arXiv subjects

Kyle Soska

Publications and source records attributed to Kyle Soska.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Meme Coin Factories: Uncovering Large-Scale Manipulations on pump.fun

Once complex, creating and deploying a new cryptocurrency has become trivial. Coin launchpads now allow users to generate a new coin with merely a few clicks, at a minimal cost. Launchpad popularity has grown in tandem with the rise of "meme coins," which usually do not offer any novel technological properties and are purely created for fun. The most prominent coin launchpad, pump.fun, has gained significant traction, grossing over 100 million USD in daily trading volume. The mass adoption of coin launchpads, however, also enables strategic actors to easily manipulate trading signals, unbeknownst to inexperienced traders who then buy certain coins, and enable these strategic actors to profit from rapid and unsustainable price increases ("pumps"). To identify such manipulations at scale, we conduct a large-scale study of pump.fun, collecting information on all 15 million coins launched in the last two years, and performing analysis on large, random samples of transaction data. We identify five classes of manipulation strategies: 1) wash trading, 2) creator address obfuscation, 3) coordinated sell, 4) copycat coins, and 5) social media manipulation. We find that strategic actors often bypass the platform interface and implement these strategies in a highly automated and low-latency fashion, by interacting directly with the blockchain. We further uncover the existence of "Market-Manipulation-as-a-service (MMaaS)," third-party tools that enable users to perform these manipulations without any technical expertise. We conclude by devising mitigations and proposing recommendations for traders, pump.fun, wallets or chain scanners, software development platforms, and regulators.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Blockchain Address Poisoning

In many blockchains, e.g., Ethereum, Binance Smart Chain (BSC), the primary representation used for wallet addresses is a hardly memorable 40-digit hexadecimal string. As a result, users often select addresses from their recent transaction history, which enables blockchain address poisoning. The adversary first generates lookalike addresses similar to one with which the victim has previously interacted, and then engages with the victim to ``poison'' their transaction history. The goal is to have the victim mistakenly send tokens to the lookalike address, as opposed to the intended recipient. Compared to contemporary studies, this paper provides four notable contributions. First, we develop a detection system and perform measurements over two years on both Ethereum and BSC. We identify 13~times more attack attempts than reported previously -- totaling 270M on-chain attacks targeting 17M victims. 6,633 incidents have caused at least 83.8M USD in losses, which makes blockchain address poisoning one of the largest cryptocurrency phishing schemes observed in the wild. Second, we analyze a few large attack entities using improved clustering techniques, and model attacker profitability and competition. Third, we reveal attack strategies -- targeted populations, success conditions (address similarity, timing), and cross-chain attacks. Fourth, we mathematically define and simulate the lookalike address generation process across various software- and hardware-based implementations, and identify a large-scale attacker group that appears to use GPUs. We also discuss defensive countermeasures.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Anatomy of a Digital Bubble: Lessons Learned from the NFT and Metaverse Frenzy

In the past few years, "metaverse" and "non-fungible tokens (NFT)" have become buzzwords, and the prices of related assets have exhibited large fluctuations. Are those characteristic of a speculative bubble? In this paper, we attempt to answer this question, and better understand the underlying economic dynamics. We look at Decentraland, a virtual world platform where land parcels are sold as NFT collections. We find that initially, land prices followed traditional real estate pricing models - in particular, value decreased with distance from the most desirable areas - suggesting Decentraland behaved much like a virtual city. However, these real estate pricing models stopped applying when both the metaverse and NFTs gained increased popular attention and enthusiasm in 2021, suggesting a new driving force for the underlying asset prices. At that time, following a substantial rise in NFT market values, short-term holders of multiple parcels began to take major selling positions in the Decentraland market, which hints that, rather than building a metaverse community, early Decentraland investors preferred to cash out when land valuations became inflated. Our analysis also shows that while the majority of buyers are new entrants to the market (many of whom joined during the bubble), liquidity (i.e., parcels) was mostly provided by early adopters selling, which caused stark differences in monetary gains. Early adopters made money - more than 10,000 USD on average per parcel sold - but users who joined later typically made no profit or even incurred losses in the order of 1,000 USD per parcel. Unlike established markets such as financial and real estate markets, newly emergent digital marketplaces are mostly self-regulated. As a result, the significant financial risks we identify indicate a strong need for establishing appropriate standards of business conduct and improving user awareness.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2018

An Empirical Analysis of Traceability in the Monero Blockchain

Monero is a privacy-centric cryptocurrency that allows users to obscure their transactions by including chaff coins, called "mixins," along with the actual coins they spend. In this paper, we empirically evaluate two weaknesses in Monero's mixin sampling strategy. First, about 62% of transaction inputs with one or more mixins are vulnerable to "chain-reaction" analysis -- that is, the real input can be deduced by elimination. Second, Monero mixins are sampled in such a way that they can be easily distinguished from the real coins by their age distribution; in short, the real input is usually the "newest" input. We estimate that this heuristic can be used to guess the real input with 80% accuracy over all transactions with 1 or more mixins. Next, we turn to the Monero ecosystem and study the importance of mining pools and the former anonymous marketplace AlphaBay on the transaction volume. We find that after removing mining pool activity, there remains a large amount of potentially privacy-sensitive transactions that are affected by these weaknesses. We propose and evaluate two countermeasures that can improve the privacy of future transactions.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2017

Attributing Hacks

In this paper we describe an algorithm for estimating the provenance of hacks on websites. That is, given properties of sites and the temporal occurrence of attacks, we are able to attribute individual attacks to joint causes and vulnerabilities, as well as estimating the evolution of these vulnerabilities over time. Specifically, we use hazard regression with a time-varying additive hazard function parameterized in a generalized linear form. The activation coefficients on each feature are continuous-time functions over time. We formulate the problem of learning these functions as a constrained variational maximum likelihood estimation problem with total variation penalty and show that the optimal solution is a 0th order spline (a piecewise constant function) with a finite number of known knots. This allows the inference problem to be solved efficiently and at scale by solving a finite dimensional optimization problem. Extensive experiments on real data sets show that our method significantly outperforms Cox's proportional hazard model. We also conduct a case study and verify that the fitted functions are indeed recovering vulnerable features and real-life events such as the release of code to exploit these features in hacker blogs.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2016

Joint Hacking and Latent Hazard Rate Estimation

In this paper we describe an algorithm for predicting the websites at risk in a long range hacking activity, while jointly inferring the provenance and evolution of vulnerabilities on websites over continuous time. Specifically, we use hazard regression with a time-varying additive hazard function parameterized in a generalized linear form. The activation coefficients on each feature are continuous-time functions constrained with total variation penalty inspired by hacking campaigns. We show that the optimal solution is a 0th order spline with a finite number of adaptively chosen knots, and can be solved efficiently. Experiments on real data show that our method significantly outperforms classic methods while providing meaningful interpretability.

stat.AP↗