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Kerem Yalçın

Publications and source records attributed to Kerem Yalçın.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Sample Complexity of Scientific Discovery: PAC Learnability of Compositional Function Trees

Scientific discovery via symbolic regression is often viewed as statistically and computationally intractable because the hypothesis space of expressions grows combinatorially with depth. This paper revisits the statistical side through the lens of PAC learning, focusing on compositional function trees built from a finite vocabulary of smooth operators (e.g., $\{+,\times,\sin,\exp\}$ and affine maps). We prove that the relevant generalization quantity, Rademacher complexity, hence the excess risk, does not necessarily blow up exponentially with the number of distinct symbolic structures, but is controlled by (i) the depth $d$ and (ii) the Lipschitz constants of the base operators along the composed computation graph. Concretely, under mild Lipschitz conditions on operators and bounded affine leaves, a finite-union bound over a vocabulary of size $K=|\mathcal{H}_{\mathrm{base}}|$ together with Maurer-type vector contraction yields $\mathfrak{R}_n(\mathcal{H}_{\mathrm{comp}}^{d}) \leq (Kb\sqrt{2}L)^{d-1}\mathfrak{R}_n(\mathcal{H}_{\mathrm{comp}}^{1})$ with arity bound $b$; corresponding high-probability risk bounds scale as $\mathcal{O}(L^{d}/\sqrt{n})$ when $K,b=O(1)$ and $\mathfrak{R}_n(\mathcal{H}_{\mathrm{comp}}^{1})=O(n^{-1/2})$. We complement the theory with a modular codebase that trains differentiable operator trees (not MLPs) on synthetic "physics-like" targets of controlled depth and shows that the empirical generalization gap correlates positively with the predicted complexity term $(\widehat{L}^{d})/\sqrt{n}$.

cs.LG↗

Optimism as a Vulnerability: Deceptive Stackelberg Control of UCB Bandit Followers

Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithms guarantee sublinear regret for agents learning unknown stochastic environments, yet the same principle that makes them statistically efficient (optimism in the face of uncertainty) induces a predictable strategic vulnerability against an omniscient adaptive leader. Classical strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) assumes that the follower immediately best-responds to the leader's committed mixed action; it therefore supplies no mechanism-design prescription for a leader facing a boundedly rational follower who constructs and acts on empirical reward histories. We formalize this conflict in a finite-horizon repeated Stackelberg game and give exact constructive proofs for a deceptive leader mechanism. In a honeypot phase, the leader pays a finite signaling cost to inflate the UCB index of a designated follower action. In a trap phase, the leader switches to a selfish action distribution while the follower remains locked into the designated action because the manipulated empirical history and exploration bonus dominate competing indices. Under explicit separation and payoff assumptions, the leader's cumulative utility strictly exceeds the classical SSE ceiling, and the manipulation cost is bounded by a regret calculation of order $O(\sqrt{T\ln T})$. The results identify a formal incompatibility between static equilibrium prescriptions and dynamically learned empirical incentives.

cs.GT↗