arXiv subjects

Lancelot Da Costa

Publications and source records attributed to Lancelot Da Costa.

33 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2023

Path integrals, particular kinds, and strange things

This paper describes a path integral formulation of the free energy principle. The ensuing account expresses the paths or trajectories that a particle takes as it evolves over time. The main results are a method or principle of least action that can be used to emulate the behaviour of particles in open exchange with their external milieu. Particles are defined by a particular partition, in which internal states are individuated from external states by active and sensory blanket states. The variational principle at hand allows one to interpret internal dynamics - of certain kinds of particles - as inferring external states that are hidden behind blanket states. We consider different kinds of particles, and to what extent they can be imbued with an elementary form of inference or sentience. Specifically, we consider the distinction between dissipative and conservative particles, inert and active particles and, finally, ordinary and strange particles. Strange particles can be described as inferring their own actions, endowing them with apparent autonomy or agency. In short - of the kinds of particles afforded by a particular partition - strange kinds may be apt for describing sentient behaviour.

nlin.AO↗

arXiv2023

The free energy principle made simpler but not too simple

This paper provides a concise description of the free energy principle, starting from a formulation of random dynamical systems in terms of a Langevin equation and ending with a Bayesian mechanics that can be read as a physics of sentience. It rehearses the key steps using standard results from statistical physics. These steps entail (i) establishing a particular partition of states based upon conditional independencies that inherit from sparsely coupled dynamics, (ii) unpacking the implications of this partition in terms of Bayesian inference and (iii) describing the paths of particular states with a variational principle of least action. Teleologically, the free energy principle offers a normative account of self-organisation in terms of optimal Bayesian design and decision-making, in the sense of maximising marginal likelihood or Bayesian model evidence. In summary, starting from a description of the world in terms of random dynamical systems, we end up with a description of self-organisation as sentient behaviour that can be interpreted as self-evidencing; namely, self-assembly, autopoiesis or active inference.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2023

On Bayesian Mechanics: A Physics of and by Beliefs

The aim of this paper is to introduce a field of study that has emerged over the last decade called Bayesian mechanics. Bayesian mechanics is a probabilistic mechanics, comprising tools that enable us to model systems endowed with a particular partition (i.e., into particles), where the internal states (or the trajectories of internal states) of a particular system encode the parameters of beliefs about external states (or their trajectories). These tools allow us to write down mechanical theories for systems that look as if they are estimating posterior probability distributions over the causes of their sensory states. This provides a formal language for modelling the constraints, forces, potentials, and other quantities determining the dynamics of such systems, especially as they entail dynamics on a space of beliefs (i.e., on a statistical manifold). Here, we will review the state of the art in the literature on the free energy principle, distinguishing between three ways in which Bayesian mechanics has been applied to particular systems (i.e., path-tracking, mode-tracking, and mode-matching). We go on to examine a duality between the free energy principle and the constrained maximum entropy principle, both of which lie at the heart of Bayesian mechanics, and discuss its implications.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2022

Modelling non-reinforced preferences using selective attention

How can artificial agents learn non-reinforced preferences to continuously adapt their behaviour to a changing environment? We decompose this question into two challenges: ($i$) encoding diverse memories and ($ii$) selectively attending to these for preference formation. Our proposed \emph{no}n-\emph{re}inforced preference learning mechanism using selective attention, \textsc{Nore}, addresses both by leveraging the agent's world model to collect a diverse set of experiences which are interleaved with imagined roll-outs to encode memories. These memories are selectively attended to, using attention and gating blocks, to update agent's preferences. We validate \textsc{Nore} in a modified OpenAI Gym FrozenLake environment (without any external signal) with and without volatility under a fixed model of the environment -- and compare its behaviour to \textsc{Pepper}, a Hebbian preference learning mechanism. We demonstrate that \textsc{Nore} provides a straightforward framework to induce exploratory preferences in the absence of external signals.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Geometric Methods for Sampling, Optimisation, Inference and Adaptive Agents

In this chapter, we identify fundamental geometric structures that underlie the problems of sampling, optimisation, inference and adaptive decision-making. Based on this identification, we derive algorithms that exploit these geometric structures to solve these problems efficiently. We show that a wide range of geometric theories emerge naturally in these fields, ranging from measure-preserving processes, information divergences, Poisson geometry, and geometric integration. Specifically, we explain how (i) leveraging the symplectic geometry of Hamiltonian systems enable us to construct (accelerated) sampling and optimisation methods, (ii) the theory of Hilbertian subspaces and Stein operators provides a general methodology to obtain robust estimators, (iii) preserving the information geometry of decision-making yields adaptive agents that perform active inference. Throughout, we emphasise the rich connections between these fields; e.g., inference draws on sampling and optimisation, and adaptive decision-making assesses decisions by inferring their counterfactual consequences. Our exposition provides a conceptual overview of underlying ideas, rather than a technical discussion, which can be found in the references herein.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2022

