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Laszlo B. Kish

Publications and source records attributed to Laszlo B. Kish.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Time synchronization protocol for the KLJN secure key exchange scheme

The information theoretically secure Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) key exchange scheme, similarly to quantum key distribution (QKD), is also potentially vulnerable against clock attacks, where Eve takes over the control of clock synchronization in the channel. This short note aims to introduce a time synchronization protocol scheme for Alice and Bob, which is resistant against arbitrary time delay attacks, both symmetric and asymmetric ones. We propose and explore various ways of clock synchronization for the KLJN system and propose an ultimate protocol that preserves time and hardware integrity under arbitrary attacks.

cs.CR↗

Statistical Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange Protocol

This paper introduces and demonstrates four new statistical attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks utilize compromised random number generators at Alice's/Bob's site(s). The case of partial correlations between Alice's/Bob's and Eve's probing noises is explored, that is, Eve's knowledge of Alice's and Bob's noises is limited but not zero. We explore the bilateral situation where Eve has partial knowledge of Alice's and Bob's random number generators. It is shown that in this situation Eve can crack the secure key bit by taking the highest cross-correlation between her probing noises and the measured voltage noise in the wire. She can also crack the secure key bit by taking the highest cross-correlation between her noise voltages and her evaluation of Alice's/Bob's noise voltages. We then explore the unilateral situation in which Eve has partial knowledge of only Alice's random number generator thus only those noises (of Alice and Eve) are correlated. In this situation Eve can still crack the secure key bit, but for sufficiently low error probability, she needs to use the whole bit exchange period for the attack. The security of the KLJN key exchange scheme, similarly to other protocols, necessitates that the random number generator outputs are truly random for Eve.

cs.CR↗

From cold resistor to secure key exchanger

Utilizing a formerly published cold resistor circuitry, a secure key exchange system is conceived and explored. A circuit realization of the system is constructed and simulated. Similarly to the Pao-Lo key exchanger, this system is secure in the steady-state limit but crackable in the transient situations.

cs.CR↗

Nonlinearity Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange Protocol

This paper introduces a new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attack is based on the nonlinearity of the noise generators. We explore the effect of total distortion (TD) at the second order (D2), third order (D3), and a combination of the second and third orders (D2,3) on the security of the KLJN scheme. It is demonstrated that a as little as 1% results in a notable power flow along the information channel, which leads to a significant information leak. We also show that decreasing the effective temperature (that is, the wire voltage) and, in this way reducing nonlinearity, results in the KLJN scheme approaching perfect security.

cs.CR↗

Comments on the "Generalized" KLJN Key Exchanger with Arbitrary Resistors: Power, Impedance, Security

In (Nature) Science Report 5 (2015) 13653, Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl (VMG) introduce a new Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchanger that operates with 4 arbitrary resistors (instead of 2 arbitrary resistance values forming 2 identical resistor pairs in the original system). They state that in this new, VMG-KLJN, non-equilibrium system with nonzero power flow, the security during the exchange of the two (HL and LH) bit values is as strong as in the original KLJN scheme. Moreover, they claim that, at practical conditions, their VMG-KLJN protocol "supports more robust protection against attacks". First, we investigate the power flow and thermal equilibrium issues of the VMG-KLJN system with 4 arbitrary resistors. Then we introduce a new KLJN protocol that allows the arbitrary choice of 3 resistors from the 4, while it still operates with zero power flow during the exchange of single bits by utilizing a specific value of the 4th resistor and a binary temperature set for the exchanged (HL and LH) bit values. Then we show that, in general, the KLJN schemes with more than 2 arbitrary resistors (including our new protocol mentioned above) are prone to 4 new passive attacks utilizing the parasitic capacitance and inductance in the cable, while the original KLJN scheme is naturally immune against these new attacks. The core of the security vulnerability exploited by these attacks is the different line resistances in the HL and LH cases. Therefore, on the contrary of the statement and claim cited above, the practical VMG-KLJN system is less secure than the original KLJN scheme. We introduce another 2, modified, non-equilibrium KLJN systems to eliminate the vulnerability against some - but not all - of these attacks. However the price for that is the loss of arbitrariness of the selection of the 4th resistor and the information leak still remains greater than zero.

cs.CR↗

AC Loop Current Attacks Against The KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme

A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise(KLJN) secure key exchange scheme is introduced. The attack exploits a parasitic (periodic) AC voltage-source at either Alice or Bob ends. Such situations exist due to AC ground loops and electromagnetic interference (EMI). In the low-frequency case, the procedure is the generalized form of the former DC ground loop based attack. In the high-frequency case, the power spectrum of the wire voltage is utilized. The attack is demonstrated in both the low and the high-frequency situations. Defense protocols against the attack are also discussed.

cs.CR↗

Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchange Protocol

This paper introduces and demonstrates two new attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks are based on random number generators with compromised security. First we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of both Alice's and Bob's random number generators. We show that in this situation Eve can crack the secure key bit within a fraction of the bit exchange period even if her current and voltage measurements have only a single bit of resolution. In the second attack, we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of only Alice's random number generator. We show that in this situation Eve can still crack the secure key bit but she needs to use the whole bit exchange period for the attack. The security of the KLJN key exchange scheme, similarly to other protocols, necessitates that the random number generator outputs are truly random for Eve.

cs.CR↗

Fluctuation-Enhanced Sensing: Review of Practical Issues

We discuss some of the fundamental practical limitations of the Fluctuation-Enhanced Sensing of odors and gases. We address resolution, measurement speed, reproducibility, memory and other problems such as humidity. Various techniques and ideas are presented to overcome these problems. Circuit solutions are also discussed.

eess.SP↗

Generalized DC loop current attack against the KLJN secure key exchange scheme

A new attack against the Kirchhoff Law Johnson Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system is studied with unknown parasitic DC voltage sources at both Alices and Bobs ends. This paper is the generalization of our earlier investigation with a single end parasitic source. Under the assumption that Eve does not know the values of the parasitic sources, a new attack, utilizing the current generated by the parasitic dc voltage sources, is introduced. The attack is mathematically analyzed and demonstrated by computer simulations. Simple defense methods against the attack are shown. The earlier defense method based solely on the comparison of current/voltage data at Alice's and Bob's terminals is useless here since the wire currents and voltages are equal at both ends. However, the more expensive version of the earlier defense method, which is based on in situ system simulation and comparison with measurements, works efficiently.

cs.ET↗

Entanglement, and unsorted database search in noise-based logic

We explore the collapse of "wavefunction" and the measurement of entanglement in the superpositions of hyperspace vectors in classical physical instantaneous-noise-based logic (INBL). We find both similarities with and major differences from the related properties of quantum systems. Two search algorithms utilizing the observed features are introduced. For the first one we assume an unsorted names database set up by Alice that is a superposition (unknown by Bob) of up to n=2^N strings; those we call names. Bob has access to the superposition wave and to the 2N reference noises of the INBL system of N noise bits. For Bob, to decide if a given name x is included in the superposition, once the search has begun, it takes N switching operations followed by a single measurement of the superposition wave. Thus the time and hardware complexity of the search algorithm is O[log(n)] which indicates an exponential speedup compared to Grover's quantum algorithm in a corresponding setting. An extra advantage is that the error probability of the search is zero. Moreover, the scheme can also check the existence of a fraction of a string, or several separate string fractions embedded in an arbitrarily long, arbitrary string. In the second algorithm, we expand the above scheme to a phonebook with n names and s phone numbers. When the names and numbers have the same bit resolution, once the search has begun, the time and hardware complexity of this search algorithm is O[log(n)]. In the case of one-to-one correspondence between names and phone numbers (n=s), the algorithm offers inverse phonebook search too. The error probability of this search algorithm is also zero.

cs.ET↗

A Static-Loop-Current Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange System

A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution system is explored. The attack is based on utilizing a parasitic dc-voltage-source in the loop. Relevant situations often exist in the low-frequency limit in practical systems, especially when the communication is over a distance, due to a ground loop and/or electromagnetic interference (EMI). Surprisingly, the usual current/voltage comparison based defense method that exposes active attacks or parasitic features (such as wire resistance allowing information leak) does not function here. The attack is successfully demonstrated. Proposed defense methods against it are shown.

cs.CR↗

Noise-based logic gates by operations on the reference system

We propose a new, low-complexity solution to realize multi-input-bit gates acting on exponentially large superpositions in noise-based logic processors. Two examples are shown, the NOT gate and the CNOT gate. The operations can be executed and repeated with polynomial time and hardware complexity. The lack of a solution of this problem had been one of the major issues prohibiting the efficient realization of Shor's algorithm by Instantaneous Noise-Based Logic, which runs on a classical Turing computer with a true random number generator. With the method described in this paper, we are one step closer to this goal.

cs.ET↗

Does a standalone, "cold" (low-thermal-noise), linear resistor exist without cooling?

