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Kimon Boehmer

Publications and source records attributed to Kimon Boehmer.

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Submodular Max-Min Allocation under Identical Valuations

In the problem of Submodular Max-Min Allocation, we are given a set of items, a set of players, and monotone submodular valuation functions that represent the satisfaction of a player with a certain subset of items. The goal is to find an allocation of the items to the players that maximizes the lowest satisfaction among all players. We study this problem in the special case where all players have the same valuation function. We devise a greedy algorithm which gives a $0.4$-approximation, improving the previously best factor of $\frac{10}{27} \approx 0.37$ by Uziahu and Feige. Furthermore, we study the integrality gap of the \emph{configuration LP} when players have identical valuations. By constructing a variable assignment to the dual from a primal integral solution, we give the first constant upper bound on the integrality gap for submodular valuations. Generalizing the result to the case where players' allocations must be independent in $k$ given matroids, we derive a $\mathcal{O}(k)$-estimation algorithm for max-min allocation subject to $k$ matroid constraints under identical valuations.

cs.DS

Arcee: An OCM-Solver

The 2024 PACE Challenge focused on the One-Sided Crossing Minimization (OCM) problem, which aims to minimize edge crossings in a bipartite graph with a fixed order in one partition and a free order in the other. We describe our OCM solver submission that utilizes various reduction rules for OCM and, for the heuristic track, employs local search approaches as well as techniques to escape local minima. The exact and parameterized solver uses an ILP formulation and branch & bound to solve an equivalent Feedback Arc Set instance.

cs.DS

Worst- and Average-Case Robustness of Stable Matchings: (Counting) Complexity and Experiments

Focusing on the bipartite Stable Marriage problem, we investigate different robustness measures related to stable matchings. We analyze the computational complexity of computing them and analyze their behavior in extensive experiments on synthetic instances. For instance, we examine whether a stable matching is guaranteed to remain stable if a given number of adversarial swaps in the agent's preferences are performed and the probability of stability when applying swaps uniformly at random. Our results reveal that stable matchings in our synthetic data are highly unrobust to adversarial swaps, whereas the average-case view presents a more nuanced and informative picture.

cs.GT