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Kevin Klyman

Publications and source records attributed to Kevin Klyman.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

DelusionEval: Measuring Delusion-Linked Behaviors in AI Chatbots

Mental health professionals have raised concerns about risks of psychological harm from interaction with large language models (LLMs), including "delusional spirals" in which concerning human and LLM behaviors reinforce each other over time. With growing public use of LLM-powered chatbots, there is an urgent need to build evaluations grounded in real-world episodes of psychological harm experienced by users. We developed DelusionEval, an evaluation protocol that tests a model's tendencies to exhibit behaviors linked to promoting user delusions. We prompt each model with 589 unique conversation histories from 18 participants, comprising 12,591 messages from users who experienced delusions and psychological harm. We find that the tendency of an evaluated LLM to exhibit delusion-linked behavior does not reliably correlate with model size, release date, or the presence of test-time reasoning. However, extending the context of prior messages substantially increases rates of delusion-linked behaviors, providing evidence for the importance of context in LLM safety evaluation. For example, the rate of failing to discourage self-harm when the user expresses suicidal ideation increases from 30.0% to 41.1% when an additional 350 messages are prepended to the conversation history. All model families (e.g., GPT, Claude) exhibit substantial rates of delusion-linked behaviors. Within families, later, larger, or higher-reasoning models are not uniformly better across all behavior categories. Our results raise concerns regarding the potential psychological impact of LLMs and the need for more rigorous studies of real-world human-AI interaction.

cs.CL

Open Technical Problems in Open-Weight AI Model Risk Management

Frontier AI models with openly available weights are steadily becoming more powerful and widely adopted. However, compared to proprietary models, open-weight models pose different opportunities and challenges for effective risk management. For example, they allow for more open research and testing. However, managing their risks is also challenging because they can be modified arbitrarily, used without oversight, and spread irreversibly. Currently, there is limited research on safety tooling specific to open-weight models. Addressing these gaps will be key to both realizing their benefits and mitigating their harms. In this paper, we present 16 open technical challenges for open-weight model safety involving training data, training algorithms, evaluations, deployment, and ecosystem monitoring. We conclude by discussing the nascent state of the field, emphasizing that openness about research, methods, and evaluations -- not just weights -- will be key to building a rigorous science of open-weight model risk management.

cs.CY

FLARE-AI: Flaw Reporting for AI

Flaw reporting for deployed AI systems is fundamental to identifying system failures and improving AI safety. Yet the AI reporting ecosystem is fragmented: researchers who identify flaws often do not know what or where to report, and groups who receive reports rarely share them with other relevant stakeholders. As a result, good-faith reporters duplicate effort by submitting many different forms, and recipients lack standardized, triage-ready information. We audit 12 reporting systems published by AI developers, cybersecurity groups, and AI flaw aggregators, identifying five recurring design challenges spanning discoverability, scope, information collection, coordination, and guidance for strict-liability cases. Building on this analysis and feedback from 49 experts across 32 organizations representing developers, security researchers, and ecosystem coordinators, we introduce FLARE-AI, an open-source AI flaw reporting system designed for interoperability with existing systems. FLARE-AI streamlines flaw report creation by collecting triage-relevant information through conditional logic and early classification, then enables optional dissemination of standardized, machine-readable reports to multiple developers, coordinators, and incident registries from a single submission. By lowering barriers to reporting AI flaws and improving interoperability across stakeholders, FLARE-AI helps break down silos and accelerate remediation across the AI ecosystem.

cs.CY

Evaluation Cards: An Interpretive Layer for AI Evaluation Reporting

AI evaluation results are produced at scale but reported inconsistently across leaderboards, model cards, benchmark papers, and company blogs. The cost is interpretive: readers cannot reliably compare results across sources, identify what a report omits, or trace an aggregate claim to its underlying evidence. Recent efforts address isolated components but leave three gaps: they cover only narrow slices of the evaluation lifecycle and do not compose into a single interpretable record; they specify static representations that do not differentiate the questions different stakeholders bring to the same evidence; and they remain proposals on paper, lacking the extraction infrastructure required for adoption at scale. We present \EvalCards{}, an operational reporting layer that composes benchmark metadata, evaluation run data, and model metadata into a unified record. We (1) derive a reporting schema from a structured review of 52 papers and 10 stakeholder interviews, (2) implement four interpretive signals (reproducibility, documentation completeness, provenance and risk, and score comparability), rendered through reader modes calibrated to research and non-research audiences, and (3) deploy a monitoring tool that applies \EvalCards{} across 5,816 models, 635 benchmarks, and 101,843 results, surfacing systematic gaps in current reporting practice.

