arXiv subjects

Lance Ying

Publications and source records attributed to Lance Ying.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

PlayTrain: An Efficient Reinforcement Learning Framework for LLM-Generated Adaptable JavaScript Games

While many video-game environments (VGEs) have played crucial roles in advancing reinforcement learning (RL), developing novel VGEs or modifying existing ones to support new features, has been a laborious process requiring extensive hand-coding. Here we present PlayTrain, an RL framework that combines the abilities of large language models (LLMs) to robustly generate JavaScript (JS) games from a minimal human prompt, and an efficient pipeline that can run any JS game in a standard 'gym' environment. Not only are recent LLMs particularly good at writing JS code, but the JS format also allows users to easily play generated VGEs, while PlayTrain enables us to train RL agents on the exact same games. We demonstrate multiple use cases of PlayTrain, including cloning well-known Atari and ProcGen games in simple JS, where PlayTrain trains pixel-based agents end-to-end at over 1M agent-decisions per second on a single GPU node; and creating modified versions thereof (e.g., that support novel test sets, procedural generation logics, or game dynamics). Through PlayTrain, we reimagine RL VGE development: all we need is a single JS file, generated and modified through an LLM. We discuss promising future RL research directions that PlayTrain unlocks.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Using Theory of Mind to Arbitrate between Social and Non-social Learning

Social learning is a powerful mechanism through which agents learn about the world from others. However, humans sometimes choose direct experience over social learning, which can carry time and cognitive resource costs. How do people balance social and non-social learning? We propose a Rational Mentalizing model of the decision to engage in social learning. This model estimates the utility of social learning by reasoning about another agent's goal and the informativeness of their future actions. It then weighs the utility of social learning against the utility of non-social learning. Using a novel game where players choose between observing other agents or exploring the environment, we show that the Rational Mentalizing model can quantitatively capture human trade-offs between these strategies. These findings suggest that selective social learning is guided by 'Theory of Mind' in the service of utility maximization.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

Pragmatic Reasoning in Design

People can often understand and use novel artifacts after only a few interactions, suggesting that design choices communicate underlying affordances and causal structure. We propose a formal account of this process by framing cooperative, user-centered design as a cooperative game in which the user is the principal and the designer is an assistant. Inspired by prior work on pragmatic communication (e.g. RSA), our model treats a designer's design decisions as communicative signals and predicts user judgments via recursive mentalizing: designers make design decisions to trade off informativeness about the artifact with efficiency, and users infer the true model of the artifact by inverting this cooperative designer model. We evaluate the model in a design game where designers place visually identical keys on trays to help a user infer which keys unlock which doors in grid-world layouts. We find that pragmatic designer and user models better match human judgments than non-mentalizing literal baselines.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2026

Post-training makes large language models less human-like

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as surrogates for human participants, but it remains unclear which models best capture human behavior and why. To address this, we introduce Psych-201, a novel dataset that enables us to measure behavioral alignment at scale. We find that post-training -- the stage that turns base models into useful assistants -- consistently reduces alignment with human behavior across model families, sizes, and objectives. Moreover, this misalignment widens in newer model generations even as base models continue to improve. Finally, we find that persona-induction -- a popular technique for eliciting human-like behavior by conditioning models on participant-specific information -- does not improve predictions at the level of individuals. Taken together, our results suggest that the very processes that are currently employed to turn LLMs into useful assistants also make them less accurate models of human behavior.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Grounding Social Perception in Intuitive Physics

People infer rich social information from others' actions. These inferences are often constrained by the physical world: what agents can do, what obstacles permit, and how the physical actions of agents causally change an environment and other agents' mental states and behavior. We propose that such rich social perception is more than visual pattern matching, but rather a reasoning process grounded in an integration of intuitive psychology with intuitive physics. To test this hypothesis, we introduced PHASE (PHysically grounded Abstract Social Events), a large dataset of procedurally generated animations, depicting physically simulated two-agent interactions on a 2D surface. Each animation follows the style of the Heider and Simmel movie, with systematic variation in environment geometry, object dynamics, agent capacities, goals, and relationships (friendly/adversarial/neutral). We then present a computational model, SIMPLE, a physics-grounded Bayesian inverse planning model that integrates planning, probabilistic planning, and physics simulation to infer agents' goals and relations from their trajectories. Our experimental results showed that SIMPLE achieved high accuracy and agreement with human judgments across diverse scenarios, while feedforward baseline models -- including strong vision-language models -- and physics-agnostic inverse planning failed to achieve human-level performance and did not align with human judgments. These results suggest that our model provides a computational account for how people understand physically grounded social scenes by inverting a generative model of physics and agents.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2026

