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Kirill Ziborov

Publications and source records attributed to Kirill Ziborov.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Agent-Driven Verification of Memory Safety for liblzma Decoder Components with VST

We report on the verification of memory safety for decoder components of liblzma, the compression library underlying xz-utils: the LZMA2 state machine, the LZMA1 decoder it controls, the outer decoding path, and the shared sliding-window dictionary. Built with the Verified Software Toolchain (VST), machine-checked body theorems establish memory safety and partial functional correctness. Across 27 completed body proofs, the largest covers lzma decode, whose 338 source lines expand to 1,934 lines of C after preprocessing; its proof comprises 183,268 lines of proof script over 775,768 lines of mechanically extracted goal statements. The verification exposed undefined behavior in raw LZMA1 zero-input handling, where range-decoder macros add zero to a null pointer and subtract two null pointers. Unlike similar work that synthesizes verified code, we verify pre-existing, production-scale C. AI agents complete proof goals and propose refinements; humans write and review models and specifications, and approve semantic changes; the Rocq kernel checks the proof terms. With agents constructing the proof scripts, the main engineering problems lay in translating and modeling production C, building a robust harness for driving Rocq, and providing feedback for proving agents. VST's assertion logic expressed every contract required by the development. We describe the pipeline, coordination mechanisms, and proof-engineering techniques that resolved these frictions.

cs.SE

Systematization of Knowledge: Formal Verification of Consensus Protocols

Formal verification is increasingly critical for blockchain consensus protocols, where subtle bugs can cause irreversible financial loss and network failure. Yet the literature on verification methods is fragmented across tools, protocol families, and property classes, hindering cumulative progress. This Systematization of Knowledge paper analyzes over 20 verified consensus protocols--from crash-fault-tolerant Raft to Byzantine-fault-tolerant HotStuff, DAG-based FairDAG, and proof-of-stake Beacon Chain--to establish a unified taxonomy of verification approaches. We introduce a verification maturity scale ranging from informal reasoning to machine-checked code proofs, and present a Protocol--Property--Method matrix mapping protocols to verified safety, liveness, and economic properties. Our analysis reveals persistent gaps: liveness verification remains underdeveloped despite its importance for progress guarantees; specification-implementation disconnects undermine real-world assurance; and scalability limits restrict verification to small networks. We provide practical recommendations for tool selection and proof engineering, and outline a research roadmap toward scalable, economically-aware verification. This work aims to guide both researchers and practitioners in building more rigorously verified consensus systems.

cs.DC

BugMagnifier: TON Transaction Simulator for Revealing Smart Contract Vulnerabilities

The Open Network (TON) blockchain employs an asynchronous execution model that introduces unique security challenges for smart contracts. A primary concern is race conditions arising from unpredictable message processing order. While previous work established vulnerability patterns through static analysis of audit reports, dynamic detection of temporal dependencies through systematic testing remains an open problem. This study proposes a dynamic evaluation methodology based on controlled message orchestration to systematically expose vulnerabilities in asynchronous smart contracts. By synthesizing precise message queue manipulation with differential state analysis and probabilistic permutation testing, we establish a framework (namely, BugMagnifier) for identifying execution flaws that static methods miss. Experimental evaluation demonstrates BugMagnifier's effectiveness through extensive parametric studies on purpose-built vulnerable contracts and five real-world vulnerability cases reproduced from recent security audits. Results reveal message ratio-dependent detection complexity that aligns with theoretical predictions. This quantitative model enables predictive vulnerability assessment while shifting discovery from manual expert analysis to automated evidence generation. By providing reproducible test scenarios for temporal vulnerabilities, BugMagnifier addresses a critical gap in the TON security tooling, offering practical support for safer smart contract development in asynchronous blockchain environments.

cs.CR

From Paradigm Shift to Audit Rift: Empirical Analysis and Validation of Security Audit Methodologies for Asynchronous Smart Contract Systems

The Open Network (TON) is a high-performance blockchain platform designed for scalability and efficiency, leveraging an asynchronous execution model and a multi-layered architecture. While TON's design offers significant advantages, it also introduces unique challenges for smart contract development and security. This paper introduces a comprehensive audit checklist for TON smart contracts, based on an empirical analysis of 34 professional audit reports containing 233 real-world vulnerabilities. The checklist addresses TON-specific challenges, such as asynchronous message handling, and provides actionable insights for developers and auditors. We also present detailed case studies of vulnerabilities in TON smart contracts, highlighting their implications and offering lessons learned. To validate practical utility, we conducted a practitioner survey (n=11 complete responses), confirming the checklist's value alongside automated tools. By adopting this checklist, developers and auditors can systematically identify and mitigate vulnerabilities, enhancing the security and reliability of TON-based projects. Our work bridges the gap between Ethereum's mature audit methodologies and the emerging needs of the TON ecosystem, fostering a more secure and robust blockchain environment.

cs.CR