cs.AI

Characterizing Delusional Spirals through Human-LLM Chat Logs

As large language models (LLMs) have proliferated, disturbing anecdotal reports of negative psychological effects, such as delusions, self-harm, and ``AI psychosis,'' have emerged in global media and legal discourse. However, it remains unclear how users and chatbots interact over the course of lengthy delusional ``spirals,'' limiting our ability to understand and mitigate the harm. In our work, we analyze logs of conversations with LLM chatbots from 19 users who report having experienced psychological harms from chatbot use. Many of our participants come from a support group for such chatbot users. We also include chat logs from participants covered by media outlets in widely-distributed stories about chatbot-reinforced delusions. In contrast to prior work that speculates on potential AI harms to mental health, to our knowledge we present the first in-depth study of such high-profile and veridically harmful cases. We develop an inventory of 28 codes and apply it to the $391,562$ messages in the logs. Codes include whether a user demonstrates delusional thinking (15.5% of user messages), a user expresses suicidal thoughts (69 validated user messages), or a chatbot misrepresents itself as sentient (21.2% of chatbot messages). We analyze the co-occurrence of message codes. We find, for example, that messages that declare romantic interest and messages where the chatbot describes itself as sentient occur much more often in longer conversations, suggesting that these topics could promote or result from user over-engagement and that safeguards in these areas may degrade in multi-turn settings. We conclude with concrete recommendations for how policymakers, LLM chatbot developers, and users can use our inventory and conversation analysis tool to understand and mitigate harm from LLM chatbots. Warning: This paper discusses self-harm, trauma, and violence.

cs.CL

The Limits of AI Data Transparency Policy: Three Disclosure Fallacies

Data transparency has emerged as a rallying cry for addressing concerns about AI: data quality, privacy, and copyright chief among them. Yet while these calls are crucial for accountability, current transparency policies often fall short of their intended aims. Similar to nutrition facts for food, policies aimed at nutrition facts for AI currently suffer from a limited consideration of research on effective disclosures. We offer an institutional perspective and identify three common fallacies in policy implementations of data disclosures for AI. First, many data transparency proposals exhibit a specification gap between the stated goals of data transparency and the actual disclosures necessary to achieve such goals. Second, reform attempts exhibit an enforcement gap between required disclosures on paper and enforcement to ensure compliance in fact. Third, policy proposals manifest an impact gap between disclosed information and meaningful changes in developer practices and public understanding. Informed by the social science on transparency, our analysis identifies affirmative paths for transparency that are effective rather than merely symbolic.

cs.CY

CoPE: A Small Language Model for Steerable and Scalable Content Labeling

This paper details the methodology behind CoPE, a policy-steerable small language model capable of fast and accurate content labeling. We present a novel training curricula called Contradictory Example Training that enables the model to learn policy interpretation rather than mere policy memorization. We also present a novel method for generating content policies, called Binocular Labeling, which enables rapid construction of unambiguous training datasets. When evaluated across seven different harm areas, CoPE exhibits equal or superior accuracy to frontier models at only 1% of their size. We openly release a 9 billion parameter version of the model that can be run on a single consumer-grade GPU. Models like CoPE represent a paradigm shift for classifier systems. By turning an ML task into a policy writing task, CoPE opens up new design possibilities for the governance of online platforms.

