arXiv subjects

Kirthevasan Kandasamy

Publications and source records attributed to Kirthevasan Kandasamy.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Learning from Biased and Costly Data Sources: Minimax-optimal Data Collection under a Budget

Data collection is a critical component of modern statistical and machine learning pipelines, particularly when data must be gathered from multiple heterogeneous sources to study a target population of interest. In many use cases, such as medical studies or political polling, different sources incur different sampling costs. Observations often have associated group identities - for example, health markers, demographics, or political affiliations - and the relative composition of these groups may differ substantially, both among the source populations and between sources and target population. In this work, we study multi-source data collection under a fixed budget, focusing on the estimation of population means and group-conditional means. We show that naive data collection strategies (e.g. attempting to "match" the target distribution) or relying on standard estimators (e.g. sample mean) can be highly suboptimal. Instead, we develop a sampling plan which maximizes the effective sample size - the total sample size divided by $D_{χ^2}(q\mid\mid\overline{p}) + 1$, where $q$ is the target distribution, $\overline{p}$ is the aggregated source distribution, and $D_{χ^2}$ is the $χ^2$-divergence. We pair this sampling plan with a classical post-stratification estimator and upper bound its risk. We provide matching lower bounds, establishing that our approach achieves the budgeted minimax optimal risk. Our techniques also extend to prediction problems when minimizing the excess risk, providing a principled approach to multi-source learning with costly and heterogeneous data sources.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2026

Incentivizing Truthful Data Contributions in a Marketplace for Mean Estimation

We study a data marketplace where a broker intermediates between buyers, who seek to estimate the mean $μ$ of an unknown normal distribution $\Ncal(μ, σ^2)$, and contributors, who can collect data from this distribution at a cost. The broker delegates data collection work to contributors, aggregates reported datasets, sells it to buyers, and redistributes revenue as payments to contributors. We aim to maximize welfare or profit under key constraints: individual rationality for buyers and contributors, incentive compatibility (contributors are incentivized to comply with data collection instructions and truthfully report the collected data), and budget balance (total contributor payments equals total revenue). We first compute welfare/profit-optimal prices under truthful reporting; however, to incentivize data collection and truthful data reporting, we adjust them based on discrepancies in contributors' reported data. This yields a Nash equilibrium (NE) where the two lowest-cost contributors collect all data. We complement this with two hardness results: \emph{(i)} no nontrivial dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanism exists in this problem, and \emph{(ii)} no mechanism outperforms ours in a NE.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Pairwise Exchanges of Freely Replicable Goods with Negative Externalities

We study a setting where a set of agents engage in pairwise exchanges of freely replicable goods (e.g., digital goods such as data), where two agents grant each other a copy of a good they possess in exchange for a good they lack. Such exchanges introduce a fundamental tension: while agents benefit from acquiring additional goods, they incur negative externalities when others do the same. This dynamic typically arises in real-world scenarios where competing entities may benefit from selective collaboration. For example, in a data sharing consortium, pharmaceutical companies might share (copies of) drug discovery data, when the value of accessing a competitor's data outweighs the risk of revealing their own. In our model, an altruistic central planner wishes to design an exchange protocol (without money), to structure such exchanges between agents. The protocol operates over multiple rounds, proposing sets of pairwise exchanges in each round, which agents may accept or reject. We formulate three key desiderata for such a protocol: (i) individual rationality: agents should not be worse off by participating in the protocol; (ii) incentive-compatibility: agents should be incentivized to share as much as possible by accepting all exchange proposals by the planner; (iii) stability: there should be no further mutually beneficial exchanges upon termination. We design an exchange protocol for the planner that satisfies all three desiderata. While the above desiderata are inspired by classical models for exchange, free-replicability and negative externalities necessitate novel and nontrivial reformalizations of these goals. We also argue that achieving Pareto-efficient agent utilities -- often a central goal in exchange models without externalities -- may be ill-suited in this setting.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Strategy-robust Online Learning in Contextual Pricing