Classical ways of cooling require some of these elements: phase transition, compressor, non-linearity, valve, and/or switch. A recent example is the 2018 patent of Linear Technology Corporation; they utilize the shot noise of a diode to produce a standalone nonlinear resistor that has T/2 noise temperature (about 150 Kelvin). While such "resistor" can cool its environment when it is AC coupled to a resistor, the thermally cooling effect is only academically interesting. The importance of the invention is of another nature: In low-noise electronics, it is essential to have resistors with low noise temperature to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. A natural question is raised: can we use a linear system with feedback to cool and, most importantly, to show reduced noise temperature? Exploring this problem, were able to produce standalone linear resistors showing strongly reduced thermal noise. Our must successful test shows T/100 (about 3 Kelvin) noise temperature, as if the resistor would have been immersed in liquid helium. We also found that there is an old solution offering similar results utilizing the virtual ground of an inverting amplifier at negative feedback. There the "cold" resistor is generated at the input of an amplifier. On the other hand, our system generates the "cold" resistance at the output, which can have practical advantages.

physics.gen-ph↗

Memristor equations: incomplete physics and undefined passivity/activity

In his seminal paper, Chua presented a fundamental physical claim by introducing the memristor, "The missing circuit element". The memristor equations were originally supposed to represent a passive circuit element because, with active circuitry, arbitrary elements can be realized without limitations. Therefore, if the memristor equations do not guarantee that the circuit element can be realized by a passive system, the fundamental physics claim about the memristor as "missing circuit element" loses all its weight. The question of passivity/activity belongs to physics thus we incorporate thermodynamics into the study of this problem. We show that the memristor equations are physically incomplete regarding the problem of passivity/activity. As a consequence, the claim that the present memristor functions describe a passive device lead to unphysical results, such as violating the Second Law of thermodynamics, in infinitely large number of cases. The seminal memristor equations cannot introduce a new physical circuit element without making the model more physical such as providing the Fluctuation Dissipation Theory of memristors.

cs.ET↗

Second Law based definition of passivity/activity of devices

Recently, our efforts to clarify the old question, if a memristor is a passive or active device [1], triggered debates between engineers, who have had advanced definitions of passivity/activity of devices, and physicists with significantly different views about this seemingly simple question. This debate triggered our efforts to test the well-known engineering concepts about passivity/activity in a deeper way, challenging them by statistical physics. It is shown that the advanced engineering definition of passivity/activity of devices is self-contradictory when a thermodynamical system executing Johnson-Nyquist noise is present. A new, statistical physical, self-consistent definition based on the Second Law of Thermodynamics is introduced. It is also shown that, in a system with uniform temperature distribution, any rectifier circuitry that can rectify thermal noise must contain an active circuit element, according to both the engineering and statistical physical definitions.

physics.gen-ph↗

Information entropy and thermal entropy: apples and oranges

The frequent misunderstanding of information entropy is pointed out. It is shown that, contrary to fortuitous situations and common beliefs, there is no general interrelation between the information entropy and the thermodynamical entropy. We point out that the change of information entropy during measurement is determined by the resolution of the measurement instrument and these changes do not have a general and clear-cut interrelation with the change of thermal entropy. Moreover, these changes can be separated in space and time. We show classical physical considerations and examples to support this conclusion. Finally, we show that information entropy can violate the Third Law of Thermodynamics which is another indication of major differences from thermal entropy.

physics.gen-ph↗

Comments on "sub-KBT micro-electromechanical irreversible logic gate"

In a recent article, Nature Communications 7 (2016) 12068, the authors claimed that they demonstrated sub-kBT energy dissipation at elementary logic operations. However, the argumentation is invalid because it neglects the dominant source of energy dissipation, namely, the charging energy of the capacitance of the input electrode, which totally dissipates during the full (0-1-0) cycle of logic values. The neglected dissipation phenomenon is identical with the mechanism that leads to the lower physical limit of dissipation (70-100 kBT) in today's microprocessors (CMOS logic) and in any other system with thermally activated errors thus the same limit holds for the new scheme, too.

cs.ET↗

Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange

The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical secure key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable and circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the current injection attack, against the ideal and a practical KLJN system, respectively. We show that two security enhancement techniques, namely, the instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple privacy amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information leak and successfully preserve the system's unconditional security.

cs.CR↗