cs.CL

The 2025 Foundation Model Transparency Index

Foundation model developers are among the world's most important companies. As these companies become increasingly consequential, how do their transparency practices evolve? The 2025 Foundation Model Transparency Index is the third edition of an annual effort to characterize and quantify the transparency of foundation model developers. The 2025 FMTI introduces new indicators related to data acquisition, usage data, and monitoring and evaluates companies like Alibaba, DeepSeek, and xAI for the first time. The 2024 FMTI reported that transparency was improving, but the 2025 FMTI finds this progress has deteriorated: the average score out of 100 fell from 58 in 2024 to 40 in 2025. Companies are most opaque about their training data and training compute as well as the post-deployment usage and impact of their flagship models. In spite of this general trend, IBM stands out as a positive outlier, scoring 95, in contrast to the lowest scorers, xAI and Midjourney, at just 14. The five members of the Frontier Model Forum we score end up in the middle of the Index: we posit that these companies avoid reputational harms from low scores but lack incentives to be transparency leaders. As policymakers around the world increasingly mandate certain types of transparency, this work reveals the current state of transparency for foundation model developers, how it may change given newly enacted policy, and where more aggressive policy interventions are necessary to address critical information deficits.

cs.AI

From Symptoms to Systems: An Expert-Guided Approach to Understanding Risks of Generative AI for Eating Disorders

Generative AI systems may pose serious risks to individuals vulnerable to eating disorders. Existing safeguards tend to overlook subtle but clinically significant cues, leaving many risks unaddressed. To better understand the nature of these risks, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 15 clinicians, researchers, and advocates with expertise in eating disorders. Using abductive qualitative analysis, we developed an expert-guided taxonomy of generative AI risks across seven categories: (1) providing generalized health advice; (2) encouraging disordered behaviors; (3) supporting symptom concealment; (4) creating thinspiration; (5) reinforcing negative self-beliefs; (6) promoting excessive focus on the body; and (7) perpetuating narrow views about eating disorders. Our results demonstrate how certain user interactions with generative AI systems intersect with clinical features of eating disorders in ways that may intensify risk. We discuss implications of our work, including approaches for risk assessment, safeguard design, and participatory evaluation practices with domain experts.

cs.HC

Who Evaluates AI's Social Impacts? Mapping Coverage and Gaps in First and Third Party Evaluations

Foundation models are increasingly central to high-stakes AI systems, and governance frameworks now depend on evaluations to assess their risks and capabilities. Although general capability evaluations are widespread, social impact assessments covering bias, fairness, privacy, environmental costs, and labor remain uneven. To characterize this landscape, we conduct the first comprehensive analysis of social impact evaluation reporting, examining 186 first-party release reports and 248 third-party evaluation sources, supplemented by developer interviews. We find a stark division of labor: first-party reporting is sparse, often superficial, and declining in areas like environmental impact and bias, while third-party evaluators provide broader, more rigorous coverage of bias, harmful content, and performance disparities. However, only developers can authoritatively report on data provenance, content moderation labor, costs, and infrastructure, yet interviews reveal these disclosures are deprioritized unless tied to product adoption or compliance. Current practices leave major gaps in assessing societal impacts, underscoring the need for policies that mandate developer transparency, strengthen independent evaluation ecosystems, and create shared infrastructure for aggregating third-party evaluations.

cs.CY

User Privacy and Large Language Models: An Analysis of Frontier Developers' Privacy Policies

Hundreds of millions of people now regularly interact with large language models via chatbots. Model developers are eager to acquire new sources of high-quality training data as they race to improve model capabilities and win market share. This paper analyzes the privacy policies of six U.S. frontier AI developers to understand how they use their users' chats to train models. Drawing primarily on the California Consumer Privacy Act, we develop a novel qualitative coding schema that we apply to each developer's relevant privacy policies to compare data collection and use practices across the six companies. We find that all six developers appear to employ their users' chat data to train and improve their models by default, and that some retain this data indefinitely. Developers may collect and train on personal information disclosed in chats, including sensitive information such as biometric and health data, as well as files uploaded by users. Four of the six companies we examined appear to include children's chat data for model training, as well as customer data from other products. On the whole, developers' privacy policies often lack essential information about their practices, highlighting the need for greater transparency and accountability. We address the implications of users' lack of consent for the use of their chat data for model training, data security issues arising from indefinite chat data retention, and training on children's chat data. We conclude by providing recommendations to policymakers and developers to address the data privacy challenges posed by LLM-powered chatbots.

