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Lane A. Hemaspaandra

Publications and source records attributed to Lane A. Hemaspaandra.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources
arXiv2008

Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control

Electoral control refers to attempts by an election's organizer ("the chair") to influence the outcome by adding/deleting/partitioning voters or candidates. The groundbreaking work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] on (constructive) control proposes computational complexity as a means of resisting control attempts: Look for election systems where the chair's task in seeking control is itself computationally infeasible. We introduce and study a method of combining two or more candidate-anonymous election schemes in such a way that the combined scheme possesses all the resistances to control (i.e., all the NP-hardnesses of control) possessed by any of its constituents: It combines their strengths. From this and new resistance constructions, we prove for the first time that there exists an election scheme that is resistant to all twenty standard types of electoral control.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2008

How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?

We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by a certain amount of bribing voters a specified candidate can be made the election's winner? We study this problem for election systems as varied as scoring protocols and Dodgson voting, and in a variety of settings regarding homogeneous-vs.-nonhomogeneous electorate bribability, bounded-size-vs.-arbitrary-sized candidate sets, weighted-vs.-unweighted voters, and succinct-vs.-nonsuccinct input specification. We obtain both polynomial-time bribery algorithms and proofs of the intractability of bribery, and indeed our results show that the complexity of bribery is extremely sensitive to the setting. For example, we find settings in which bribery is NP-complete but manipulation (by voters) is in P, and we find settings in which bribing weighted voters is NP-complete but bribing voters with individual bribe thresholds is in P. For the broad class of elections (including plurality, Borda, k-approval, and veto) known as scoring protocols, we prove a dichotomy result for bribery of weighted voters: We find a simple-to-evaluate condition that classifies every case as either NP-complete or in P.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2008

Frequency of Correctness versus Average-Case Polynomial Time and Generalized Juntas

We prove that every distributional problem solvable in polynomial time on the average with respect to the uniform distribution has a frequently self-knowingly correct polynomial-time algorithm. We also study some features of probability weight of correctness with respect to generalizations of Procaccia and Rosenschein's junta distributions [PR07b].

cs.CC↗
arXiv2008

The Complexity of Power-Index Comparison

We study the complexity of the following problem: Given two weighted voting games G' and G'' that each contain a player p, in which of these games is p's power index value higher? We study this problem with respect to both the Shapley-Shubik power index [SS54] and the Banzhaf power index [Ban65,DS79]. Our main result is that for both of these power indices the problem is complete for probabilistic polynomial time (i.e., is PP-complete). We apply our results to partially resolve some recently proposed problems regarding the complexity of weighted voting games. We also study the complexity of the raw Shapley-Shubik power index. Deng and Papadimitriou [DP94] showed that the raw Shapley-Shubik power index is #P-metric-complete. We strengthen this by showing that the raw Shapley-Shubik power index is many-one complete for #P. And our strengthening cannot possibly be further improved to parsimonious completeness, since we observe that, in contrast with the raw Banzhaf power index, the raw Shapley-Shubik power index is not #P-parsimonious-complete.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2007

Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control

Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [FHHR07] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland^1) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland^0) of Copeland voting are computationally resistant to many, yet not all, types of constructive control and that they also provide broad resistance to bribery. We study a parameterized version of Copeland voting, denoted by Copeland^alpha where the parameter alpha is a rational number between 0 and 1 that specifies how ties are valued in the pairwise comparisons of candidates in Copeland elections. We establish resistance or vulnerability results, in every previously studied control scenario, for Copeland^alpha, for each rational alpha, 0 <alpha < 1. In particular, we prove that Copeland^0.5, the system commonly referred to as ``Copeland voting,'' provides full resistance to constructive control. Among the systems with a polynomial-time winner problem, this is the first natural election system proven to have full resistance to constructive control. Results on bribery and fixed-parameter tractability of bounded-case control proven for Copeland^0 and Copeland^1 in [FHHR07] are extended to Copeland^alpha for each rational alpha, 0 < alpha < 1; we also give results in more flexible models such as microbribery and extended control.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2007

