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Kyle Beadle

Publications and source records attributed to Kyle Beadle.

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"There is literally zero funding": Understanding the Emerging Role of Trusted Flaggers under the EU Digital Services Act

The European Union's Digital Services Act (DSA) introduced regulatory mechanisms which serve as a way to manage harmful content online. The recognition of Trusted Flaggers (TFs) is one such mechanism which accredits entities with experience, platform independence, and skill in identifying and reporting illegal content. With the DSA's TF role being roughly one year old, we interviewed representatives of seven such TF organizations to learn about their experiences of becoming a TF and how it impacts their interactions with online platforms and with individual users. We additionally ran a workshop involving TF representatives, primarily as it was requested by TFs themselves, who collectively wanted to share experiences of their new role and learn from each other rather than be isolated. Notably, we found that accreditation as a TF can be cumbersome, that resources for TFs remain the same despite an increasing workload, and that platforms priorities often diverge from TFs. We conclude with recommendations for future research into understanding user representation within the DSA and the need for standardization measures tailored to the needs and resource constraints of TFs.

cs.CY

Peer Surveillance in Online Communities

Online communities are not safe spaces for user privacy. Even though existing research focuses on creating and improving various content moderation strategies and privacy preserving technologies, platforms hosting online communities support features allowing users to surveil one another--leading to harassment, personal data breaches, and offline harm. To tackle this problem, we introduce a new, work-in-progress framework for analyzing data privacy within vulnerable, identity-based online communities. Where current SOUPS papers study surveillance and longitudinal user data as two distinct challenges to user privacy, more work needs to be done in exploring the sites where surveillance and historical user data assemble. By synthesizing over 40 years of developments in the analysis of surveillance, we derive properties of online communities that enable the abuse of user data by fellow community members and suggest key steps to improving security for vulnerable users. Deploying this new framework on new and existing platforms will ensure that online communities are privacy-conscious and designed more inclusively.

cs.HC