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Lachlan J. Gunn

Publications and source records attributed to Lachlan J. Gunn.

15 recordsLinked to original sources

TrustMee: Self-Verifying Remote Attestation Evidence

Remote attestation allows a TEE to attest its own state to a remote party, and is used in the Confidential Computing ecosystem to provide assurance that data and code are available only to authorized hardware and software. This functionality can then be incorporated into higher-level platforms, allowing workloads to attest themselves to a remote party. However, supporting each new platform enlarges a Verifier's trusted computing base, since it must include code to verify the attestation evidence from each platform, often performing risky operations e.g., binary parsing. This means that emerging or niche Attester platforms cannot be supported by standard Verifier software, preventing them from interacting with the broader confidential computing ecosystem. We introduce self-verifying remote attestation evidence. Each attestation bundle identifies its verification logic in the form of a WebAssembly component that is downloaded by the Verifier and executed. This approach transforms evidence verification into a platform-agnostic functionality that is implemented once for all platforms: the Verifier executes the supplied verification logic to validate the evidence and incorporates its hash and, when available, the signer's public key as identity claims into the attestation result. As a result, Verifiers can validate attestation evidence without any platform-specific code; the verification logic is just another measurement whose reference value can be checked with existing mechanisms. We implement this concept as TrustMee, a platform-agnostic verification driver for the Trustee framework. We demonstrate self-verifying evidence for AMD SNP, Intel TDX, Intel SGX, Kata agent-policy appraisal, and ReCFA control-flow attestations, producing attestation claims in the standard EAT format. The last two are part of the software stack, and not supported by existing Verifiers such as Trustee.

cs.CR

PAL*M: Property Attestation for Large Generative Models

Machine learning property attestations allow provers (e.g., model providers or owners) to attest properties of their models/datasets to verifiers (e.g., regulators, customers), enabling accountability towards regulations and policies. But, current approaches do not support generative models or large datasets. We present PAL*M, a property attestation framework for large generative models, illustrated using large language models. PAL*M defines properties across training and inference, leverages confidential virtual machines with security-aware GPUs for coverage of CPU-GPU operations, and proposes using incremental multiset hashing over memory-mapped datasets to efficiently track their integrity. We implement PAL*M on Intel TDX+NVIDIA H100 and evaluate it using state-of-the-art models and datasets, showing PAL*M is efficient, incurring < 11% overhead for common operations. Finally, we use the Tamarin Prover symbolic verification tool to formally model PAL*M's property attestation protocol, confirming that its security guarantees are upheld under the defined threat model.

cs.CR

Data-Oblivious ML Accelerators using Hardware Security Extensions

Outsourced computation can put client data confidentiality at risk. Existing solutions are either inefficient or insufficiently secure: cryptographic techniques like fully-homomorphic encryption incur significant overheads, even with hardware assistance, while the complexity of hardware-assisted trusted execution environments has been exploited to leak secret data. Recent proposals such as BliMe and OISA show how dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) enforced in hardware can protect client data efficiently. They are designed to protect CPU-only workloads. However, many outsourced computing applications, like machine learning, make extensive use of accelerators. We address this gap with Dolma, which applies DIFT to the Gemmini matrix multiplication accelerator, efficiently guaranteeing client data confidentiality, even in the presence of malicious/vulnerable software and side channel attacks on the server. We show that accelerators can allow DIFT logic optimizations that significantly reduce area overhead compared with general-purpose processor architectures. Dolma is integrated with the BliMe framework to achieve end-to-end security guarantees. We evaluate Dolma on an FPGA using a ResNet-50 DNN model and show that it incurs low overheads for large configurations ($4.4\%$, $16.7\%$, $16.5\%$ for performance, resource usage and power, respectively, with a 32x32 configuration).

cs.CR

BliMe: Verifiably Secure Outsourced Computation with Hardware-Enforced Taint Tracking