Reward Maximisation through Discrete Active Inference

Active inference is a probabilistic framework for modelling the behaviour of biological and artificial agents, which derives from the principle of minimising free energy. In recent years, this framework has successfully been applied to a variety of situations where the goal was to maximise reward, offering comparable and sometimes superior performance to alternative approaches. In this paper, we clarify the connection between reward maximisation and active inference by demonstrating how and when active inference agents perform actions that are optimal for maximising reward. Precisely, we show the conditions under which active inference produces the optimal solution to the Bellman equation--a formulation that underlies several approaches to model-based reinforcement learning and control. On partially observed Markov decision processes, the standard active inference scheme can produce Bellman optimal actions for planning horizons of 1, but not beyond. In contrast, a recently developed recursive active inference scheme (sophisticated inference) can produce Bellman optimal actions on any finite temporal horizon. We append the analysis with a discussion of the broader relationship between active inference and reinforcement learning.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

Sparse coupling and Markov blankets: A comment on "How particular is the physics of the Free Energy Principle?" by Aguilera, Millidge, Tschantz and Buckley

In this commentary, we respond to a technical analysis of the Free Energy Principle (hereafter: FEP) presented in "How particular is the physics of the Free Energy Principle" by Aguilera et al. In the target article, the authors analyzed certain sparsely coupled stochastic differential equations whose non-equilibrium steady-state densities are claimed--in previous FEP literature--to have a Markov blanket. The authors demonstrate that in general, Markov blankets are not guaranteed to follow from sparse coupling. The current commentary explains the relationship between sparse coupling and Markov blankets in the case of Gaussian steady-state densities. We precisely derive conditions under which causal coupling leads--or does not lead--to Markov blankets. Importantly, our derivations hold for both linear and non-linear stochastic differential equations. This result may shed light on the sorts of systems which we expect to have Markov blankets. Future work should focus on verifying whether these sorts of constraints are satisfied in realistic models of sparsely coupled systems.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2022

Branching Time Active Inference: the theory and its generality

Over the last 10 to 15 years, active inference has helped to explain various brain mechanisms from habit formation to dopaminergic discharge and even modelling curiosity. However, the current implementations suffer from an exponential (space and time) complexity class when computing the prior over all the possible policies up to the time-horizon. Fountas et al (2020) used Monte Carlo tree search to address this problem, leading to impressive results in two different tasks. In this paper, we present an alternative framework that aims to unify tree search and active inference by casting planning as a structure learning problem. Two tree search algorithms are then presented. The first propagates the expected free energy forward in time (i.e., towards the leaves), while the second propagates it backward (i.e., towards the root). Then, we demonstrate that forward and backward propagations are related to active inference and sophisticated inference, respectively, thereby clarifying the differences between those two planning strategies.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

Bayesian Mechanics for Stationary Processes

This paper develops a Bayesian mechanics for adaptive systems. Firstly, we model the interface between a system and its environment with a Markov blanket. This affords conditions under which states internal to the blanket encode information about external states. Second, we introduce dynamics and represent adaptive systems as Markov blankets at steady-state. This allows us to identify a wide class of systems whose internal states appear to infer external states, consistent with variational inference in Bayesian statistics and theoretical neuroscience. Finally, we partition the blanket into sensory and active states. It follows that active states can be seen as performing active inference and well-known forms of stochastic control (such as PID control), which are prominent formulations of adaptive behaviour in theoretical biology and engineering.

math-ph↗

arXiv2021

Active inference, Bayesian optimal design, and expected utility

Active inference, a corollary of the free energy principle, is a formal way of describing the behavior of certain kinds of random dynamical systems that have the appearance of sentience. In this chapter, we describe how active inference combines Bayesian decision theory and optimal Bayesian design principles under a single imperative to minimize expected free energy. It is this aspect of active inference that allows for the natural emergence of information-seeking behavior. When removing prior outcomes preferences from expected free energy, active inference reduces to optimal Bayesian design, i.e., information gain maximization. Conversely, active inference reduces to Bayesian decision theory in the absence of ambiguity and relative risk, i.e., expected utility maximization. Using these limiting cases, we illustrate how behaviors differ when agents select actions that optimize expected utility, expected information gain, and expected free energy. Our T-maze simulations show optimizing expected free energy produces goal-directed information-seeking behavior while optimizing expected utility induces purely exploitive behavior and maximizing information gain engenders intrinsically motivated behavior.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2021

