arXiv subjects

Larissa Albantakis

Publications and source records attributed to Larissa Albantakis.

17 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Only what exists can cause: An intrinsic powers view of free will

This essay addresses the implications of integrated information theory (IIT) for free will. IIT is a theory of what consciousness is and of how its presence and quality can be accounted for in physical terms. According to IIT, the presence of consciousness is accounted for by a maximum of cause-effect power in the brain. Moreover, the way an experience feels is accounted for by how that cause-effect power is structured. If IIT is right, we do have free will in a genuine sense: we have alternatives, reasons, and values, we make decisions, and we-not our neurons or atoms-are the cause of our willed actions and bear responsibility for them. IIT's argument for genuine free will hinges on the proper understanding of consciousness as intrinsic existence, captured by its intrinsic powers ontology: what exists absolutely, in physical terms, are intrinsic entities, and only what exists can cause.

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arXiv2025

On the utility of toy models for theories of consciousness

Toy models are highly idealized and deliberately simplified models that retain only the essential features of a system in order to explore specific theoretical questions. Long used in physics and other sciences, they have recently begun to play a more visible role in consciousness research. This chapter examines the potential utility of toy models for developing and evaluating scientific theories of consciousness in terms of their ability to clarify theoretical frameworks, test assumptions, and illuminate philosophical challenges. Drawing primarily on examples from Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Global Workspace Theory (GWT), I show how these simplified systems could make abstract concepts more tangible, enabling researchers to probe the coherence, consistency, and implications of competing frameworks. In addition to supporting theory development, toy models can also address specific features of experience, as exemplified by the account of spatial extendedness and temporal flow provided by integrated information theory (IIT) and recent theory-independent structural approaches. Moreover, toy models bring philosophical debates into sharper focus, such as the distinction between functional and structural theories of consciousness. By bridging abstract claims and empirical inquiry, toy models provide essential insights into the challenges of building comprehensive theories of consciousness.

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arXiv2025

Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness

Developments in machine learning and computing power suggest that artificial general intelligence is within reach. This raises the question of artificial consciousness: if a computer were to be functionally equivalent to a human, being able to do all we do, would it experience sights, sounds, and thoughts, as we do when we are conscious? Answering this question in a principled manner can only be done on the basis of a theory of consciousness that is grounded in phenomenology and that states the necessary and sufficient conditions for any system, evolved or engineered, to support subjective experience. Here we employ Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which provides principled tools to determine whether a system is conscious, to what degree, and the content of its experience. We consider pairs of systems constituted of simple Boolean units, one of which -- a basic stored-program computer -- simulates the other with full functional equivalence. By applying the principles of IIT, we demonstrate that (i) two systems can be functionally equivalent without being phenomenally equivalent, and (ii) that this conclusion is not dependent on the simulated system's function. We further demonstrate that, according to IIT, it is possible for a digital computer to simulate our behavior, possibly even by simulating the neurons in our brain, without replicating our experience. This contrasts sharply with computational functionalism, the thesis that performing computations of the right kind is necessary and sufficient for consciousness.

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arXiv2023

Measuring the integrated information of a quantum mechanism

Originally conceived as a theory of consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT) provides a theoretical framework intended to characterize the compositional causal information that a system, in its current state, specifies about itself. However, it remains to be determined whether IIT as a theory of consciousness is compatible with quantum mechanics as a theory of microphysics. Here, we present an extension of IIT's latest formalism to evaluate the mechanism integrated information ($φ$) of a system subset to finite-dimensional quantum systems (e.g., quantum logic gates). To that end, we translate a recently developed, unique measure of intrinsic information into a density matrix formulation, and extend the notion of conditional independence to accommodate quantum entanglement. The compositional nature of the IIT analysis might shed some light on the internal structure of composite quantum states and operators that cannot be obtained using standard information-theoretical analysis. Finally, our results should inform theoretical arguments about the link between consciousness, causation, and physics from the classical to the quantum.