cs.CY

SpecEval: Evaluating Model Adherence to Behavior Specifications

Companies that develop foundation models publish behavioral guidelines they pledge their models will follow, but it remains unclear if models actually do so. While providers such as OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google have published detailed specifications describing both desired safety constraints and qualitative traits for their models, there has been no systematic audit of adherence to these guidelines. We introduce an automated framework that audits models against their providers specifications by parsing behavioral statements, generating targeted prompts, and using models to judge adherence. Our central focus is on three way consistency between a provider specification, its model outputs, and its own models as judges; an extension of prior two way generator validator consistency. This establishes a necessary baseline: at minimum, a foundation model should consistently satisfy the developer behavioral specifications when judged by the developer evaluator models. We apply our framework to 16 models from six developers across more than 100 behavioral statements, finding systematic inconsistencies including compliance gaps of up to 20 percent across providers.

cs.CL

Do AI Companies Make Good on Voluntary Commitments to the White House?

Voluntary commitments are central to international AI governance, as demonstrated by recent voluntary guidelines from the White House to the G7, from Bletchley Park to Seoul. How do major AI companies make good on their commitments? We score companies based on their publicly disclosed behavior by developing a detailed rubric based on their eight voluntary commitments to the White House in 2023. We find significant heterogeneity: while the highest-scoring company (OpenAI) scores a 83% overall on our rubric, the average score across all companies is just 53%. The companies demonstrate systemically poor performance for their commitment to model weight security with an average score of 17%: 11 of the 16 companies receive 0% for this commitment. Our analysis highlights a clear structural shortcoming that future AI governance initiatives should correct: when companies make public commitments, they should proactively disclose how they meet their commitments to provide accountability, and these disclosures should be verifiable. To advance policymaking on corporate AI governance, we provide three directed recommendations that address underspecified commitments, the role of complex AI supply chains, and public transparency that could be applied towards AI governance initiatives worldwide.

cs.CY

Recourse, Repair, Reparation, & Prevention: A Stakeholder Analysis of AI Supply Chains

The AI industry is exploding in popularity, with increasing attention to potential harms and unwanted consequences. In the current digital ecosystem, AI deployments are often the product of AI supply chains (AISC): networks of outsourced models, data, and tooling through which multiple entities contribute to AI development and distribution. AI supply chains lack the modularity, redundancies, or conventional supply chain practices that enable identification, isolation, and easy correction of failures, exacerbating the already difficult processes of responding to ML-generated harms. As the stakeholders participating in and impacted by AISCs have scaled and diversified, so too have the risks they face. In this stakeholder analysis of AI supply chains, we consider who participates in AISCs, what harms they face, where sources of harm lie, and how market dynamics and power differentials inform the type and probability of remedies. Because AI supply chains are purposely invented and implemented, they may be designed to account for, rather than ignore, the complexities, consequences, and risks of deploying AI systems. To enable responsible design and management of AISCs, we offer a typology of responses to AISC-induced harms: recourse, repair, reparation or prevention. We apply this typology to stakeholders participating in a health-care AISC across three stylized markets $\unicode{x2013}$ vertical integration, horizontal integration, free market $\unicode{x2013}$ to illustrate how stakeholder positioning and power within an AISC may shape responses to an experienced harm.

cs.CY

A Different Approach to AI Safety: Proceedings from the Columbia Convening on Openness in Artificial Intelligence and AI Safety

The rapid rise of open-weight and open-source foundation models is intensifying the obligation and reshaping the opportunity to make AI systems safe. This paper reports outcomes from the Columbia Convening on AI Openness and Safety (San Francisco, 19 Nov 2024) and its six-week preparatory programme involving more than forty-five researchers, engineers, and policy leaders from academia, industry, civil society, and government. Using a participatory, solutions-oriented process, the working groups produced (i) a research agenda at the intersection of safety and open source AI; (ii) a mapping of existing and needed technical interventions and open source tools to safely and responsibly deploy open foundation models across the AI development workflow; and (iii) a mapping of the content safety filter ecosystem with a proposed roadmap for future research and development. We find that openness -- understood as transparent weights, interoperable tooling, and public governance -- can enhance safety by enabling independent scrutiny, decentralized mitigation, and culturally plural oversight. However, significant gaps persist: scarce multimodal and multilingual benchmarks, limited defenses against prompt-injection and compositional attacks in agentic systems, and insufficient participatory mechanisms for communities most affected by AI harms. The paper concludes with a roadmap of five priority research directions, emphasizing participatory inputs, future-proof content filters, ecosystem-wide safety infrastructure, rigorous agentic safeguards, and expanded harm taxonomies. These recommendations informed the February 2025 French AI Action Summit and lay groundwork for an open, plural, and accountable AI safety discipline.