Enforcing and Defying Associativity, Commutativity, Totality, and Strong Noninvertibility for One-Way Functions in Complexity Theory

Rabi and Sherman [RS97,RS93] proved that the hardness of factoring is a sufficient condition for there to exist one-way functions (i.e., p-time computable, honest, p-time noninvertible functions; this paper is in the worst-case model, not the average-case model) that are total, commutative, and associative but not strongly noninvertible. In this paper we improve the sufficient condition to ``P does not equal NP.'' More generally, in this paper we completely characterize which types of one-way functions stand or fall together with (plain) one-way functions--equivalently, stand or fall together with P not equaling NP. We look at the four attributes used in Rabi and Sherman's seminal work on algebraic properties of one-way functions (see [RS97,RS93]) and subsequent papers--strongness (of noninvertibility), totality, commutativity, and associativity--and for each attribute, we allow it to be required to hold, required to fail, or ``don't care.'' In this categorization there are 3^4 = 81 potential types of one-way functions. We prove that each of these 81 feature-laden types stand or fall together with the existence of (plain) one-way functions.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2007

Guarantees for the Success Frequency of an Algorithm for Finding Dodgson-Election Winners

In the year 1876 the mathematician Charles Dodgson, who wrote fiction under the now more famous name of Lewis Carroll, devised a beautiful voting system that has long fascinated political scientists. However, determining the winner of a Dodgson election is known to be complete for the Θ_2^p level of the polynomial hierarchy. This implies that unless P=NP no polynomial-time solution to this problem exists, and unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to NP the problem is not even in NP. Nonetheless, we prove that when the number of voters is much greater than the number of candidates--although the number of voters may still be polynomial in the number of candidates--a simple greedy algorithm very frequently finds the Dodgson winners in such a way that it ``knows'' that it has found them, and furthermore the algorithm never incorrectly declares a nonwinner to be a winner.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2007

On Approximating Optimal Weighted Lobbying, and Frequency of Correctness versus Average-Case Polynomial Time

We investigate issues related to two hard problems related to voting, the optimal weighted lobbying problem and the winner problem for Dodgson elections. Regarding the former, Christian et al. [CFRS06] showed that optimal lobbying is intractable in the sense of parameterized complexity. We provide an efficient greedy algorithm that achieves a logarithmic approximation ratio for this problem and even for a more general variant--optimal weighted lobbying. We prove that essentially no better approximation ratio than ours can be proven for this greedy algorithm. The problem of determining Dodgson winners is known to be complete for parallel access to NP [HHR97]. Homan and Hemaspaandra [HH06] proposed an efficient greedy heuristic for finding Dodgson winners with a guaranteed frequency of success, and their heuristic is a ``frequently self-knowingly correct algorithm.'' We prove that every distributional problem solvable in polynomial time on the average with respect to the uniform distribution has a frequently self-knowingly correct polynomial-time algorithm. Furthermore, we study some features of probability weight of correctness with respect to Procaccia and Rosenschein's junta distributions [PR07].

cs.GT↗
arXiv2006

The Consequences of Eliminating NP Solutions

Given a function based on the computation of an NP machine, can one in general eliminate some solutions? That is, can one in general decrease the ambiguity? This simple question remains, even after extensive study by many researchers over many years, mostly unanswered. However, complexity-theoretic consequences and enabling conditions are known. In this tutorial-style article we look at some of those, focusing on the most natural framings: reducing the number of solutions of NP functions, refining the solutions of NP functions, and subtracting from or otherwise shrinking #P functions. We will see how small advice strings are important here, but we also will see how increasing advice size to achieve robustness is central to the proof of a key ambiguity-reduction result for NP functions.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2006