Learning effective pricing strategies is crucial in digital marketplaces, especially when buyers' valuations are unknown and must be inferred through interaction. We study the online contextual pricing problem, where a seller observes a stream of context-valuation pairs and dynamically sets prices. Moreover, departing from traditional online learning frameworks, we consider a strategic setting in which buyers may misreport valuations to influence future prices, a challenge known as strategic overfitting (Amin et al. 2013). We introduce a strategy-robust notion of regret for multi-buyer online environments, capturing worst-case strategic behavior in the spirit of the Price of Anarchy. Our first contribution is a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for learning linear pricing policies in adversarial, adaptive environments, enabled by a novel online sketching technique. Building on this result, we propose our main construction: the Sparse Update Mechanism (SUM), a simple yet effective sequential mechanism that ensures robustness to all Nash equilibria among buyers. Moreover, our construction yields a black-box reduction from online expert algorithms to strategy-robust learners.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

A Cramér-von Mises Approach to Incentivizing Truthful Data Sharing

Modern data marketplaces and data sharing consortia increasingly rely on incentive mechanisms to encourage agents to contribute data. However, schemes that reward agents based on the quantity of submitted data are vulnerable to manipulation, as agents may submit fabricated or low-quality data to inflate their rewards. Prior work has proposed comparing each agent's data against others' to promote honesty: when others contribute genuine data, the best way to minimize discrepancy is to do the same. Yet prior implementations of this idea rely on very strong assumptions about the data distribution (e.g. Gaussian), limiting their applicability. In this work, we develop reward mechanisms based on a novel, two-sample test inspired by the Cramér-von Mises statistic. Our methods strictly incentivize agents to submit more genuine data, while disincentivizing data fabrication and other types of untruthful reporting. We establish that truthful reporting constitutes a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium in both Bayesian and prior-agnostic settings. We theoretically instantiate our method in three canonical data sharing problems and show that it relaxes key assumptions made by prior work. Empirically, we demonstrate that our mechanism incentivizes truthful data sharing via simulations and on real-world language and image data.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Constrained Best Arm Identification with Tests for Feasibility

Best arm identification (BAI) aims to identify the highest-performance arm among a set of $K$ arms by collecting stochastic samples from each arm. In real-world problems, the best arm needs to satisfy additional feasibility constraints. While there is limited prior work on BAI with feasibility constraints, they typically assume the performance and constraints are observed simultaneously on each pull of an arm. However, this assumption does not reflect most practical use cases, e.g., in drug discovery, we wish to find the most potent drug whose toxicity and solubility are below certain safety thresholds. These safety experiments can be conducted separately from the potency measurement. Thus, this requires designing BAI algorithms that not only decide which arm to pull but also decide whether to test for the arm's performance or feasibility. In this work, we study feasible BAI which allows a decision-maker to choose a tuple $(i,\ell)$, where $i\in [K]$ denotes an arm and $\ell$ denotes whether she wishes to test for its performance ($\ell=0$) or any of its $N$ feasibility constraints ($\ell\in[N]$). We focus on the fixed confidence setting, which is to identify the feasible arm with the highest performance, with a probability of at least $1-δ$. We propose an efficient algorithm and upper-bound its sample complexity, showing our algorithm can naturally adapt to the problem's difficulty and eliminate arms by worse performance or infeasibility, whichever is easier. We complement this upper bound with a lower bound showing that our algorithm is \textit{asymptotically ($δ\rightarrow 0$) optimal}. Finally, we empirically show that our algorithm outperforms other state-of-the-art BAI algorithms in both synthetic and real-world datasets.