Bayesian brains and the Rényi divergence

Under the Bayesian brain hypothesis, behavioural variations can be attributed to different priors over generative model parameters. This provides a formal explanation for why individuals exhibit inconsistent behavioural preferences when confronted with similar choices. For example, greedy preferences are a consequence of confident (or precise) beliefs over certain outcomes. Here, we offer an alternative account of behavioural variability using Rényi divergences and their associated variational bounds. Rényi bounds are analogous to the variational free energy (or evidence lower bound) and can be derived under the same assumptions. Importantly, these bounds provide a formal way to establish behavioural differences through an $α$ parameter, given fixed priors. This rests on changes in $α$ that alter the bound (on a continuous scale), inducing different posterior estimates and consequent variations in behaviour. Thus, it looks as if individuals have different priors, and have reached different conclusions. More specifically, $α\to 0^{+}$ optimisation leads to mass-covering variational estimates and increased variability in choice behaviour. Furthermore, $α\to + \infty$ optimisation leads to mass-seeking variational posteriors and greedy preferences. We exemplify this formulation through simulations of the multi-armed bandit task. We note that these $α$ parameterisations may be especially relevant, i.e., shape preferences, when the true posterior is not in the same family of distributions as the assumed (simpler) approximate density, which may be the case in many real-world scenarios. The ensuing departure from vanilla variational inference provides a potentially useful explanation for differences in behavioural preferences of biological (or artificial) agents under the assumption that the brain performs variational Bayesian inference.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2021

Neural dynamics under active inference: plausibility and efficiency of information processing

Active inference is a normative framework for explaining behaviour under the free energy principle -- a theory of self-organisation originating in neuroscience. It specifies neuronal dynamics for state-estimation in terms of a descent on (variational) free energy -- a measure of the fit between an internal (generative) model and sensory observations. The free energy gradient is a prediction error -- plausibly encoded in the average membrane potentials of neuronal populations. Conversely, the expected probability of a state can be expressed in terms of neuronal firing rates. We show that this is consistent with current models of neuronal dynamics and establish face validity by synthesising plausible electrophysiological responses. We then show that these neuronal dynamics approximate natural gradient descent, a well-known optimisation algorithm from information geometry that follows the steepest descent of the objective in information space. We compare the information length of belief updating in both schemes, a measure of the distance traveled in information space that has a direct interpretation in terms of metabolic cost. We show that neural dynamics under active inference are metabolically efficient and suggest that neural representations in biological agents may evolve by approximating steepest descent in information space towards the point of optimal inference.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2020

Sophisticated Inference

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behaviour, from which special and important cases can be derived, e.g., reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design, etc. Active inference resolves the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences, by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference, using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about 'what would happen if I did that' to 'what would I believe about what would happen if I did that'. The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states, as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme, using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2020

Active inference on discrete state-spaces: a synthesis

Active inference is a normative principle underwriting perception, action, planning, decision-making and learning in biological or artificial agents. From its inception, its associated process theory has grown to incorporate complex generative models, enabling simulation of a wide range of complex behaviours. Due to successive developments in active inference, it is often difficult to see how its underlying principle relates to process theories and practical implementation. In this paper, we try to bridge this gap by providing a complete mathematical synthesis of active inference on discrete state-space models. This technical summary provides an overview of the theory, derives neuronal dynamics from first principles and relates this dynamics to biological processes. Furthermore, this paper provides a fundamental building block needed to understand active inference for mixed generative models; allowing continuous sensations to inform discrete representations. This paper may be used as follows: to guide research towards outstanding challenges, a practical guide on how to implement active inference to simulate experimental behaviour, or a pointer towards various in-silico neurophysiological responses that may be used to make empirical predictions.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2020

Some interesting observations on the free energy principle

Biehl et al (2020) present some interesting observations on an early formulation of the free energy principle in (Friston, 2013). We use these observations to scaffold a discussion of the technical arguments that underwrite the free energy principle. This discussion focuses on solenoidal coupling between various (subsets of) states in sparsely coupled systems that possess a Markov blanket - and the distinction between exact and approximate Bayesian inference, implied by the ensuing Bayesian mechanics.

q-bio.NC↗