Query-Monotonic Turing Reductions

We study reductions that limit the extreme adaptivity of Turing reductions. In particular, we study reductions that make a rapid, structured progression through the set to which they are reducing: Each query is strictly longer (shorter) than the previous one. We call these reductions query-increasing (query-decreasing) Turing reductions. We also study query-nonincreasing (query-nondecreasing) Turing reductions. These are Turing reductions in which the sequence of query lengths is nonincreasing (nondecreasing). We ask whether these restrictions in fact limit the power of reductions. We prove that query-increasing and query-decreasing Turing reductions are incomparable with (that is, are neither strictly stronger than nor strictly weaker than) truth-table reductions and are strictly weaker than Turing reductions. In addition, we prove that query-nonincreasing and query-nondecreasing Turing reductions are strictly stronger than truth-table reductions and strictly weaker than Turing reductions. Despite the fact that we prove query-increasing and query-decreasing Turing reductions to in the general case be strictly weaker than Turing reductions, we identify a broad class of sets A for which any set that Turing reduces to A will also reduce to A via both query-increasing and query-decreasing Turing reductions. In particular, this holds for all tight paddable sets, where a set is said to be tight paddable exactly if it is paddable via a function whose output length is bounded tightly both from above and from below in the length of the input. We prove that many natural NP-complete problems such as satisfiability, clique, and vertex cover are tight paddable.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2005

P-Selectivity, Immunity, and the Power of One Bit

We prove that P-sel, the class of all P-selective sets, is EXP-immune, but is not EXP/1-immune. That is, we prove that some infinite P-selective set has no infinite EXP-time subset, but we also prove that every infinite P-selective set has some infinite subset in EXP/1. Informally put, the immunity of P-sel is so fragile that it is pierced by a single bit of information. The above claims follow from broader results that we obtain about the immunity of the P-selective sets. In particular, we prove that for every recursive function f, P-sel is DTIME(f)-immune. Yet we also prove that P-sel is not Π_2^p/1-immune.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2005

Cluster Computing and the Power of Edge Recognition

We study the robustness--the invariance under definition changes--of the cluster class CL#P [HHKW05]. This class contains each #P function that is computed by a balanced Turing machine whose accepting paths always form a cluster with respect to some length-respecting total order with efficient adjacency checks. The definition of CL#P is heavily influenced by the defining paper's focus on (global) orders. In contrast, we define a cluster class, CLU#P, to capture what seems to us a more natural model of cluster computing. We prove that the naturalness is costless: CL#P = CLU#P. Then we exploit the more natural, flexible features of CLU#P to prove new robustness results for CL#P and to expand what is known about the closure properties of CL#P. The complexity of recognizing edges--of an ordered collection of computation paths or of a cluster of accepting computation paths--is central to this study. Most particularly, our proofs exploit the power of unique discovery of edges--the ability of nondeterministic functions to, in certain settings, discover on exactly one (in some cases, on at most one) computation path a critical piece of information regarding edges of orderings or clusters.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2005

Open Questions in the Theory of Semifeasible Computation

The study of semifeasible algorithms was initiated by Selman's work a quarter of century ago [Sel79,Sel81,Sel82]. Informally put, this research stream studies the power of those sets L for which there is a deterministic (or in some cases, the function may belong to one of various nondeterministic function classes) polynomial-time function f such that when at least one of x and y belongs to L, then f(x,y) \in L \cap \{x,y\}. The intuition here is that it is saying: ``Regarding membership in L, if you put a gun to my head and forced me to bet on one of x or y as belonging to L, my money would be on f(x,y).'' In this article, we present a number of open problems from the theory of semifeasible algorithms. For each we present its background and review what partial results, if any, are known.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2005