AI Gamestore: Scalable, Open-Ended Evaluation of Machine General Intelligence with Human Games

Rigorously evaluating machine intelligence against the broad spectrum of human general intelligence has become increasingly important and challenging in this era of rapid technological advance. Conventional AI benchmarks typically assess only narrow capabilities in a limited range of human activity. Most are also static, quickly saturating as developers explicitly or implicitly optimize for them. We propose that a more promising way to evaluate human-like general intelligence in AI systems is through a particularly strong form of general game playing: studying how and how well they play and learn to play \textbf{all conceivable human games}, in comparison to human players with the same level of experience, time, or other resources. We define a "human game" to be a game designed by humans for humans, and argue for the evaluative suitability of this space of all such games people can imagine and enjoy -- the "Multiverse of Human Games". Taking a first step towards this vision, we introduce the AI GameStore, a scalable and open-ended platform that uses LLMs with humans-in-the-loop to synthesize new representative human games, by automatically sourcing and adapting standardized and containerized variants of game environments from popular human digital gaming platforms. As a proof of concept, we generated 100 such games based on the top charts of Apple App Store and Steam, and evaluated seven frontier vision-language models (VLMs) on short episodes of play. The best models achieved less than 10\% of the human average score on the majority of the games, and especially struggled with games that challenge world-model learning, memory and planning. We conclude with a set of next steps for building out the AI GameStore as a practical way to measure and drive progress toward human-like general intelligence in machines.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Evaluating Language Models' Evaluations of Games

Reasoning is not just about solving problems -- it is also about evaluating which problems are worth solving at all. Evaluations of artificial intelligence (AI) systems primarily focused on problem solving, historically by studying how models play games such as chess and Go. In this paper, we advocate for a new paradigm that assesses AI systems' evaluation of games. First, we introduce a formalism for evaluating such evaluations. We then leverage a large-scale dataset of over 100 novel board games and over 450 human judgments to compare evaluations produced by modern language and reasoning models against those of people and symbolic computational agents. We consider two kinds of evaluative queries: assessing the payoff (or fairness) and the funness of games. These queries span two dimensions relevant to the design of evaluations of AI evaluations: how complex a query is to compute and how difficult a query is to quantify. Our results show that reasoning models are generally more aligned to people in their evaluations of games than non-reasoning language models. However, we observe a non-monotonic relationship: as models get closer to game-theoretic optimal, their fit to human data weakens. We also observe more "jaggedness" across models for assessing funness, in line with the greater difficulty of quantifying this query. Across queries and games, reasoning models show highly variable and unpredictable resource usage when assessing queries, pointing to the importance of imbuing more resource-rational meta-reasoning in language and reasoning models.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

ProToM: Promoting Prosocial Behaviour via Theory of Mind-Informed Feedback

While humans are inherently social creatures, the challenge of identifying when and how to assist and collaborate with others - particularly when pursuing independent goals - can hinder cooperation. To address this challenge, we aim to develop an AI system that provides useful feedback to promote prosocial behaviour - actions that benefit others, even when not directly aligned with one's own goals. We introduce ProToM, a Theory of Mind-informed facilitator that promotes prosocial actions in multi-agent systems by providing targeted, context-sensitive feedback to individual agents. ProToM first infers agents' goals using Bayesian inverse planning, then selects feedback to communicate by maximising expected utility, conditioned on the inferred goal distribution. We evaluate our approach against baselines in two multi-agent environments: Doors, Keys, and Gems, as well as Overcooked. Our results suggest that state-of-the-art large language and reasoning models fall short of communicating feedback that is both contextually grounded and well-timed - leading to higher communication overhead and task speedup. In contrast, ProToM provides targeted and helpful feedback, achieving a higher success rate, shorter task completion times, and is consistently preferred by human users.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Assessing Adaptive World Models in Machines with Novel Games