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arXiv2025

Balancing Performance and Costs in Best Arm Identification

We consider the problem of identifying the best arm in a multi-armed bandit model. Despite a wealth of literature in the traditional fixed budget and fixed confidence regimes of the best arm identification problem, it still remains a mystery to most practitioners as to how to choose an approach and corresponding budget or confidence parameter. We propose a new formalism to avoid this dilemma altogether by minimizing a risk functional which explicitly balances the performance of the recommended arm and the cost incurred by learning this arm. In this framework, a cost is incurred for each observation during the sampling phase, and upon recommending an arm, a performance penalty is incurred for identifying a suboptimal arm. The learner's goal is to minimize the sum of the penalty and cost. This new regime mirrors the priorities of many practitioners, e.g. maximizing profit in an A/B testing framework, better than classical fixed budget or confidence settings. We derive theoretical lower bounds for the risk of each of two choices for the performance penalty, the probability of misidentification and the simple regret, and propose an algorithm called DBCARE to match these lower bounds up to polylog factors on nearly all problem instances. We then demonstrate the performance of DBCARE on a number of simulated models, comparing to fixed budget and confidence algorithms to show the shortfalls of existing BAI paradigms on this problem.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2025

Collaborative Mean Estimation Among Heterogeneous Strategic Agents: Individual Rationality, Fairness, and Truthful Contribution

We study a collaborative learning problem where $m$ agents aim to estimate a vector $μ=(μ_1,\ldots,μ_d)\in \mathbb{R}^d$ by sampling from associated univariate normal distributions $\{\mathcal{N}(μ_k, σ^2)\}_{k\in[d]}$. Agent $i$ incurs a cost $c_{i,k}$ to sample from $\mathcal{N}(μ_k, σ^2)$. Instead of working independently, agents can exchange data, collecting cheaper samples and sharing them in return for costly data, thereby reducing both costs and estimation error. We design a mechanism to facilitate such collaboration, while addressing two key challenges: ensuring individually rational (IR) and fair outcomes so all agents benefit, and preventing strategic behavior (e.g. non-collection, data fabrication) to avoid socially undesirable outcomes. We design a mechanism and an associated Nash equilibrium (NE) which minimizes the social penalty-sum of agents' estimation errors and collection costs-while being IR for all agents. We achieve a $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{m})$-approximation to the minimum social penalty in the worst case and an $\mathcal{O}(1)$-approximation under favorable conditions. Additionally, we establish three hardness results: no nontrivial mechanism guarantees (i) a dominant strategy equilibrium where agents report truthfully, (ii) is IR for every strategy profile of other agents, (iii) or avoids a worst-case $Ω(\sqrt{m})$ price of stability in any NE. Finally, by integrating concepts from axiomatic bargaining, we demonstrate that our mechanism supports fairer outcomes than one which minimizes social penalty.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Learning to Price Homogeneous Data

We study a data pricing problem, where a seller has access to $N$ homogeneous data points (e.g. drawn i.i.d. from some distribution). There are $m$ types of buyers in the market, where buyers of the same type $i$ have the same valuation curve $v_i:[N]\rightarrow [0,1]$, where $v_i(n)$ is the value for having $n$ data points. A priori, the seller is unaware of the distribution of buyers, but can repeat the market for $T$ rounds so as to learn the revenue-optimal pricing curve $p:[N] \rightarrow [0, 1]$. To solve this online learning problem, we first develop novel discretization schemes to approximate any pricing curve. When compared to prior work, the size of our discretization schemes scales gracefully with the approximation parameter, which translates to better regret in online learning. Under assumptions like smoothness and diminishing returns which are satisfied by data, the discretization size can be reduced further. We then turn to the online learning problem, both in the stochastic and adversarial settings. On each round, the seller chooses an anonymous pricing curve $p_t$. A new buyer appears and may choose to purchase some amount of data. She then reveals her type only if she makes a purchase. Our online algorithms build on classical algorithms such as UCB and FTPL, but require novel ideas to account for the asymmetric nature of this feedback and to deal with the vastness of the space of pricing curves. Using the improved discretization schemes previously developed, we are able to achieve $\tilde{O}(m\sqrt{T})$ regret in the stochastic setting and $\tilde{O}(m^{3/2}\sqrt{T})$ regret in the adversarial setting.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Bandit Profit-maximization for Targeted Marketing

