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Kim Joris Boström

Publications and source records attributed to Kim Joris Boström.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Optimization reduces knee-joint forces during walking and squatting: Validating the inverse dynamics approach for full body movements on instrumented knee prostheses

Due to the redundancy of our motor system, movements can be performed in many ways. While multiple motor control strategies can all lead to the desired behavior, they result in different joint and muscle forces. This creates opportunities to explore this redundancy, e.g., for pain avoidance or reducing the risk of further injury. To assess the effect of different motor control optimization strategies, a direct measurement of muscle and joint forces is desirable, but problematic for medical and ethical reasons. Computational modeling might provide a solution by calculating approximations of these forces. In this study, we used a full-body computational musculoskeletal model to (1) predict forces measured in knee prostheses during walking and squatting and (2) to study the effect of different motor control strategies (i.e., minimizing joint force vs. muscle activation) on the joint load and prediction error. We found that musculoskeletal models can accurately predict knee joint forces with an RMSE of <0.5 BW in the superior direction and about 0.1 BW in the medial and anterior directions. Generally, minimization of joint forces produced the best predictions. Furthermore, minimizing muscle activation resulted in maximum knee forces of about 4 BW for walking and 2.5 BW for squatting. Minimizing joint forces resulted in maximum knee forces of 2.25 BW and 2.12 BW, i.e., a reduction of 44% and 15%, respectively. Thus, changing the muscular coordination strategy can strongly affect knee joint forces. Patients with a knee prosthesis may adapt their neuromuscular activation to reduce joint forces during locomotion.

q-bio.QM↗

Is Bohmian Mechanics an empirically adequate theory?

Bohmian mechanics (BM) draws a picture of nature, which is completely different from that drawn by standard quantum mechanics (SQM): Particles are at any time at a definite position, and the universe evolves deterministically. Astonishingly, according to a proof by Bohm the empirical predictions of these two very different theories coincide. From the very beginning, BM has faced all kinds of criticism, most of which are either technical or philosophical. There is, however, a criticism first raised by Correggi et al. (2002) and recently strengthened by Kiukas and Werner (2010), which holds that, in spite of Bohm's proof, the predictions of BM do not agree with those of SQM in the case of local position measurements on entangled particles in a stationary state. Hence, given that SQM has been proven to be tremendously successful in the past, BM could most likely not be considered an empirically adequate theory. My aim is to resolve the conflict by showing that 1) it relies on hidden differences in the conceptual thinking, and that 2) the predictions of both theories approximately coincide if the process of measurement is adequately accounted for. My analysis makes no use of any sort of wavefunction collapse, refuting a widespread belief that an "effective collapse" is needed to reconcile BM with the predictions of SQM.

quant-ph↗

Quantum mechanics as a deterministic theory of a continuum of worlds

A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that describes the universe as a continuum of worlds whose mutual interference gives rise to quantum phenomena. A logical framework is introduced to properly deal with propositions about objects in a multiplicity of worlds. In this logical framework, the continuum of worlds is treated in analogy to the continuum of time points, both "time" and "world" are considered as mutually independent modes of existence. The theory combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett's many-worlds interpretation, it has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Probability as given by the Born rule emerges as a consequence of insufficient knowledge of observers about which world it is that they live in. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett's approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no splitting of worlds, which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains (1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, (2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, and (3) the apparently random "collapse of the wavefunction" caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.

quant-ph↗

Combining Bohm and Everett: Axiomatics for a Standalone Quantum Mechanics

A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett's "many-worlds" interpretation. The resulting theory has the advantage of resolving known issues of both theories, as well as those of standard quantum mechanics. It has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Most importantly, the Born rule can be derived by straightforward application of the Laplacian rule, without reliance on a "quantum equilibrium hypothesis" that is crucial for Bohmian mechanics, and without reliance on a "branch weight" that is crucial for Everett-type theories. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett's approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no "splitting of worlds", which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains 1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, 2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, 3) the identification of observables as self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space, and 4) the apparently random "collapse of the wavefunction" caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.

quant-ph↗