The Complexity of Kings

A king in a directed graph is a node from which each node in the graph can be reached via paths of length at most two. There is a broad literature on tournaments (completely oriented digraphs), and it has been known for more than half a century that all tournaments have at least one king [Lan53]. Recently, kings have proven useful in theoretical computer science, in particular in the study of the complexity of the semifeasible sets [HNP98,HT05] and in the study of the complexity of reachability problems [Tan01,NT02]. In this paper, we study the complexity of recognizing kings. For each succinctly specified family of tournaments, the king problem is known to belong to $Π_2^p$ [HOZZ]. We prove that this bound is optimal: We construct a succinctly specified tournament family whose king problem is $Π_2^p$-complete. It follows easily from our proof approach that the problem of testing kingship in succinctly specified graphs (which need not be tournaments) is $Π_2^p$-complete. We also obtain $Π_2^p$-completeness results for k-kings in succinctly specified j-partite tournaments, $k,j \geq 2$, and we generalize our main construction to show that $Π_2^p$-completeness holds for testing k-kingship in succinctly specified families of tournaments for all $k \geq 2$.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2005

Dichotomy for Voting Systems

Scoring protocols are a broad class of voting systems. Each is defined by a vector $(α_1,α_2,...,α_m)$, $α_1 \geq α_2 \geq >... \geq α_m$, of integers such that each voter contributes $α_1$ points to his/her first choice, $α_2$ points to his/her second choice, and so on, and any candidate receiving the most points is a winner. What is it about scoring-protocol election systems that makes some have the desirable property of being NP-complete to manipulate, while others can be manipulated in polynomial time? We find the complete, dichotomizing answer: Diversity of dislike. Every scoring-protocol election system having two or more point values assigned to candidates other than the favorite--i.e., having $||\{α_i \condition 2 \leq i \leq m\}||\geq 2$--is NP-complete to manipulate. Every other scoring-protocol election system can be manipulated in polynomial time. In effect, we show that--other than trivial systems (where all candidates alway tie), plurality voting, and plurality voting's transparently disguised translations--\emph{every} scoring-protocol election system is NP-complete to manipulate.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2005

The Complexity of Computing the Size of an Interval

Given a p-order A over a universe of strings (i.e., a transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric relation such that if (x, y) is an element of A then |x| is polynomially bounded by |y|), an interval size function of A returns, for each string x in the universe, the number of strings in the interval between strings b(x) and t(x) (with respect to A), where b(x) and t(x) are functions that are polynomial-time computable in the length of x. By choosing sets of interval size functions based on feasibility requirements for their underlying p-orders, we obtain new characterizations of complexity classes. We prove that the set of all interval size functions whose underlying p-orders are polynomial-time decidable is exactly #P. We show that the interval size functions for orders with polynomial-time adjacency checks are closely related to the class FPSPACE(poly). Indeed, FPSPACE(poly) is exactly the class of all nonnegative functions that are an interval size function minus a polynomial-time computable function. We study two important functions in relation to interval size functions. The function #DIV maps each natural number n to the number of nontrivial divisors of n. We show that #DIV is an interval size function of a polynomial-time decidable partial p-order with polynomial-time adjacency checks. The function #MONSAT maps each monotone boolean formula F to the number of satisfying assignments of F. We show that #MONSAT is an interval size function of a polynomial-time decidable total p-order with polynomial-time adjacency checks. Finally, we explore the related notion of cluster computation.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2005

Algebraic Properties for Selector Functions

The nondeterministic advice complexity of the P-selective sets is known to be exactly linear. Regarding the deterministic advice complexity of the P-selective sets--i.e., the amount of Karp--Lipton advice needed for polynomial-time machines to recognize them in general--the best current upper bound is quadratic [Ko, 1983] and the best current lower bound is linear [Hemaspaandra and Torenvliet, 1996]. We prove that every associatively P-selective set is commutatively, associatively P-selective. Using this, we establish an algebraic sufficient condition for the P-selective sets to have a linear upper bound (which thus would match the existing lower bound) on their deterministic advice complexity: If all P-selective sets are associatively P-selective then the deterministic advice complexity of the P-selective sets is linear. The weakest previously known sufficient condition was P=NP. We also establish related results for algebraic properties of, and advice complexity of, the nondeterministically selective sets.

cs.CC↗