arXiv subjects

Laura Arditti

Publications and source records attributed to Laura Arditti.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

On Signed Network Games with Binary Actions

We study binary-action pairwise-separable graphical games that encompass both coordination and anti-coordination network games. Our model is grounded in an underlying directed signed graph, where each link is associated with a signed weight that describes both nature and the strength of the strategic pairwise interaction. Specifically, positive link weight corresponds to a strategic complement type interaction, whereas negative link weight corresponds to strategic substitute type interaction. The utility for each player is then an aggregation of pairwise terms determined by the weights of the signed graph in addition to an individual bias term. We consider a scenario that assumes the presence of a prominent cohesive subset of players, who are either connected exclusively by positive weights, or form a structurally balanced subset that can be bipartitioned into two adversarial subcommunities with positive intra-community and negative inter-community edges. Under suitable properties of the game restricted to the remaining players, our results guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria characterized by either consensus or polarization within the first group, as well as their stability under best response transitions. Our results can be interpreted as robustness results, building on the super-modular properties of network coordination games and on a novel use of the concept of graph cohesiveness.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Robust Coordination of Linear Threshold Dynamics on Directed Weighted Networks

We study asynchronous dynamics in a network of interacting agents updating their binary states according to a time-varying threshold rule. Specifically, agents revise their state asynchronously by comparing the weighted average of the current states of their neighbors in the interaction network with possibly heterogeneous time-varying threshold values. Such thresholds are determined by an exogenous signal representing an external influence field modeling the different agents' biases towards one state with respect to the other one. We prove necessary and sufficient conditions for global stability of consensus equilibria, i.e., equilibria where all agents have the same state, robustly with respect to the (constant or time-varying) external field. Our results apply to general weighted directed interaction networks and build on super-modularity properties of certain network coordination games whose best response dynamics coincide with the linear threshold dynamics. In particular, we introduce a novel notion of robust improvement paths for such games and characterize conditions for their existence.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

User Value in Modern Payment Platforms: A Graph Approach

Payment platforms have significantly evolved in recent years to keep pace with the proliferation of online and cashless payments. These platforms are increasingly aligned with online social networks, allowing users to interact with each other and transfer small amounts of money in a Peer-to-Peer fashion. This poses new challenges for analysing payment data, as traditional methods are only user-centric or business-centric and neglect the network users build during the interaction. This paper proposes a first methodology for measuring user value in modern payment platforms. We combine quantitative user-centric metrics with an analysis of the graph created by users' activities and its topological features inspired by the evolution of opinions in social networks. We showcase our approach using a dataset from a large operational payment platform and show how it can support business decisions and marketing campaign design, e.g., by targeting specific users.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2021

Equilibria and learning dynamics in mixed network coordination/anti-coordination games

Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more complex behaviors. In fact, depending on the network structure, such games may even fail to have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. An example is represented by the well-known matching pennies (discoordination) game. In this work, we first provide graph-theoretic conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in mixed network coordination/anti-coordination games of arbitrary size. For the case where such conditions are met, we then study the asymptotic behavior of best-response dynamics and provide sufficient conditions for finite-time convergence to the set of Nash equilibria. Our results build on an extension and refinement of the notion of network cohesiveness and on the formulation of the new concept of network indecomposibility.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

On games with coordinating and anti-coordinating agents

This work studies Nash equilibria for games where a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, with possibly heterogeneous thresholds, coexist and interact through an all-to-all network. Whilst games with only coordinating or only anti-coordinating agents are potential, also in the presence of heterogeneities, this does not hold when both type of agents are simultaneously present. This makes their analysis more difficult and existence of Nash equilibria not guaranteed. Our main result is a checkable condition on the threshold distributions that characterizes the existence of Nash equilibria in such mixed games. When this condition is satisfied an explicit algorithm allows to determine the complete set of such equilibria. Moreover, for the special case when only one type of agents is present (either coordinating or anti-coordinating), our results allow an explicit computation of the cardinality of Nash equilibria.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Separable games

We present the notion of separable game with respect to a forward directed hypergraph (FDH-graph), which refines and generalizes that of graphical game. First, we show that there exists a minimal FDH-graph with respect to which a game is separable, providing a minimal complexity description for the game. Then, we prove a symmetry property of the minimal FDH-graph of potential games and we describe how it reflects to a decomposition of the potential function in terms of local functions. In particular, these last results strengthen the ones recently proved for graphical potential games. Finally, we study the interplay between separability and the decomposition of finite games in their harmonic and potential components, characterizing the separability properties of both such components.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

BMO spaces on weighted homogeneous trees

We consider an infinite homogeneous tree $\mathcal V$ endowed with the usual metric $d$ defined on graphs and a weighted measure $μ$. The metric measure space $(\mathcal V,d,μ)$ is nondoubling and of exponential growth, hence the classical theory of Hardy and $BMO$ spaces does not apply in this setting. We introduce a space $BMO(μ)$ on $(\mathcal V,d,μ)$ and investigate some of its properties. We prove in particular that $BMO(μ)$ can be identified with the dual of a Hardy space $H^1(μ)$ introduced in a previous work and we investigate the sharp maximal function related with $BMO(μ)$.

math.FA↗

arXiv2020

Robustness of Nash Equilibria in Network Games

We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum magnitude of a perturbation that makes a Nash equilibrium of the original game stop being so in the perturbed game. Then, we investigate what the maximally robust equilibria are in some standard network games such as the coordination and the anti-coordination game. Finally, as an application, we provide some sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in network games with a mixture of coordinating and anticoordinating games.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Graphical Games and Decomposition

We consider graphical games as introduced by Kearns et al. (2001). First we analyse the interaction of graphicality with a notion of strategic equivalence of games, providing a minimal complexity graphical description for games. Then we study the interplay between graphicality and the classical decomposition of games proposed by Candogan et al. (2011), characterizing the graphical properties of each part of the decomposition.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Hardy spaces on weighted homogeneous trees

We consider an infinite homogeneous tree V endowed with the usual metric d defined on graphs and a weighted measure μ. The metric measure space V,d,μ) is nondoubling and of exponential growth, hence the classical theory of Hardy spaces does not apply in this setting. We construct an atomic Hardy space H^1 on (V,d,μ) and investigate some of its properties, focusing in particular on real interpolation properties and on boundedness of singular integrals on H^1.

math.FA↗