We study a sequential profit-maximization problem, optimizing for both price and ancillary variables like marketing expenditures. Specifically, we aim to maximize profit over an arbitrary sequence of multiple demand curves, each dependent on a distinct ancillary variable, but sharing the same price. A prototypical example is targeted marketing, where a firm (seller) wishes to sell a product over multiple markets. The firm may invest different marketing expenditures for different markets to optimize customer acquisition, but must maintain the same price across all markets. Moreover, markets may have heterogeneous demand curves, each responding to prices and marketing expenditures differently. The firm's objective is to maximize its gross profit, the total revenue minus marketing costs. Our results are near-optimal algorithms for this class of problems in an adversarial bandit setting, where demand curves are arbitrary non-adaptive sequences, and the firm observes only noisy evaluations of chosen points on the demand curves. For $n$ demand curves (markets), we prove a regret upper bound of $\tilde{O}(nT^{3/4})$ and a lower bound of $Ω((nT)^{3/4})$ for monotonic demand curves, and a regret bound of $\tildeΘ(nT^{2/3})$ for demands curves that are monotonic in price and concave in the ancillary variables.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Nash Incentive-compatible Online Mechanism Learning via Weakly Differentially Private Online Learning

We study a multi-round mechanism design problem, where we interact with a set of agents over a sequence of rounds. We wish to design an incentive-compatible (IC) online learning scheme to maximize an application-specific objective within a given class of mechanisms, without prior knowledge of the agents' type distributions. Even if each mechanism in this class is IC in a single round, if an algorithm naively chooses from this class on each round, the entire learning process may not be IC against non-myopic buyers who appear over multiple rounds. On each round, our method randomly chooses between the recommendation of a weakly differentially private online learning algorithm (e.g., Hedge), and a commitment mechanism which penalizes non-truthful behavior. Our method is IC and achieves $O(T^{\frac{1+h}{2}})$ regret for the application-specific objective in an adversarial setting, where $h$ quantifies the long-sightedness of the agents. When compared to prior work, our approach is conceptually simpler,it applies to general mechanism design problems (beyond auctions), and its regret scales gracefully with the size of the mechanism class.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Mechanism Design for Collaborative Normal Mean Estimation

We study collaborative normal mean estimation, where $m$ strategic agents collect i.i.d samples from a normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(μ, σ^2)$ at a cost. They all wish to estimate the mean $μ$. By sharing data with each other, agents can obtain better estimates while keeping the cost of data collection small. To facilitate this collaboration, we wish to design mechanisms that encourage agents to collect a sufficient amount of data and share it truthfully, so that they are all better off than working alone. In naive mechanisms, such as simply pooling and sharing all the data, an individual agent might find it beneficial to under-collect and/or fabricate data, which can lead to poor social outcomes. We design a novel mechanism that overcomes these challenges via two key techniques: first, when sharing the others' data with an agent, the mechanism corrupts this dataset proportional to how much the data reported by the agent differs from the others; second, we design minimax optimal estimators for the corrupted dataset. Our mechanism, which is Nash incentive compatible and individually rational, achieves a social penalty (sum of all agents' estimation errors and data collection costs) that is at most a factor 2 of the global minimum. When applied to high dimensional (non-Gaussian) distributions with bounded variance, this mechanism retains these three properties, but with slightly weaker results. Finally, in two special cases where we restrict the strategy space of the agents, we design mechanisms that essentially achieve the global minimum.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Leveraging Reviews: Learning to Price with Buyer and Seller Uncertainty

