arXiv subjects

Laszlo B. Kish

Publications and source records attributed to Laszlo B. Kish.

114 records · Page 7Linked to original sources

arXiv2006

Totally secure classical networks with multipoint telecloning (teleportation) of classical bits through loops with Johnson-like noise

First, we show a new inexpensive defense against intruders and the man-in-the-middle attack in the Kirchhoff's-loop-Johnson-like-noise (KLJN) cipher. Then instead of point-to-point communication, we propose a high efficiency, secure network. The (in the idealistic case totally secure) classical network is based on an improved version of the KLJN cipher. The network consists of two parallel networks: i) a chain-like network of securely communicating, electrically isolated Kirchhoff-loops with Johnson-like noise and driven by a specific switching process of the resistances; ii) and a regular non-secure data network with a Coordinator-server. If the classical network is fast enough, the chain-like network of N communicators can generate and share an N bit long secret key within a single clock period of the ciphers and that implies a significant speed-up compared to the point-to-point key exchanges used by quantum communication or RSA-like key exchange methods. This is a teleportation-type multiple telecloning of the classical information bit because the information transfer can take place without the actual presence of the information bit at the intermediate points of the network. With similar quantum schemes the telecloning of classical bits via quantum communicator networks without telecloning the quantum states is also possible.

physics.gen-ph↗

arXiv2006

Totally Secure Classical Communication Utilizing Johnson (-like) Noise and Kirchoff's Law

An absolutely secure, fast, inexpensive, robust, maintenance-free and low-power- consumption communication is proposed. The states of the information bit are represented by two resistance values. The sender and the receiver have such resistors available and they randomly select and connect one of them to the channel at the beginning of each clock period. The thermal noise voltage and current can be observed but Kirchoff's law provides only a second-order equation. A secure bit is communicated when the actual resistance values at the sender's side and the receiver's side differ. Then the second order equation yields the two resistance values but the eavesdropper is unable to determine the actual locations of the resistors and to find out the state of the sender's bit. The receiver knows that the sender has the inverse of his bit, similarly to quantum entanglement. The eavesdropper can decode the message if, for each bits, she inject current in the wire and measures the voltage change and the current changes in the two directions. However, in this way she gets discovered by the very first bit she decodes. Instead of thermal noise, proper external noise generators should be used when the communication is not aimed to be stealth.

physics.class-ph↗

arXiv2006

Protection against the man-in-the-middle-attack for the Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-noise cipher and expansion by voltage-based security

It is shown that the original Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-noise (KLJN) cipher is naturally protected against the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, if the eavesdropper is using resistors and noise voltage generators just like the sender and the receiver. The eavesdropper can extract zero bit of information before she is discovered. However, when the eavesdropper is using noise current generators, though the cipher is protected, the eavesdropper may still be able to extract one bit of information while she is discovered. For enhanced security, we expand the KLJN cipher with the comparison of the instantaneous voltages via the public channel. In this way, the sender and receiver has a full control over the security of measurable physical quantities in the Kirchhoff-loop. We show that when the sender and receiver compare not only their instantaneous current data but also their instantaneous voltage data then the zero-bit security holds even for the noise current generator case. We show that the original KLJN scheme is also zero-bit protected against that type of MITM attack when the eavesdropper uses voltage noise generators, only. In conclusion, within the idealized model scheme, the man-in-the-middle-attack does not provide any advantage compared to the regular attack considered earlier. The remaining possibility is the attack by a short, large current pulse, which described in the original paper as the only efficient type of regular attacks, and that yields the one bit security. In conclusion, the KLJN cipher is superior to known quantum communication schemes in every respect, including speed, robustness, maintenance need, price and its natural immunity against the man-in-the-middle attack.

physics.gen-ph↗

arXiv2005

Stealth Communication: Zero-Power Classical Communication, Zero-Quantum Quantum Communication and Environmental-Noise Communication

An alternative physical way of communication, communication by the inherent background noise, is proposed which does not need net energy transfer in the information channel. The communicator devices do dissipate energy; however, they do not emit net energy into the channel, instead of that, they modulate the parameters of inherent spontaneous fluctuations in the channel. The method can use two different mechanisms, thermal noise (Johnson-Nyquist noise) for classical communication, and vacuum fluctuations/zero point energy (quantum uncertainty noise) for quantum communication. The strongest advantage of the method that this is apparently the most hidden (stealth) way of communication, because it is using the inherent background noise for communication, therefore it is extremely difficult or impossible to discover its presence. With proper wave-based arrangements and specific conditions, the sender and the receiver can easily detect eavesdropper activities, so that the eavesdropper is detected as soon as she extracts a single bit of information, thus the security of the method is comparable to the security of quantum communication/quantum key distribution schemes. Finally, concerning practical applications, environmental noise, out of the fundamental/inherent fluctuations, can also be used for this kind of communication provided that is sufficiently stationary.

physics.data-an↗

arXiv2005

Recognizing different types of stochastic processes

We propose a new cross-correlation method that can recognize independent realizations of the same type of stochastic processes and can be used as a new kind of pattern recognition tool in biometrics, sensing, forensic, security and image processing applications. The method, which we call bispectrum correlation coefficient method, makes use of the cross-correlation of the bispectra. Three kinds of cross-correlation coefficients are introduced. To demonstrate the new method, six different random telegraph signals are tested, where four of them have the same power density spectrum. It is shown that the three coefficients can map the different stochastic processes to specific sub-volumes in a cube.

physics.data-an↗

arXiv2005

An absolutely secure QKD scheme with no detection noise, entanglement and classical communication

A new quantum communication scheme is introduced which is the quantum realization of the classical Kish-Sethuraman (KS) cipher. First the message is bounced back with additional encryption by the Receiver and the original encryption is removed and the message is resent by the Sender. The mechanical analogy of this operation is using two padlocks; one by the Sender and one by the Receiver. We show that the rotation of the polarization is an operator which satisfies the conditions required for the KS encryption operators provided single photons are communicated. The new method is not only simple but has several advantages. The Evasdropper extracts zero information even if she executes a quantum measurement on the state. The communication can be done by two publicly agreed orthogonal states. Therefore, there is no inherent detection noise. No classical channel and no entangled states are required for the communication.

quant-ph↗