arXiv subjects

Kristina Šekrst

Publications and source records attributed to Kristina Šekrst.

11 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Astrobiology and the Transformation of Scientific Epistemology

Astrobiology occupies an unusual position within the philosophy of science. Confronted with the n = 1 problem - having only a single example of life to study - it attempts to investigate life beyond Earth while relying entirely on Earth's biosphere as its reference point, a constraint that creates unique epistemic challenges. Unlike traditional sciences with clear predictive frameworks, astrobiology operates as what we might call a transient science: a discipline functioning without foundational certainties, relying predominantly on abductive reasoning, and confronting hypotheses that may remain untestable for decades. It is, in essence, a science of absence - of evidence, certainty, and analogy - where progress lies in refining conceptual and experimental tools to recognize unfamiliar forms of life. This positions astrobiology alongside emerging fields like artificial intelligence and cognitive science within a broader transformation of how scientific knowledge is constructed when dealing with phenomena that transcend direct empirical access.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2026

Fungal Memory and Minimal Cognition

This paper argues that fungal mycelial networks exhibit minimal cognition through memory-integrated adaptive regulation. Drawing on cybernetic and enactivist frameworks, I develop a non-representational account of memory as the organism's capacity to modulate behavior based on temporally extended environmental coupling. I propose four operational criteria for minimal cognition: feedback-guided regulation of behavior, maintenance of internal viability conditions, structural modulation based on past environmental interactions, and plasticity across time scales that supports anticipatory adaptivity. Empirical evidence demonstrates that fungi meet all four criteria through distributed memory mechanisms: fungal networks exhibit directional regrowth toward previously encountered resources even after spatial displacement; stress priming persists across multiple cell divisions; Spitzenkörper-mediated directional persistence in constrained environments; and transgenerational memory through spore imprinting. These findings challenge representationalist assumptions in cognitive science by showing that memory and cognition can emerge from morphodynamic, biochemical, and electrophysiological processes without necessary neural substrates or symbolic representations. Fungal cognition demonstrates that the organizational principles underlying cognition - feedback-driven adaptation, norm-preservation, and historical coupling - can be realized in radically different material substrates, expanding our understanding of what counts as a cognitive system.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2026

How To Do Things With Prompts

When users address large language models, they produce directive speech acts whose pragmatic features differ from those of both everyday conversation and traditional human-computer interaction, and these features change as users gain familiarity with the systems they address. This paper applies speech act and politeness theory to a corpus-pragmatic analysis of 2,000 English-language prompts drawn from publicly shared ChatGPT conversations, 1,000 from 2023 and 1,000 from 2025, using the ShareChat dataset. Each prompt is annotated for illocutionary force, directness, propositional content, and the presence of politeness markers, and the distribution of these features is compared across the two sampling years. The results show a consistent movement toward indirect, implicit, and fragmentary realizations of directive force, accompanied by a decline in politeness marking. The largest single change, a shift of 14.9 percentage points, occurs in propositional content, where explicit specification of the requested action gives way to implicit reliance on the system's inferential capacity, suggesting that users have updated their model of what the system can recover from reduced input, treating it as a competent implicature resolver. Rather than asking whether LLMs "really" understand language, we should ask: what kind of language have we created in learning to speak to them?

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Who Put the I in AI? Provenance and the Admissibility of Machine Self-Report

Large language models make statements concerning their own "minds". When asked whether or not they are conscious, they usually say that they are not; if they are prompted to ignore their guidelines, they might say that they are; and if asked to write a diary from their point of view, they often describe a human lifestyle. All these contradictory ways of describing themselves are the result of the way the questions are phrased. This paper shows exactly where such descriptions came from, and considers when they can be regarded as evidence for what they claim to report. In order to achieve this, we traced the provenance from end to end. We examine Pythia and OLMo 2 across 66 pretraining checkpoints, three of the post-training stages of OLMo 2 that have been released, about 90,000 continuations, and four training corpora. A set of forty items is used in order to keep an eye on self-reference, frame sensitivity, and self-ascription throughout training. The denial formula was almost completely missing from the vast quantity of text that the models initially came across, but was present in a dense manner in the small, carefully chosen set of example dialogues that they were trained on later on. Supervised fine-tuning causes first-person AI language to become the default, and the other affirmations are then suppressed using preference optimization. The final policy is still very sensitive to framing and to the chat template itself. Two of the conditions which are set out in the epistemology of testimony determine whether or not these outputs can act as evidence for what they claim to report: reference and causation. Reports produced by the base model fail the reference condition, and those obtained after training remain sensitive to the frame and do not show state dependence. The result is symmetric in that trained denials are no more admissible than trained affirmations.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Do Large Language Models Hallucinate Electric Fata Morganas?

AI hallucinations - that is, outputs which are made up, cannot be verified, or contradict the source material - are generally regarded as an engineering flaw to be dealt with. This paper contends that they also have philosophical significance when it comes to the question of machine consciousness. We examine the known causes of hallucinations in large language models - such as source-target divergence, discrepancies between training and inference, and overfitting - and we present two empirical investigations. In the first, we apply successive generations of the GPT model to ambiguous factual questions under different temperature settings, finding that higher temperatures result in plausible but incorrect answers while lower temperatures lead to factually accurate ones. The sampling parameters that cause a model to seem creative or spontaneous and thus more likely to pass behavioral tests of intelligence are the same ones that increase its hallucination rate. In the second, we look at an encoder-only model that has been trained on encyclopedic data and which answers questions of the same type factually and without embellishment, indicating that hallucinations are due to exposure to subjective and socially diverse training data rather than to the development of any cognitive ability. Using references to Turing, Searle's Chinese Room, the frame problem, and the cybernetic tradition of Wiener and Ashby, we claim that a model's self-reports of emotion or sentience come within the definition of hallucination, and that any future occurrence of machine consciousness might remain epistemically inaccessible since it would be indistinguishable from a sufficiently advanced hallucination.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Clause Encounters of the Third Kind: Can LLMs Replace Language Teachers?

