arXiv subjects

Kyungchan Lim

Publications and source records attributed to Kyungchan Lim.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Supporting Students in Navigating LLM-Generated Insecure Code

The advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI), particularly large language models (LLMs), has revolutionized software development by enabling developers to specify tasks in natural language and receive corresponding code, boosting productivity. However, this shift also introduces security risks, as LLMs may generate insecure code that can be exploited by adversaries. Conventional educational approaches emphasize efficiency while overlooking these risks, leaving students unprepared to identify and mitigate security issues in AI-assisted workflows. To surface this gap, we present \texttt{Bifr\"ost}, a classroom measurement and feedback framework that pairs an adversarially configured code-generation model with a VS Code extension and automated vulnerability reports that instructors can use to guide follow-up discussions. Through classroom deployments with undergraduate students ($n=61$), we observe that students frequently accepted insecure LLM-generated code despite prior security coursework and stated skepticism. A post-feedback survey ($n=21$) provides preliminary evidence that students' stated trust shifted toward greater skepticism after receiving Bifr\"ost feedback, and that some students articulated more security-specific concerns about AI-generated code.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Ocassionally Secure: A Comparative Analysis of Code Generation Assistants

$ $Large Language Models (LLMs) are being increasingly utilized in various applications, with code generations being a notable example. While previous research has shown that LLMs have the capability to generate both secure and insecure code, the literature does not take into account what factors help generate secure and effective code. Therefore in this paper we focus on identifying and understanding the conditions and contexts in which LLMs can be effectively and safely deployed in real-world scenarios to generate quality code. We conducted a comparative analysis of four advanced LLMs--GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using ChatGPT and Bard and Gemini from Google--using 9 separate tasks to assess each model's code generation capabilities. We contextualized our study to represent the typical use cases of a real-life developer employing LLMs for everyday tasks as work. Additionally, we place an emphasis on security awareness which is represented through the use of two distinct versions of our developer persona. In total, we collected 61 code outputs and analyzed them across several aspects: functionality, security, performance, complexity, and reliability. These insights are crucial for understanding the models' capabilities and limitations, guiding future development and practical applications in the field of automated code generation.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Registration, Detection, and Deregistration: Analyzing DNS Abuse for Phishing Attacks

Phishing continues to pose a significant cybersecurity threat. While blocklists currently serve as a primary defense, due to their reactive, passive nature, these delayed responses leave phishing websites operational long enough to harm potential victims. It is essential to address this fundamental challenge at the root, particularly in phishing domains. Domain registration presents a crucial intervention point, as domains serve as the primary gateway between users and websites. We conduct a comprehensive longitudinal analysis of 690,502 unique phishing domains, spanning a 39 month period, to examine their characteristics and behavioral patterns throughout their lifecycle-from initial registration to detection and eventual deregistration. We find that 66.1% of the domains in our dataset are maliciously registered, leveraging cost-effective TLDs and targeting brands by mimicking their domain names under alternative TLDs (e.g., .top and .tk) instead of the TLDs under which the brand domains are registered (e.g., .com and .ru). We also observe minimal improvements in detection speed for maliciously registered domains compared to compromised domains. Detection times vary widely across blocklists, and phishing domains remain accessible for an average of 11.5 days after detection, prolonging their potential impact. Our systematic investigation uncovers key patterns from registration through detection to deregistration, which could be leveraged to enhance anti-phishing active defenses at the DNS level.

cs.CR↗