Outsourced computing is widely used today. However, current approaches for protecting client data in outsourced computing fall short: use of cryptographic techniques like fully-homomorphic encryption incurs substantial costs, whereas use of hardware-assisted trusted execution environments has been shown to be vulnerable to run-time and side-channel attacks. We present Blinded Memory (BliMe), an architecture to realize efficient and secure outsourced computation. BliMe consists of a novel and minimal set of instruction set architecture (ISA) extensions implementing a taint-tracking policy to ensure the confidentiality of client data even in the presence of server vulnerabilities. To secure outsourced computation, the BliMe extensions can be used together with an attestable, fixed-function hardware security module (HSM) and an encryption engine that provides atomic decrypt-and-taint and encrypt-and-untaint operations. Clients rely on remote attestation and key agreement with the HSM to ensure that their data can be transferred securely to and from the encryption engine and will always be protected by BliMe's taint-tracking policy while at the server. We provide an RTL implementation BliMe-BOOM based on the BOOM RISC-V core. BliMe-BOOM requires no reduction in clock frequency relative to unmodified BOOM, and has minimal power ($<\!1.5\%$) and FPGA resource ($\leq\!9.0\%$) overheads. Various implementations of BliMe incur only moderate performance overhead ($8--25\%$). We also provide a machine-checked security proof of a simplified model ISA with BliMe extensions.

cs.CR

GrandDetAuto: Detecting Malicious Nodes in Large-Scale Autonomous Networks

Autonomous collaborative networks of devices are rapidly emerging in numerous domains, such as self-driving cars, smart factories, critical infrastructure, and Internet of Things in general. Although autonomy and self-organization are highly desired properties, they increase vulnerability to attacks. Hence, autonomous networks need dependable mechanisms to detect malicious devices in order to prevent compromise of the entire network. However, current mechanisms to detect malicious devices either require a trusted central entity or scale poorly. In this paper, we present GrandDetAuto, the first scheme to identify malicious devices efficiently within large autonomous networks of collaborating entities. GrandDetAuto functions without relying on a central trusted entity, works reliably for very large networks of devices, and is adaptable to a wide range of application scenarios thanks to interchangeable components. Our scheme uses random elections to embed integrity validation schemes in distributed consensus, providing a solution supporting tens of thousands of devices. We implemented and evaluated a concrete instance of GrandDetAuto on a network of embedded devices and conducted large-scale network simulations with up to 100000 nodes. Our results show the effectiveness and efficiency of our scheme, revealing logarithmic growth in run-time and message complexity with increasing network size. Moreover, we provide an extensive evaluation of key parameters showing that GrandDetAuto is applicable to many scenarios with diverse requirements.

cs.CR

Towards cryptographically-authenticated in-memory data structures

Modern processors include high-performance cryptographic functionalities such as Intel's AES-NI and ARM's Pointer Authentication that allow programs to efficiently authenticate data held by the program. Pointer Authentication is already used to protect return addresses in recent Apple devices, but as yet these structures have seen little use for the protection of general program data. In this paper, we show how cryptographically-authenticated data structures can be used to protect against attacks based on memory corruption, and show how they can be efficiently realized using widely available hardware-assisted cryptographic mechanisms. We present realizations of secure stacks and queues with minimal overall performance overhead (3.4%-6.4% slowdown of the OpenCV core performance tests), and provide proofs of correctness.

cs.CR

Linear measurements from nonlinear sensors: identifying distortion with incidental noise

Nonlinearity in many systems is heavily dependent on component variation and environmental factors such as temperature. This is often overcome by keeping signals close enough to the device's operating point that it appears approximately linear. But as the signal being measured becomes larger, the deviation from linearity increases, and the device's nonlinearity specification will be exceeded. This limits the range over which the device will produce directly useful measurements, often to far less than the device's safe range of operation.

eess.SP

PACStack: an Authenticated Call Stack

A popular run-time attack technique is to compromise the control-flow integrity of a program by modifying function return addresses on the stack. So far, shadow stacks have proven to be essential for comprehensively preventing return address manipulation. Shadow stacks record return addresses in integrity-protected memory secured with hardware-assistance or software access control. Software shadow stacks incur high overheads or trade off security for efficiency. Hardware-assisted shadow stacks are efficient and secure, but require the deployment of special-purpose hardware. We present authenticated call stack (ACS), an approach that uses chained message authentication codes (MACs). Our prototype, PACStack, uses the ARM general purpose hardware mechanism for pointer authentication (PA) to implement ACS. Via a rigorous security analysis, we show that PACStack achieves security comparable to hardware-assisted shadow stacks without requiring dedicated hardware. We demonstrate that PACStack's performance overhead is small (~3%).

cs.CR

Game theoretical modelling of network/cybersecurity

Game theory is an established branch of mathematics that offers a rich set of mathematical tools for multi-person strategic decision making that can be used to model the interactions of decision makers in security problems who compete for limited and shared resources. This article presents a review of the literature in the area of game theoretical modelling of network/cybersecurity.