In online marketplaces, customers have access to hundreds of reviews for a single product. Buyers often use reviews from other customers that share their type -- such as height for clothing, skin type for skincare products, and location for outdoor furniture -- to estimate their values, which they may not know a priori. Customers with few relevant reviews may hesitate to make a purchase except at a low price, so for the seller, there is a tension between setting high prices and ensuring that there are enough reviews so that buyers can confidently estimate their values. Simultaneously, sellers may use reviews to gauge the demand for items they wish to sell. In this work, we study this pricing problem in an online setting where the seller interacts with a set of buyers of finitely many types, one by one, over a series of $T$ rounds. At each round, the seller first sets a price. Then a buyer arrives and examines the reviews of the previous buyers with the same type, which reveal those buyers' ex-post values. Based on the reviews, the buyer decides to purchase if they have good reason to believe that their ex-ante utility is positive. Crucially, the seller does not know the buyer's type when setting the price, nor even the distribution over types. We provide a no-regret algorithm that the seller can use to obtain high revenue. When there are $d$ types, after $T$ rounds, our algorithm achieves a problem-independent $\tilde O(T^{2/3}d^{1/3})$ regret bound. However, when the smallest probability $q_{\text{min}}$ that any given type appears is large, specifically when $q_{\text{min}} \in Ω(d^{-2/3}T^{-1/3})$, then the same algorithm achieves a $\tilde O(T^{1/2}q_{\text{min}}^{-1/2})$ regret bound. We complement these upper bounds with matching lower bounds in both regimes, showing that our algorithm is minimax optimal up to lower-order terms.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Active Cost-aware Labeling of Streaming Data

We study actively labeling streaming data, where an active learner is faced with a stream of data points and must carefully choose which of these points to label via an expensive experiment. Such problems frequently arise in applications such as healthcare and astronomy. We first study a setting when the data's inputs belong to one of $K$ discrete distributions and formalize this problem via a loss that captures the labeling cost and the prediction error. When the labeling cost is $B$, our algorithm, which chooses to label a point if the uncertainty is larger than a time and cost dependent threshold, achieves a worst-case upper bound of $\widetilde{O}(B^{\frac{1}{3}} K^{\frac{1}{3}} T^{\frac{2}{3}})$ on the loss after $T$ rounds. We also provide a more nuanced upper bound which demonstrates that the algorithm can adapt to the arrival pattern, and achieves better performance when the arrival pattern is more favorable. We complement both upper bounds with matching lower bounds. We next study this problem when the inputs belong to a continuous domain and the output of the experiment is a smooth function with bounded RKHS norm. After $T$ rounds in $d$ dimensions, we show that the loss is bounded by $\widetilde{O}(B^{\frac{1}{d+3}} T^{\frac{d+2}{d+3}})$ in an RKHS with a squared exponential kernel and by $\widetilde{O}(B^{\frac{1}{2d+3}} T^{\frac{2d+2}{2d+3}})$ in an RKHS with a Matérn kernel. Our empirical evaluation demonstrates that our method outperforms other baselines in several synthetic experiments and two real experiments in medicine and astronomy.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Learning Competitive Equilibria in Exchange Economies with Bandit Feedback

The sharing of scarce resources among multiple rational agents is one of the classical problems in economics. In exchange economies, which are used to model such situations, agents begin with an initial endowment of resources and exchange them in a way that is mutually beneficial until they reach a competitive equilibrium (CE). The allocations at a CE are Pareto efficient and fair. Consequently, they are used widely in designing mechanisms for fair division. However, computing CEs requires the knowledge of agent preferences which are unknown in several applications of interest. In this work, we explore a new online learning mechanism, which, on each round, allocates resources to the agents and collects stochastic feedback on their experience in using that allocation. Its goal is to learn the agent utilities via this feedback and imitate the allocations at a CE in the long run. We quantify CE behavior via two losses and propose a randomized algorithm which achieves sublinear loss under a parametric class of utilities. Empirically, we demonstrate the effectiveness of this mechanism through numerical simulations.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

