminary security analysis to show how repository-centric security signals differ across taxonomy-defined clusters and why taxonomy-aware stratification is necessary for interpreting RSSC security measurements.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2025

How Do Agents Perform Code Optimization? An Empirical Study

Performance optimization is a critical yet challenging aspect of software development, often requiring a deep understanding of system behavior, algorithmic tradeoffs, and careful code modifications. Although recent advances in AI coding agents have accelerated code generation and bug fixing, little is known about how these agents perform on real-world performance optimization tasks. We present the first empirical study comparing agent- and human-authored performance optimization commits, analyzing 324 agent-generated and 83 human-authored PRs from the AIDev dataset across adoption, maintainability, optimization patterns, and validation practices. We find that AI-authored performance PRs are less likely to include explicit performance validation than human-authored PRs (45.7\% vs. 63.6\%, $p=0.007$). In addition, AI-authored PRs largely use the same optimization patterns as humans. We further discuss limitations and opportunities for advancing agentic code optimization.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2025

Why Software Signing (Still) Matters: Trust Boundaries in the Software Supply Chain

Software signing provides a formal mechanism for provenance by ensuring artifact integrity and verifying producer identity. It also imposes tooling and operational costs to implement in practice. In an era of centralized registries such as PyPI, npm, Maven Central, and Hugging Face, it is reasonable to ask whether hardening registry security controls obviates the need for end-to-end artifact signing. In this work, we posit that the core guarantees of signing, provenance, integrity, and accountability are not automatically carried across different software distribution boundaries. These boundaries include mirrors, corporate proxies, re-hosting, and air-gapped transfers, where registry security controls alone cannot provide sufficient assurance. We synthesize historical practice and present a trust model for modern distribution modes to identify when signing is necessary to extend trust beyond registry control. Treating signing as a baseline layer of defense strengthens software supply chain assurance even when registries are secure.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2025

An Industry Interview Study of Software Signing for Supply Chain Security

Many software products are composed of components integrated from other teams or external parties. Each additional link in a software product's supply chain increases the risk of the injection of malicious behavior. To improve supply chain provenance, many cybersecurity frameworks, standards, and regulations recommend the use of software signing. However, recent surveys and measurement studies have found that the adoption rate and quality of software signatures are low. We lack in-depth industry perspectives on the challenges and practices of software signing. To understand software signing in practice, we interviewed 18 experienced security practitioners across 13 organizations. We study the challenges that affect the effective implementation of software signing in practice. We also provide possible impacts of experienced software supply chain failures, security standards, and regulations on software signing adoption. To summarize our findings: (1) We present a refined model of the software supply chain factory model highlighting practitioner's signing practices; (2) We highlight the different challenges-technical, organizational, and human-that hamper software signing implementation; (3) We report that experts disagree on the importance of signing; and (4) We describe how internal and external events affect the adoption of software signing. Our work describes the considerations for adopting software signing as one aspect of the broader goal of improved software supply chain security.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2025

Establishing Provenance Before Coding: Traditional and Next-Gen Software Signing

Software engineers integrate third-party components into their applications. The resulting software supply chain is vulnerable. To reduce the attack surface, we can verify the origin of components (provenance) before adding them. Cryptographic signatures enable this. This article describes traditional signing, its challenges, and the changes introduced by next-generation signing platforms.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Recommending Pre-Trained Models for IoT Devices

The availability of pre-trained models (PTMs) has enabled faster deployment of machine learning across applications by reducing the need for extensive training. Techniques like quantization and distillation have further expanded PTM applicability to resource-constrained IoT hardware. Given the many PTM options for any given task, engineers often find it too costly to evaluate each model's suitability. Approaches such as LogME, LEEP, and ModelSpider help streamline model selection by estimating task relevance without exhaustive tuning. However, these methods largely leave hardware constraints as future work-a significant limitation in IoT settings. In this paper, we identify the limitations of current model recommendation approaches regarding hardware constraints and introduce a novel, hardware-aware method for PTM selection. We also propose a research agenda to guide the development of effective, hardware-conscious model recommendation systems for IoT applications.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Reflecting on the Use of the Policy-Process-Product Theory in Empirical Software Engineering

The primary theory of software engineering is that an organization's Policies and Processes influence the quality of its Products. We call this the PPP Theory. Although empirical software engineering research has grown common, it is unclear whether researchers are trying to evaluate the PPP Theory. To assess this, we analyzed half (33) of the empirical works published over the last two years in three prominent software engineering conferences. In this sample, 70% focus on policies/processes or products, not both. Only 33% provided measurements relating policy/process and products. We make four recommendations: (1) Use PPP Theory in study design; (2) Study feedback relationships; (3) Diversify the studied feedforward relationships; and (4) Disentangle policy and process. Let us remember that research results are in the context of, and with respect to, the relationship between software products, processes, and policies.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2023

An Empirical Study on Using Large Language Models to Analyze Software Supply Chain Security Failures

As we increasingly depend on software systems, the consequences of breaches in the software supply chain become more severe. High-profile cyber attacks like those on SolarWinds and ShadowHammer have resulted in significant financial and data losses, underlining the need for stronger cybersecurity. One way to prevent future breaches is by studying past failures. However, traditional methods of analyzing these failures require manually reading and summarizing reports about them. Automated support could reduce costs and allow analysis of more failures. Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques such as Large Language Models (LLMs) could be leveraged to assist the analysis of failures. In this study, we assessed the ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to analyze historical software supply chain breaches. We used LLMs to replicate the manual analysis of 69 software supply chain security failures performed by members of the Cloud Native Computing Foundation (CNCF). We developed prompts for LLMs to categorize these by four dimensions: type of compromise, intent, nature, and impact. GPT 3.5s categorizations had an average accuracy of 68% and Bard had an accuracy of 58% over these dimensions. We report that LLMs effectively characterize software supply chain failures when the source articles are detailed enough for consensus among manual analysts, but cannot yet replace human analysts. Future work can improve LLM performance in this context, and study a broader range of articles and failures.

cs.CR↗