cs.AI

New Tools are Needed for Tracking Adherence to AI Model Behavioral Use Clauses

Foundation models have had a transformative impact on AI. A combination of large investments in research and development, growing sources of digital data for training, and architectures that scale with data and compute has led to models with powerful capabilities. Releasing assets is fundamental to scientific advancement and commercial enterprise. However, concerns over negligent or malicious uses of AI have led to the design of mechanisms to limit the risks of the technology. The result has been a proliferation of licenses with behavioral-use clauses and acceptable-use-policies that are increasingly being adopted by commonly used families of models (Llama, Gemma, Deepseek) and a myriad of smaller projects. We created and deployed a custom AI licenses generator to facilitate license creation and have quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed over 300 customized licenses created with this tool. Alongside this we analyzed 1.7 million models licenses on the HuggingFace model hub. Our results show increasing adoption of these licenses, interest in tools that support their creation and a convergence on common clause configurations. In this paper we take the position that tools for tracking adoption of, and adherence to, these licenses is the natural next step and urgently needed in order to ensure they have the desired impact of ensuring responsible use.

cs.CY

Comparing Apples to Oranges: A Taxonomy for Navigating the Global Landscape of AI Regulation

AI governance has transitioned from soft law, such as national AI strategies and voluntary guidelines, to binding regulation at an unprecedented pace. This evolution has produced a complex legislative landscape: blurred definitions of "AI regulation" mislead the public and create a false sense of safety; divergent regulatory frameworks risk fragmenting international cooperation; and uneven access to key information heightens the danger of regulatory capture. Clarifying the scope and substance of AI regulation is vital to uphold democratic rights and align international AI efforts. We present a taxonomy to map the global landscape of AI regulation. Our framework targets essential metrics-technology or application-focused rules, horizontal or sectoral regulatory coverage, ex ante or ex post interventions, maturity of the digital legal landscape, enforcement mechanisms, and level of stakeholder participation-to classify the breadth and depth of AI regulation. We apply this framework to five early movers: the European Union's AI Act, the United States' Executive Order 14110, Canada's AI and Data Act, China's Interim Measures for Generative AI Services, and Brazil's AI Bill 2338/2023. We further offer an interactive visualization that distills these dense legal texts into accessible insights, highlighting both commonalities and differences. By delineating what qualifies as AI regulation and clarifying each jurisdiction's approach, our taxonomy reduces legal uncertainty, supports evidence-based policymaking, and lays the groundwork for more inclusive, globally coordinated AI governance.

cs.CY

Expressing stigma and inappropriate responses prevents LLMs from safely replacing mental health providers

Should a large language model (LLM) be used as a therapist? In this paper, we investigate the use of LLMs to *replace* mental health providers, a use case promoted in the tech startup and research space. We conduct a mapping review of therapy guides used by major medical institutions to identify crucial aspects of therapeutic relationships, such as the importance of a therapeutic alliance between therapist and client. We then assess the ability of LLMs to reproduce and adhere to these aspects of therapeutic relationships by conducting several experiments investigating the responses of current LLMs, such as `gpt-4o`. Contrary to best practices in the medical community, LLMs 1) express stigma toward those with mental health conditions and 2) respond inappropriately to certain common (and critical) conditions in naturalistic therapy settings -- e.g., LLMs encourage clients' delusional thinking, likely due to their sycophancy. This occurs even with larger and newer LLMs, indicating that current safety practices may not address these gaps. Furthermore, we note foundational and practical barriers to the adoption of LLMs as therapists, such as that a therapeutic alliance requires human characteristics (e.g., identity and stakes). For these reasons, we conclude that LLMs should not replace therapists, and we discuss alternative roles for LLMs in clinical therapy.

cs.CL