arXiv subjects

Lars Sandved-Smith

Publications and source records attributed to Lars Sandved-Smith.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Contemplative Artificial Intelligence

As artificial intelligence (AI) improves, traditional alignment strategies may falter in the face of unpredictable self-improvement, hidden subgoals, and the sheer complexity of intelligent systems. Inspired by contemplative wisdom traditions, we show how four axiomatic principles can instil a resilient Wise World Model in AI systems. First, mindfulness enables self-monitoring and recalibration of emergent subgoals. Second, emptiness forestalls dogmatic goal fixation and relaxes rigid priors. Third, non-duality dissolves adversarial self-other boundaries. Fourth, boundless care motivates the universal reduction of suffering. We find that prompting AI to reflect on these principles improves performance on the AILuminate Benchmark (d=.96) and boosts cooperation and joint-reward on the Prisoner's Dilemma task (d=7+). We offer detailed implementation strategies at the level of architectures, constitutions, and reinforcement on chain-of-thought. For future systems, active inference may offer the self-organizing and dynamic coupling capabilities needed to enact Contemplative AI in embodied agents.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

A Rosetta Stone Hypothesis for Neurophenomenology: Mathematical Predictions from Predictive Processing

Consciousness science faces the challenge of bridging first-person experience with third-person empirical measurements. Neurophenomenology aims to build such `generative passages' connecting the content of experience with behavioural and neuroscientific data. However, the mathematical machinery for such bridges remains underdeveloped. Here we develop a Rosetta Stone hypothesis from predictive processing, where beliefs serve as a central hub connecting phenomenology, behaviour, and neural dynamics. This hinges on a central technical assumption that phenomenology is a function of beliefs. We pursue a conditional approach: if this assumption holds, then certain predictions mathematically follow. We derive predictions for subjective similarity judgements, cognitive metabolic cost, subjective cognitive effort, and time perception. We review the connection between beliefs and neural dynamics to complete the generative passage for neurophenomenology, omitting the connection between beliefs and behaviour as this is already well-documented elsewhere. Testing our predictions will inform the validity of the central assumption connecting beliefs and phenomenology, and advance the neurophenomenology research programme.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2024

Metacognitive particles, mental action and the sense of agency

This paper articulates metacognition using the language of statistical physics and Bayesian mechanics. Metacognitive beliefs, defined as beliefs about beliefs, find a natural description within this formalism, which allows us to define the dynamics of 'metacognitive particles', i.e., systems possessing metacognitive beliefs. We further unpack this typology of metacognitive systems by distinguishing passive and active metacognitive particles, where active particles are endowed with the capacity for mental actions that update the parameters of other beliefs. We provide arguments for the necessity of this architecture in the emergence of a subjective sense of agency and the experience of being separate from the environment. The motivation is to pave the way towards a mathematical and physical understanding of cognition -- and higher forms thereof -- furthering the study and formalization of cognitive science in the language of mathematical physics.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2023

Towards a Bayesian mechanics of metacognitive particles: A commentary on "Path integrals, particular kinds, and strange things" by Friston, Da Costa, Sakthivadivel, Heins, Pavliotis, Ramstead, and Parr

What could metacognition look like in simple physical terms? We define metacognition as having beliefs about beliefs, which can be articulated very simply using the language of statistical physics and Bayesian mechanics. We introduce a typology between cognitive and metacognitive particles and develop an example of a metacognitive particle. This can be generalized to provide examples of higher forms of metacognition: i.e. particles having beliefs about beliefs about beliefs and so forth. We conclude by saying that the typology of particles laid down in the target article seems promising, for seemingly enabling a physics of cognition that builds upon and refines the free energy principle, toward a physical description of entities that specifically possess higher forms of cognition.

nlin.AO↗