Human intelligence exhibits a remarkable capacity for rapid adaptation and effective problem-solving in novel and unfamiliar contexts. We argue that this profound adaptability is fundamentally linked to the efficient construction and refinement of internal representations of the environment, commonly referred to as world models, and we refer to this adaptation mechanism as world model induction. However, current understanding and evaluation of world models in artificial intelligence (AI) remains narrow, often focusing on static representations learned from training on massive corpora of data, instead of the efficiency and efficacy in learning these representations through interaction and exploration within a novel environment. In this Perspective, we provide a view of world model induction drawing on decades of research in cognitive science on how humans learn and adapt so efficiently; we then call for a new evaluation framework for assessing adaptive world models in AI. Concretely, we propose a new benchmarking paradigm based on suites of carefully designed games with genuine, deep and continually refreshing novelty in the underlying game structures -- we refer to this class of games as novel games. We detail key desiderata for constructing these games and propose appropriate metrics to explicitly challenge and evaluate the agent's ability for rapid world model induction. We hope that this new evaluation framework will inspire future evaluation efforts on world models in AI and provide a crucial step towards developing AI systems capable of human-like rapid adaptation and robust generalization -- a critical component of artificial general intelligence.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Modeling Open-World Cognition as On-Demand Synthesis of Probabilistic Models

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Adaptive Social Learning using Theory of Mind

Social learning is a powerful mechanism through which agents learn about the world from others. However, humans don't always choose to observe others, since social learning can carry time and cognitive resource costs. How do people balance social and non-social learning? In this paper, we propose a rational mentalizing model of the decision to engage in social learning. This model estimates the utility of social learning by reasoning about the other agent's goal and the informativity of their future actions. It then weighs the utility of social learning against the utility of self-exploration (non-social learning). Using a multi-player treasure hunt game, we show that our model can quantitatively capture human trade-offs between social and non-social learning. Furthermore, our results indicate that these two components allow agents to flexibly apply social learning to achieve their goals more efficiently.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2025

Language-Informed Synthesis of Rational Agent Models for Grounded Theory-of-Mind Reasoning On-The-Fly

Drawing real world social inferences usually requires taking into account information from multiple modalities. Language is a particularly powerful source of information in social settings, especially in novel situations where language can provide both abstract information about the environment dynamics and concrete specifics about an agent that cannot be easily visually observed. In this paper, we propose Language-Informed Rational Agent Synthesis (LIRAS), a framework for drawing context-specific social inferences that integrate linguistic and visual inputs. LIRAS frames multimodal social reasoning as a process of constructing structured but situation-specific agent and environment representations - leveraging multimodal language models to parse language and visual inputs into unified symbolic representations, over which a Bayesian inverse planning engine can be run to produce granular probabilistic judgments. On a range of existing and new social reasoning tasks derived from cognitive science experiments, we find that our model (instantiated with a comparatively lightweight VLM) outperforms ablations and state-of-the-art models in capturing human judgments across all domains.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

What's in the Box? Reasoning about Unseen Objects from Multimodal Cues

People regularly make inferences about objects in the world that they cannot see by flexibly integrating information from multiple sources: auditory and visual cues, language, and our prior beliefs and knowledge about the scene. How are we able to so flexibly integrate many sources of information to make sense of the world around us, even if we have no direct knowledge? In this work, we propose a neurosymbolic model that uses neural networks to parse open-ended multimodal inputs and then applies a Bayesian model to integrate different sources of information to evaluate different hypotheses. We evaluate our model with a novel object guessing game called ``What's in the Box?'' where humans and models watch a video clip of an experimenter shaking boxes and then try to guess the objects inside the boxes. Through a human experiment, we show that our model correlates strongly with human judgments, whereas unimodal ablated models and large multimodal neural model baselines show poor correlation.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Belief Attribution as Mental Explanation: The Role of Accuracy, Informativity, and Causality

