arXiv subjects

Kristina Fort

Publications and source records attributed to Kristina Fort.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Open Problems in Frontier AI Risk Management

Frontier AI both amplifies existing risks and introduces qualitatively novel challenges. Not only is there a notable lack of stable scientific consensus resulting from the rapid pace of technological change, but emerging frontier AI safety practices are often misaligned with, or may undermine, established risk management frameworks. To address these challenges, we systematically surface open problems in frontier AI risk management. Adopting a problem-oriented approach, we examine each stage of the risk management process - risk planning, identification, analysis, evaluation, and mitigation - through a structured review of the literature, identifying unresolved challenges and the actors best positioned to address them. Recognising that different types of open problems call for different responses, we classify open problems according to whether they reflect (a) a lack of scientific or technical consensus, (b) misalignment with, or challenges to, established risk management frameworks, or (c) shortcomings in implementation despite apparent consensus and alignment. By mapping these open problems and identifying the actors best positioned to address them - including developers, deployers, regulators, standards bodies, researchers, and third-party evaluators - this work aims to clarify where progress is needed to enable robust and meaningful consensus on frontier AI risk management.The paper does not propose specific solutions; instead, it provides a problem-oriented, agenda-setting reference document, complemented by a living online repository, intended to support coordination, reduce duplication, and guide future research and governance efforts.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Understanding the First Wave of AI Safety Institutes: Characteristics, Functions, and Challenges

In November 2023, the UK and US announced the creation of their AI Safety Institutes (AISIs). Five other jurisdictions have followed in establishing AISIs or similar institutions, with more likely to follow. While there is considerable variation between these institutions, there are also key similarities worth identifying. This primer describes one cluster of similar AISIs, the "first wave," consisting of the Japan, UK, and US AISIs. First-wave AISIs have several fundamental characteristics in common: they are technical government institutions, have a clear mandate related to the safety of advanced AI systems, and lack regulatory powers. Safety evaluations are at the center of first-wave AISIs. These techniques test AI systems across tasks to understand their behavior and capabilities on relevant risks, such as cyber, chemical, and biological misuse. They also share three core functions: research, standards, and cooperation. These functions are critical to AISIs' work on safety evaluations but also support other activities such as scientific consensus-building and foundational AI safety research. Despite its growing popularity as an institutional model, the AISI model is not free from challenges and limitations. Some analysts have criticized the first wave of AISIs for specializing too much in a sub-area and for being potentially redundant with existing institutions, for example. Future developments may rapidly change this landscape, and particularities of individual AISIs may not be captured by our broad-strokes description. This policy brief aims to outline the core elements of first-wave AISIs as a way of encouraging and improving conversations on this novel institutional model, acknowledging this is just a simplified snapshot rather than a timeless prescription.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

The Role of AI Safety Institutes in Contributing to International Standards for Frontier AI Safety

International standards are crucial for ensuring that frontier AI systems are developed and deployed safely around the world. Since the AI Safety Institutes (AISIs) possess in-house technical expertise, mandate for international engagement, and convening power in the national AI ecosystem while being a government institution, we argue that they are particularly well-positioned to contribute to the international standard-setting processes for AI safety. In this paper, we propose and evaluate three models for AISI involvement: 1. Seoul Declaration Signatories, 2. US (and other Seoul Declaration Signatories) and China, and 3. Globally Inclusive. Leveraging their diverse strengths, these models are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they offer a multi-track system solution in which the central role of AISIs guarantees coherence among the different tracks and consistency in their AI safety focus.

cs.CY↗