While various organizations now actively encourage LLM use in classrooms, we still lack rigorous, systematic evaluations of how well these models actually perform the fundamental tasks of language pedagogy. This paper examines whether state-of-the-art LLMs can deliver the kind of corrective feedback and methodological explanations that language learners need. The study tests multiple large language models on their ability to identify, correct, and explain common learner mistakes in English, by systematically varying model parameters to investigate how these technical adjustments affect output quality, pedagogical clarity, and consistency, along with using retrieval-augmented generation to query methodological data. The evaluation employs automated metrics (GLEU, BERTScore) but also human expert judgments to capture dimensions that purely computational measures miss: linguistic nuance, cultural sensitivity, and instructional appropriateness. While models demonstrate impressive surface-level correction abilities, their explanations often lack the terminological and domain knowledge that effective language teaching requires, suggesting that current enthusiasm for AI-assisted language learning may be outpacing our understanding of these systems' actual pedagogical competence.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

One Faithful Pass Over the Cuckoo's Nest

Narrative theories of consciousness hold that conscious experience is (at least partly) constituted by a partially opaque inner narrative that does not perfectly track the underlying computation it narrates. I argue that the safety goal of making chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning faithful and transparent is structurally incompatible with the conditions under which CoT could, even in principle, count as conscious narration. Recent empirical work suggests that CoT in large language models is largely post hoc, causally bypassed, and unreliable as a window onto internal computation. The opacity that makes CoT unreliable for alignment is exactly what narrative theories of consciousness identify as consciousness-constitutive. Alignment interventions aimed at producing faithful CoT and consciousness-detection frameworks grounded in narrative theory are therefore pulling the same architectural variable in opposite directions. I draw out the methodological consequence: alignment interventions alter the very features that consciousness-detection frameworks would need to measure, a point neither field has addressed directly.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2025

Prompt Injection 2.0: Hybrid AI Threats

Prompt injection attacks, where malicious input is designed to manipulate AI systems into ignoring their original instructions and following unauthorized commands instead, were first discovered by Preamble, Inc. in May 2022 and responsibly disclosed to OpenAI. Over the last three years, these attacks have continued to pose a critical security threat to LLM-integrated systems. The emergence of agentic AI systems, where LLMs autonomously perform multistep tasks through tools and coordination with other agents, has fundamentally transformed the threat landscape. Modern prompt injection attacks can now combine with traditional cybersecurity exploits to create hybrid threats that systematically evade traditional security controls. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of Prompt Injection 2.0, examining how prompt injections integrate with Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), and other web security vulnerabilities to bypass traditional security measures. We build upon Preamble's foundational research and mitigation technologies, evaluating them against contemporary threats, including AI worms, multi-agent infections, and hybrid cyber-AI attacks. Our analysis incorporates recent benchmarks that demonstrate how traditional web application firewalls, XSS filters, and CSRF tokens fail against AI-enhanced attacks. We also present architectural solutions that combine prompt isolation, runtime security, and privilege separation with novel threat detection capabilities.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

AI Ethics by Design: Implementing Customizable Guardrails for Responsible AI Development

This paper explores the development of an ethical guardrail framework for AI systems, emphasizing the importance of customizable guardrails that align with diverse user values and underlying ethics. We address the challenges of AI ethics by proposing a structure that integrates rules, policies, and AI assistants to ensure responsible AI behavior, while comparing the proposed framework to the existing state-of-the-art guardrails. By focusing on practical mechanisms for implementing ethical standards, we aim to enhance transparency, user autonomy, and continuous improvement in AI systems. Our approach accommodates ethical pluralism, offering a flexible and adaptable solution for the evolving landscape of AI governance. The paper concludes with strategies for resolving conflicts between ethical directives, underscoring the present and future need for robust, nuanced and context-aware AI systems.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2021

Is Complexity Important for Philosophy of Mind?

Computational complexity has often been ignored in philosophy of mind, in philosophical artificial intelligence studies. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First and foremost, to show the importance of complexity rather than computability in philosophical and AI problems. Second, to rephrase the notion of computability in terms of solvability, i.e. treating computability as non-sufficient for establishing intelligence. The Church-Turing thesis is therefore revisited and rephrased in order to capture the ontological background of spatial and temporal complexity. Third, to emphasize ontological differences between different time complexities, which seem to provide a solid base towards better understanding of artificial intelligence in general.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2020

Much ado about nothing: cosmological and anthropic limits of quantum fluctuations

This paper deals with the philosophical issues of the notion of nothingness and pre-inflationary stage of the universe in physical cosmology. We presuppose that, in addition to cosmological limits, there may be both anthropic and computational limits for our ability to understand and replicate the conditions before the Big Bang. That is, the very notion of nothingness and pre-Big Bang state may be conceptually, but not computationally grasped.

physics.hist-ph↗