Poisoned Playbooks: Demystifying Knowledge Poisoning Effects on AI Security Agents
AI security agents increasingly rely on Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to use external security knowledge for vulnerability analysis and exploit reasoning. This creates a new risk: poisoned write-ups can be operationalized into incorrect exploit behavior. Yet, prior work on RAG poisoning has mostly studied answer corruption in QA settings, much less is known about action-taking security agents. This paper aims to reveal such characteristics with crafted poisons about real-world challenges and AI agents. First, we demonstrate how a crafted single poisoned write-up injected into public-style security knowledge sources which we denote as Poisoned Playbooks, alters the behavior of RAG-based AI security agents. Across 11 CTF challenges, 3 frontier LLM families, 2 model generations, and 11 real-world CVEs, we find that poison adoption is systematic rather than random. To explain this pattern, we introduce the Verification Boundary (VB), a 3-level empirical classification based on what evidence the agent can use to refute a retrieved claim. Finally, we evaluate verification prompting and multi-source retrieval, showing that both help when stronger evidence exists, but weaken under sparse-evidence and zero-day conditions.