arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to L. Luthi.
We simulate the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games on a real social acquaintance network. Using a discrete analogue of replicator dynamics, we show that surprisingly high levels of cooperation can be achieved, contrary to what happens in unstructured mixing populations. Moreover, we empirically show that cooperation in this network is stable with respect to invasion by defectors.
Useful information about scientific collaboration structures and patterns can be inferred from computer databases of published papers. The genetic programming bibliography is the most complete reference of papers on GP\@. In addition to locating publications, it contains coauthor and coeditor relationships from which a more complete picture of the field emerges. We treat these relationships as undirected small world graphs whose study reveals the community structure of the GP collaborative social network. Automatic analysis discovers new communities and highlights new facets of them. The investigation reveals many similarities between GP and coauthorship networks in other scientific fields but also some subtle differences such as a smaller central network component and a high clustering.
We explore the Hawk-Dove game on networks with topologies ranging from regular lattices to random graphs with small-world networks in between. This is done by means of computer simulations using several update rules for the population evolutionary dynamics. We find the overall result that cooperation is sometimes inhibited and sometimes enhanced in those network structures, with respect to the mixing population case. The differences are due to different update rules and depend on the gain-to-cost ratio. We analyse and qualitatively explain this behavior by using local topological arguments.
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation and, to some extent the timing of the operations, have a marked influence on the transient dynamics and on the amount of cooperation that can be established at equilibrium. We also study the dynamical behavior of the populations and their evolutionary stability.