cs.GT

Making Speculative BFT Resilient with Trusted Monotonic Counters

Consensus mechanisms used by popular distributed ledgers are highly scalable but notoriously inefficient. Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) protocols are efficient but far less scalable. Speculative BFT protocols such as Zyzzyva and Zyzzyva5 are efficient and scalable but require a trade-off: Zyzzyva requires only $3f + 1$ replicas to tolerate $f$ faults, but even a single slow replica will make Zyzzyva fall back to more expensive non-speculative operation. Zyzzyva5 does not require a non-speculative fallback, but requires $5f + 1$ replicas in order to tolerate $f$ faults. BFT variants using hardware-assisted trusted components can tolerate a greater proportion of faults, but require that every replica have this hardware. We present SACZyzzyva, addressing these concerns: resilience to slow replicas and requiring only $3f + 1$ replicas, with only one replica needing an active monotonic counter at any given time. We experimentally evaluate our protocols, demonstrating low latency and high scalability. We prove that SACZyzzyva is optimally robust and that trusted components cannot increase fault tolerance unless they are present in greater than two-thirds of replicas.

cs.CR

Safety in Numbers: Anonymization Makes Centralized Systems Trustworthy

Decentralized systems can be more resistant to operator mischief than centralized ones, but they are substantially harder to develop, deploy, and maintain. This cost is dramatically reduced if the decentralized part of the system can be made highly generic, and thus incorporated into many different applications. We show how existing anonymization systems can serve this purpose, securing a public database against equivocation by its operator without the need for cooperation by the database owner. We derive bounds on the probability of successful equivocation, and in doing so, we demonstrate that anonymization systems are not only important for user privacy, but that by providing privacy to machines they have a wider value within the internet infrastructure

cs.CR

Too good to be true: when overwhelming evidence fails to convince

Is it possible for a large sequence of measurements or observations, which support a hypothesis, to counterintuitively decrease our confidence? Can unanimous support be too good to be true? The assumption of independence is often made in good faith, however rarely is consideration given to whether a systemic failure has occurred. Taking this into account can cause certainty in a hypothesis to decrease as the evidence for it becomes apparently stronger. We perform a probabilistic Bayesian analysis of this effect with examples based on (i) archaeological evidence, (ii) weighing of legal evidence, and (iii) cryptographic primality testing. We find that even with surprisingly low systemic failure rates high confidence is very difficult to achieve and in particular we find that certain analyses of cryptographically-important numerical tests are highly optimistic, underestimating their false-negative rate by as much as a factor of $2^{80}$.

stat.AP

Functions of multivector variables

As is well known, the common elementary functions defined over the real numbers can be generalized to act not only over the complex number field but also over the skew (non-commuting) field of the quaternions. In this paper, we detail a number of elementary functions extended to act over the skew field of Clifford multivectors, in both two and three dimensions. Complex numbers, quaternions and Cartesian vectors can be described by the various components within a Clifford multivector and from our results we are able to demonstrate new inter-relationships between these algebraic systems. One key relationship that we discover is that a complex number raised to a vector power produces a quaternion thus combining these systems within a single equation. We also find a single formula that produces the square root, amplitude and inverse of a multivector over one, two and three dimensions. Finally, comparing the functions over different dimension we observe that $ C\ell \left (\Re^3 \right) $ provides a particularly versatile algebraic framework.

math.RA

A directional coupler attack against the Kish key distribution system

The Kish key distribution system has been proposed as a class ical alternative to quantum key distribution. The idealized Kish scheme elegantly promise s secure key distribution by exploiting thermal noise in a transmission line. However, we demonstrate that it is vulnerable to nonidealities in its components, such as the finite resistance of the transmission line connecting its endpoints. We introduce a novel attack against this nonideality using directional wave measurements, and experimentally demonstrate its efficacy. Our attack is based on causality: in a spatially distributed system, propagation is needed for thermodynamic equilibration, and that leaks information.

cs.CR

Physical-layer encryption on the public internet: a stochastic approach to the Kish-Sethuraman cipher

While information-theoretic security is often associated with the one-time pad and quantum key distribution, noisy transport media leave room for classical techniques and even covert operation. Transit times across the public internet exhibit a degree of randomness, and cannot be determined noiselessly by an eavesdropper. We demonstrate the use of these measurements for information-theoretically secure communication over the public internet.

cs.CR