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arXiv2022

Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms

This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0. IIT aims to account for the properties of experience in physical (operational) terms. It identifies the essential properties of experience (axioms), infers the necessary and sufficient properties that its substrate must satisfy (postulates), and expresses them in mathematical terms. In principle, the postulates can be applied to any system of units in a state to determine whether it is conscious, to what degree, and in what way. IIT offers a parsimonious explanation of empirical evidence, makes testable predictions, and permits inferences and extrapolations. IIT 4.0 incorporates several developments of the past ten years, including a more accurate translation of axioms into postulates and mathematical expressions, the introduction of a unique measure of intrinsic information that is consistent with the postulates, and an explicit assessment of causal relations. By fully unfolding a system's irreducible cause-effect power, the distinctions and relations specified by a substrate can account for the quality of experience.

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arXiv2022

System Integrated Information

Integrated information theory (IIT) starts from consciousness itself and identifies a set of properties (axioms) that are true of every conceivable experience. The axioms are translated into a set of postulates about the substrate of consciousness (called a complex), which are then used to formulate a mathematical framework for assessing both the quality and quantity of experience. The explanatory identity proposed by IIT is that an experience is identical to the cause-effect structure unfolded from a maximally irreducible substrate (a $Φ$-structure). In this work we introduce a definition for the integrated information of a system ($φ_s$) that is based on the existence, intrinsicality, information, and integration postulates of IIT. We explore how notions of determinism, degeneracy, and fault lines in the connectivity impact system integrated information. We then demonstrate how the proposed measure identifies complexes as systems whose $φ_s$ is greater than the $φ_s$ of any overlapping candidate systems.

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arXiv2021

What we are is more than what we do

If we take the subjective character of consciousness seriously, consciousness becomes a matter of "being" rather than "doing". Because "doing" can be dissociated from "being", functional criteria alone are insufficient to decide whether a system possesses the necessary requirements for being a physical substrate of consciousness. The dissociation between "being" and "doing" is most salient in artificial general intelligence, which may soon replicate any human capacity: computers can perform complex functions (in the limit resembling human behavior) in the absence of consciousness. Complex behavior becomes meaningless if it is not performed by a conscious being.

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arXiv2020

A macro agent and its actions

In science, macro level descriptions of the causal interactions within complex, dynamical systems are typically deemed convenient, but ultimately reducible to a complete causal account of the underlying micro constituents. Yet, such a reductionist perspective is hard to square with several issues related to autonomy and agency: (1) agents require (causal) borders that separate them from the environment, (2) at least in a biological context, agents are associated with macroscopic systems, and (3) agents are supposed to act upon their environment. Integrated information theory (IIT) (Oizumi et al., 2014) offers a quantitative account of causation based on a set of causal principles, including notions such as causal specificity, composition, and irreducibility, that challenges the reductionist perspective in multiple ways. First, the IIT formalism provides a complete account of a system's causal structure, including irreducible higher-order mechanisms constituted of multiple system elements. Second, a system's amount of integrated information ($Φ$) measures the causal constraints a system exerts onto itself and can peak at a macro level of description (Hoel et al., 2016; Marshall et al., 2018). Finally, the causal principles of IIT can also be employed to identify and quantify the actual causes of events ("what caused what"), such as an agent's actions (Albantakis et al., 2019). Here, we demonstrate this framework by example of a simulated agent, equipped with a small neural network, that forms a maximum of $Φ$ at a macro scale.

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arXiv2019

When is an action caused from within? Quantifying the causal chain leading to actions in simulated agents

An agent's actions can be influenced by external factors through the inputs it receives from the environment, as well as internal factors, such as memories or intrinsic preferences. The extent to which an agent's actions are "caused from within", as opposed to being externally driven, should depend on its sensor capacity as well as environmental demands for memory and context-dependent behavior. Here, we test this hypothesis using simulated agents ("animats"), equipped with small adaptive Markov Brains (MB) that evolve to solve a perceptual-categorization task under conditions varied with regards to the agents' sensor capacity and task difficulty. Using a novel formalism developed to identify and quantify the actual causes of occurrences ("what caused what?") in complex networks, we evaluate the direct causes of the animats' actions. In addition, we extend this framework to trace the causal chain ("causes of causes") leading to an animat's actions back in time, and compare the obtained spatio-temporal causal history across task conditions. We found that measures quantifying the extent to which an animat's actions are caused by internal factors (as opposed to being driven by the environment through its sensors) varied consistently with defining aspects of the task conditions they evolved to thrive in.