VCG Mechanism Design with Unknown Agent Values under Stochastic Bandit Feedback

We study a multi-round welfare-maximising mechanism design problem in instances where agents do not know their values. On each round, a mechanism first assigns an allocation each to a set of agents and charges them a price; at the end of the round, the agents provide (stochastic) feedback to the mechanism for the allocation they received. This setting is motivated by applications in cloud markets and online advertising where an agent may know her value for an allocation only after experiencing it. Therefore, the mechanism needs to explore different allocations for each agent so that it can learn their values, while simultaneously attempting to find the socially optimal set of allocations. Our focus is on truthful and individually rational mechanisms which imitate the classical VCG mechanism in the long run. To that end, we first define three notions of regret for the welfare, the individual utilities of each agent and that of the mechanism. We show that these three terms are interdependent via an $Ω(T^{\frac{2}{3}})$ lower bound for the maximum of these three terms after $T$ rounds of allocations, and describe an algorithm which essentially achieves this rate. Our framework also provides flexibility to control the pricing scheme so as to trade-off between the agent and seller regrets. Next, we define asymptotic variants for the truthfulness and individual rationality requirements and provide asymptotic rates to quantify the degree to which both properties are satisfied by the proposed algorithm.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2021

PAC Best Arm Identification Under a Deadline

We study $(ε, δ)$-PAC best arm identification, where a decision-maker must identify an $ε$-optimal arm with probability at least $1 - δ$, while minimizing the number of arm pulls (samples). Most of the work on this topic is in the sequential setting, where there is no constraint on the time taken to identify such an arm; this allows the decision-maker to pull one arm at a time. In this work, the decision-maker is given a deadline of $T$ rounds, where, on each round, it can adaptively choose which arms to pull and how many times to pull them; this distinguishes the number of decisions made (i.e., time or number of rounds) from the number of samples acquired (cost). Such situations occur in clinical trials, where one may need to identify a promising treatment under a deadline while minimizing the number of test subjects, or in simulation-based studies run on the cloud, where we can elastically scale up or down the number of virtual machines to conduct as many experiments as we wish, but need to pay for the resource-time used. As the decision-maker can only make $T$ decisions, she may need to pull some arms excessively relative to a sequential algorithm in order to perform well on all possible problems. We formalize this added difficulty with two hardness results that indicate that unlike sequential settings, the ability to adapt to the problem difficulty is constrained by the finite deadline. We propose Elastic Batch Racing (EBR), a novel algorithm for this setting and bound its sample complexity, showing that EBR is optimal with respect to both hardness results. We present simulations evaluating EBR in this setting, where it outperforms baselines by several orders of magnitude.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Resource Allocation in Multi-armed Bandit Exploration: Overcoming Sublinear Scaling with Adaptive Parallelism

We study exploration in stochastic multi-armed bandits when we have access to a divisible resource that can be allocated in varying amounts to arm pulls. We focus in particular on the allocation of distributed computing resources, where we may obtain results faster by allocating more resources per pull, but might have reduced throughput due to nonlinear scaling. For example, in simulation-based scientific studies, an expensive simulation can be sped up by running it on multiple cores. This speed-up however, is partly offset by the communication among cores, which results in lower throughput than if fewer cores were allocated per trial to run more trials in parallel. In this paper, we explore these trade-offs in two settings. First, in a fixed confidence setting, we need to find the best arm with a given target success probability as quickly as possible. We propose an algorithm which trades off between information accumulation and throughput and show that the time taken can be upper bounded by the solution of a dynamic program whose inputs are the gaps between the sub-optimal and optimal arms. We also prove a matching hardness result. Second, we present an algorithm for a fixed deadline setting, where we are given a time deadline and need to maximize the probability of finding the best arm. We corroborate our theoretical insights with simulation experiments that show that the algorithms consistently match or outperform baseline algorithms on a variety of problem instances.

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