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L. Elisa Celis

Publications and source records attributed to L. Elisa Celis.

40 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

How to be Fair and Diverse?

Due to the recent cases of algorithmic bias in data-driven decision-making, machine learning methods are being put under the microscope in order to understand the root cause of these biases and how to correct them. Here, we consider a basic algorithmic task that is central in machine learning: subsampling from a large data set. Subsamples are used both as an end-goal in data summarization (where fairness could either be a legal, political or moral requirement) and to train algorithms (where biases in the samples are often a source of bias in the resulting model). Consequently, there is a growing effort to modify either the subsampling methods or the algorithms themselves in order to ensure fairness. However, in doing so, a question that seems to be overlooked is whether it is possible to produce fair subsamples that are also adequately representative of the feature space of the data set - an important and classic requirement in machine learning. Can diversity and fairness be simultaneously ensured? We start by noting that, in some applications, guaranteeing one does not necessarily guarantee the other, and a new approach is required. Subsequently, we present an algorithmic framework which allows us to produce both fair and diverse samples. Our experimental results on an image summarization task show marked improvements in fairness without compromising feature diversity by much, giving us the best of both the worlds.

cs.LG↗

A Model for Social Network Formation: Efficiency, Stability and Dynamics

We introduce a simple network formation model for social networks. Agents are nodes, connecting to another agent by building a directed edge (or accepting a connection from another agent) has a cost, and reaching (or being reached by) other agents via short directed paths has a benefit; in effect, an agent wants to reach others quickly, but without the cost of directly connecting each and every one. We prove that asynchronous edge dynamics always converge to a stable network; in fact, for nontrivial ranges of parameters this convergence is fast. Moreover, the set of fixed points of the dynamics form a nontrivial class of networks. For the static game, we give classes of efficient networks for nontrivial parameter ranges and further study their stability. We close several problems, and leave many interesting ones open.

cs.SI↗

Sequential Voting Promotes Collective Discovery in Social Recommendation Systems

One goal of online social recommendation systems is to harness the wisdom of crowds in order to identify high quality content. Yet the sequential voting mechanisms that are commonly used by these systems are at odds with existing theoretical and empirical literature on optimal aggregation. This literature suggests that sequential voting will promote herding---the tendency for individuals to copy the decisions of others around them---and hence lead to suboptimal content recommendation. Is there a problem with our practice, or a problem with our theory? Previous attempts at answering this question have been limited by a lack of objective measurements of content quality. Quality is typically defined endogenously as the popularity of content in absence of social influence. The flaw of this metric is its presupposition that the preferences of the crowd are aligned with underlying quality. Domains in which content quality can be defined exogenously and measured objectively are thus needed in order to better assess the design choices of social recommendation systems. In this work, we look to the domain of education, where content quality can be measured via how well students are able to learn from the material presented to them. Through a behavioral experiment involving a simulated massive open online course (MOOC) run on Amazon Mechanical Turk, we show that sequential voting systems can surface better content than systems that elicit independent votes.

cs.SI↗

Convergence of Local Dynamics to Balanced Outcomes in Exchange Networks

Bargaining games on exchange networks have been studied by both economists and sociologists. A Balanced Outcome for such a game is an equilibrium concept that combines notions of stability and fairness. In a recent paper, Kleinberg and Tardos introduced balanced outcomes to the computer science community and provided a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the set of such outcomes. Their work left open a pertinent question: are there natural, local dynamics that converge quickly to a balanced outcome? In this paper, we provide a partial answer to this question by showing that simple edge-balancing dynamics converge to a balanced outcome whenever one exists.

cs.GT↗