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arXiv2019

Black-boxing and cause-effect power

Reductionism assumes that causation in the physical world occurs at the micro level, excluding the emergence of macro-level causation. We challenge this reductionist assumption by employing a principled, well-defined measure of intrinsic cause-effect power - integrated information (Φ), and showing that, according to this measure, it is possible for a macro level to "beat" the micro level. Simple systems were evaluated for Φ across different spatial and temporal scales by systematically considering all possible black boxes. These are macro elements that consist of one or more micro elements over one or more micro updates. Cause-effect power was evaluated based on the inputs and outputs of the black boxes, ignoring the internal micro elements that support their input-output function. We show how black-box elements can have more common inputs and outputs than the corresponding micro elements, revealing the emergence of high-order mechanisms and joint constraints that are not apparent at the micro level. As a consequence, a macro, black-box system can have higher Φ than its micro constituents by having more mechanisms (higher composition) that are more interconnected (higher integration). We also show that, for a given micro system, one can identify local maxima of Φ across several spatiotemporal scales. The framework is demonstrated on a simple biological system, the Boolean network model of the fission-yeast cell-cycle, for which we identify stable local maxima during the course of its simulated biological function. These local maxima correspond to macro levels of organization at which emergent cause-effect properties of physical systems come into focus, and provide a natural vantage point for scientific inquiries.

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arXiv2019

What caused what? A quantitative account of actual causation using dynamical causal networks

Actual causation is concerned with the question "what caused what?" Consider a transition between two states within a system of interacting elements, such as an artificial neural network, or a biological brain circuit. Which combination of synapses caused the neuron to fire? Which image features caused the classifier to misinterpret the picture? Even detailed knowledge of the system's causal network, its elements, their states, connectivity, and dynamics does not automatically provide a straightforward answer to the "what caused what?" question. Counterfactual accounts of actual causation based on graphical models, paired with system interventions, have demonstrated initial success in addressing specific problem cases in line with intuitive causal judgments. Here, we start from a set of basic requirements for causation (realization, composition, information, integration, and exclusion) and develop a rigorous, quantitative account of actual causation that is generally applicable to discrete dynamical systems. We present a formal framework to evaluate these causal requirements that is based on system interventions and partitions, and considers all counterfactuals of a state transition. This framework is used to provide a complete causal account of the transition by identifying and quantifying the strength of all actual causes and effects linking the two consecutive system states. Finally, we examine several exemplary cases and paradoxes of causation and show that they can be illuminated by the proposed framework for quantifying actual causation.

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arXiv2018

PyPhi: A toolbox for integrated information theory

Integrated information theory provides a mathematical framework to fully characterize the cause-effect structure of a physical system. Here, we introduce PyPhi, a Python software package that implements this framework for causal analysis and unfolds the full cause-effect structure of discrete dynamical systems of binary elements. The software allows users to easily study these structures, serves as an up-to-date reference implementation of the formalisms of integrated information theory, and has been applied in research on complexity, emergence, and certain biological questions. We first provide an overview of the main algorithm and demonstrate PyPhi's functionality in the course of analyzing an example system, and then describe details of the algorithm's design and implementation. PyPhi can be installed with Python's package manager via the command 'pip install pyphi' on Linux and macOS systems equipped with Python 3.4 or higher. PyPhi is open-source and licensed under the GPLv3; the source code is hosted on GitHub at https://github.com/wmayner/pyphi . Comprehensive and continually-updated documentation is available at https://pyphi.readthedocs.io/ . The pyphi-users mailing list can be joined at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/pyphi-users . A web-based graphical interface to the software is available at http://integratedinformationtheory.org/calculate.html .