A key feature of human theory-of-mind is the ability to attribute beliefs to other agents as mentalistic explanations for their behavior. But given the wide variety of beliefs that agents may hold about the world and the rich language we can use to express them, which specific beliefs are people inclined to attribute to others? In this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that people prefer to attribute beliefs that are good explanations for the behavior they observe. We develop a computational model that quantifies the explanatory strength of a (natural language) statement about an agent's beliefs via three factors: accuracy, informativity, and causal relevance to actions, each of which can be computed from a probabilistic generative model of belief-driven behavior. Using this model, we study the role of each factor in how people selectively attribute beliefs to other agents. We investigate this via an experiment where participants watch an agent collect keys hidden in boxes in order to reach a goal, then rank a set of statements describing the agent's beliefs about the boxes' contents. We find that accuracy and informativity perform reasonably well at predicting these rankings when combined, but that causal relevance is the single factor that best explains participants' responses.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

On Benchmarking Human-Like Intelligence in Machines

Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have yielded powerful computational models that, by learning from vast amounts of human-generated data, are increasingly posited as approximate models of human cognition. However, we argue that many current evaluation paradigms for AI are insufficient for assessing human-like cognitive capabilities in these models. We identify a set of key shortcomings: a lack of human-validated labels, inadequate representation of human response variability and uncertainty, and reliance on simplified and ecologically invalid tasks. We support our claims by conducting a human evaluation study on nine existing AI benchmarks, suggesting major limitations in task and label designs. To address these limitations, we propose five concrete recommendations for future AI evaluation efforts that will enable more rigorous and meaningful understanding of human-like cognitive capacities in AI models.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Hypothesis-Driven Theory-of-Mind Reasoning for Large Language Models

Existing LLM reasoning methods have shown impressive capabilities across various tasks, such as solving math and coding problems. However, applying these methods to scenarios without ground-truth answers or rule-based verification methods - such as tracking the mental states of an agent - remains challenging. Inspired by the sequential Monte Carlo algorithm, we introduce thought-tracing, an inference-time reasoning algorithm designed to trace the mental states of specific agents by generating hypotheses and weighting them based on observations without relying on ground-truth solutions to questions in datasets. Our algorithm is modeled after the Bayesian theory-of-mind framework, using LLMs to approximate probabilistic inference over agents' evolving mental states based on their perceptions and actions. We evaluate thought-tracing on diverse theory-of-mind benchmarks, demonstrating significant performance improvements compared to baseline LLMs. Our experiments also reveal interesting behaviors of the recent reasoning models - e.g., o3 and R1 - on theory-of-mind, highlighting the difference of social reasoning compared to other domains.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Pragmatic Embodied Spoken Instruction Following in Human-Robot Collaboration with Theory of Mind

Spoken language instructions are ubiquitous in agent collaboration. However, in real-world human-robot collaboration, following human spoken instructions can be challenging due to various speaker and environmental factors, such as background noise or mispronunciation. When faced with noisy auditory inputs, humans can leverage the collaborative context in the embodied environment to interpret noisy spoken instructions and take pragmatic assistive actions. In this paper, we present a cognitively inspired neurosymbolic model, Spoken Instruction Following through Theory of Mind (SIFToM), which leverages a Vision-Language Model with model-based mental inference to enable robots to pragmatically follow human instructions under diverse speech conditions. We test SIFToM in both simulated environments (VirtualHome) and real-world human-robot collaborative settings with human evaluations. Results show that SIFToM can significantly improve the performance of a lightweight base VLM (Gemini 2.5 Flash), outperforming state-of-the-art VLMs (Gemini 2.5 Pro) and approaching human-level accuracy on challenging spoken instruction following tasks.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2024

Understanding Epistemic Language with a Language-augmented Bayesian Theory of Mind

How do people understand and evaluate claims about others' beliefs, even though these beliefs cannot be directly observed? In this paper, we introduce a cognitive model of epistemic language interpretation, grounded in Bayesian inferences about other agents' goals, beliefs, and intentions: a language-augmented Bayesian theory-of-mind (LaBToM). By translating natural language into an epistemic ``language-of-thought'' with grammar-constrained LLM decoding, then evaluating these translations against the inferences produced by inverting a generative model of rational action and perception, LaBToM captures graded plausibility judgments of epistemic claims. We validate our model in an experiment where participants watch an agent navigate a maze to find keys hidden in boxes needed to reach their goal, then rate sentences about the agent's beliefs. In contrast with multimodal LLMs (GPT-4o, Gemini Pro) and ablated models, our model correlates highly with human judgments for a wide range of expressions, including modal language, uncertainty expressions, knowledge claims, likelihood comparisons, and attributions of false belief.

cs.CL↗