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arXiv2018

How swarm size during evolution impacts the behavior, generalizability, and brain complexity of animats performing a spatial navigation task

While it is relatively easy to imitate and evolve natural swarm behavior in simulations, less is known about the social characteristics of simulated, evolved swarms, such as the optimal (evolutionary) group size, why individuals in a swarm perform certain actions, and how behavior would change in swarms of different sizes. To address these questions, we used a genetic algorithm to evolve animats equipped with Markov Brains in a spatial navigation task that facilitates swarm behavior. The animats' goal was to frequently cross between two rooms without colliding with other animats. Animats were evolved in swarms of various sizes. We then evaluated the task performance and social behavior of the final generation from each evolution when placed with swarms of different sizes in order to evaluate their generalizability across conditions. According to our experiments, we find that swarm size during evolution matters: animats evolved in a balanced swarm developed more flexible behavior, higher fitness across conditions, and, in addition, higher brain complexity.

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arXiv2018

The Role of Conditional Independence in the Evolution of Intelligent Systems

Systems are typically made from simple components regardless of their complexity. While the function of each part is easily understood, higher order functions are emergent properties and are notoriously difficult to explain. In networked systems, both digital and biological, each component receives inputs, performs a simple computation, and creates an output. When these components have multiple outputs, we intuitively assume that the outputs are causally dependent on the inputs but are themselves independent of each other given the state of their shared input. However, this intuition can be violated for components with probabilistic logic, as these typically cannot be decomposed into separate logic gates with one output each. This violation of conditional independence on the past system state is equivalent to instantaneous interaction --- the idea is that some information between the outputs is not coming from the inputs and thus must have been created instantaneously. Here we compare evolved artificial neural systems with and without instantaneous interaction across several task environments. We show that systems without instantaneous interactions evolve faster, to higher final levels of performance, and require fewer logic components to create a densely connected cognitive machinery.

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arXiv2017

Markov Brains: A Technical Introduction

Markov Brains are a class of evolvable artificial neural networks (ANN). They differ from conventional ANNs in many aspects, but the key difference is that instead of a layered architecture, with each node performing the same function, Markov Brains are networks built from individual computational components. These computational components interact with each other, receive inputs from sensors, and control motor outputs. The function of the computational components, their connections to each other, as well as connections to sensors and motors are all subject to evolutionary optimization. Here we describe in detail how a Markov Brain works, what techniques can be used to study them, and how they can be evolved.

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arXiv2017

How causal analysis can reveal autonomy in models of biological systems

Standard techniques for studying biological systems largely focus on their dynamical, or, more recently, their informational properties, usually taking either a reductionist or holistic perspective. Yet, studying only individual system elements or the dynamics of the system as a whole disregards the organisational structure of the system - whether there are subsets of elements with joint causes or effects, and whether the system is strongly integrated or composed of several loosely interacting components. Integrated information theory (IIT), offers a theoretical framework to (1) investigate the compositional cause-effect structure of a system, and to (2) identify causal borders of highly integrated elements comprising local maxima of intrinsic cause-effect power. Here we apply this comprehensive causal analysis to a Boolean network model of the fission yeast (Schizosaccharomyces pombe) cell-cycle. We demonstrate that this biological model features a non-trivial causal architecture, whose discovery may provide insights about the real cell cycle that could not be gained from holistic or reductionist approaches. We also show how some specific properties of this underlying causal architecture relate to the biological notion of autonomy. Ultimately, we suggest that analysing the causal organisation of a system, including key features like intrinsic control and stable causal borders, should prove relevant for distinguishing life from non-life, and thus could also illuminate the origin of life problem.

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arXiv2017

A Tale of Two Animats: What does it take to have goals?

What does it take for a system, biological or not, to have goals? Here, this question is approached in the context of in silico artificial evolution. By examining the informational and causal properties of artificial organisms ('animats') controlled by small, adaptive neural networks (Markov Brains), this essay discusses necessary requirements for intrinsic information, autonomy, and meaning. The focus lies on comparing two types of Markov Brains that evolved in the same simple environment: one with purely feedforward connections between its elements, the other with an integrated set of elements that causally constrain each other. While both types of brains 'process' information about their environment and are equally fit, only the integrated one forms a causally autonomous entity above a background of external influences. This suggests that to assess whether goals are meaningful for a system itself, it is important to understand what the system is, rather than what it does.

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