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Laurent Vanbever

Publications and source records attributed to Laurent Vanbever.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Self-evolving network verifiers

Symbolic network verifiers can reason about correctness across vast spaces of routing inputs and failures, but only for the protocols and features an expert has encoded by hand. Creating and maintaining a faithful model of the control plane is both difficult and never-ending, since no written source specifies perfectly what a network does: vendor implementations deviate from the RFCs, and behaviour shifts with releases. The burden of constant upkeep ultimately keeps verification out of many networks that need it. We argue that the model should instead evolve automatically to faithfully capture the actual network behaviour. To achieve that, we leverage the only source that specifies it unambiguously: the router software itself. In a counterexample-guided loop, a coding agent proposes extensions to the verifier's symbolic encoding, while a trusted oracle (e.g., emulated routers) supplies the ground-truth routing state. The agent iteratively refines the network model using each disagreement with the oracle. As early evidence, a prototype of this system taught a 3,000-line SMT-based verifier three features it did not support: OSPF areas, BGP route reflection, and L3VPN over EVPN, converging autonomously on models that match the oracle, even noticing vendor-specific behaviour. Automating model growth shifts the hard problem from writing verification systems to systematically testing them; we propose a research agenda for trusting and harnessing automatically evolved verifiers.

cs.NI

Evaluating Agentic Configuration Repair for Computer Networks

Misconfigurations in computer networks remain a major source of critical Internet outages. Research is turning to Large Language Models (LLMs) to automate the complex, error-prone task of network configuration. However, even state-of-the-art models fail to resolve misconfigurations in large-scale, complex scenarios and often introduce new errors. In this work, we benchmark open- and closed-source LLMs augmented with formal network verification and context retrieval tools. We demonstrate that agentic architectures outperform base LLMs in repair efficacy (by 12% on average) and safety (by 17% on average), enabled by the ability to dynamically manage context and iteratively validate configuration repairs.

cs.AI

Enforcing Application-Layer Policies in eBPF

Service meshes have recently emerged as the de-facto standard for deploying microservices. Conceptually, they provide a uniform abstraction for inter-process communication (IPC) between services by implementing common networking mechanisms---such as encryption, routing, and load balancing---and by allowing these mechanisms to be configured and composed through high-level policies. Supporting these policies, however, comes with a significant performance cost, since service meshes interpose proxies (``sidecars'') on the data path between every service. This paper presents Beeline, a fast path for service meshes which can enforce the vast majority of application-layer policies seen in the wild directly in kernel space. Given high-level policies, Beeline automatically synthesizes an eBPF-based data plane which enforces them in the kernel. Beeline accelerates existing microservices without any code modification, and transparently falls back to existing service proxies (the slow path) for the few unsupported policies. We fully implemented Beeline, with support for both TLS and HTTP/2. Compared to state-of-the-art service meshes, Beeline reduces the median request latency of realistic applications by up to $6\times$ while sustaining $3\times$ more throughput.

cs.NI

Benchmarking LLM-Driven Network Configuration Repair

There is a rapidly growing interest in using Large Language Models (LLMs) to automate complex network operations, but their reliable adoption requires rigorous assessment of their effectiveness and safety. Existing benchmarks do not address whether LLMs can successfully resolve errors in large-scale, interdependent network configurations without introducing new disruptions. Developing such a benchmark is challenging: scenarios must be diverse and increasingly complex, yet their evaluation must be straightforward and meaningful. In this paper, we present Cornetto, the first benchmark to evaluate LLM-driven network configuration repair functionally and at scale. Cornetto features a generation pipeline that synthesizes representative and plausible misconfiguration scenarios, coupled with an evaluation framework that uses formal verification to assess functional correctness of proposed fixes against ground-truth specifications. Using this pipeline, we synthesize a dataset of 231 problems for fixing configurations across varying network topologies (20--754 nodes) and diverse protocols. We evaluate 9 state-of-the-art LLMs and find that while they show promise, they often introduce regressions and their performance degrades at scale. Our results indicate that reliable LLM-powered network automation requires integrating LLMs into iterative workflows guided by formal verification.

cs.NI

Five Blind Men and the Internet: Towards an Understanding of Internet Traffic

The Internet, the world's largest and most pervasive network, lacks a transparent, granular view of its traffic patterns, volumes, and growth trends, hindering the networking community's understanding of its dynamics. This paper leverages publicly available Internet Exchange Point traffic statistics to address this gap, presenting a comprehensive two-year study (2023-2024) from 472 IXPs worldwide, capturing approximately 300 Tbps of peak daily aggregate traffic by late 2024. Our analysis reveals a 49.2% global traffic increase (24.5% annualized), uncovers regionally distinct diurnal patterns and event-driven anomalies, and demonstrates stable utilization rates, reflecting predictable infrastructure scaling. By analyzing biases and confirming high self-similarity, we establish IXP traffic as a robust proxy for overall Internet growth and usage behavior. With transparent, replicable data--covering 87% of the worldwide IXP port capacity--and plans to release our dataset, this study offers a verifiable foundation for long-term Internet traffic monitoring. In particular, our findings shed light on the interplay between network design and function, providing an accessible framework for researchers and operators to explore the Internet's evolving ecosystem.

cs.NI

Faster Offloads by Unloading them -- The RDMA Case

From hardware offloads like RDMA to software ones like eBPF, offloads are everywhere and their value is in performance. However, there is evidence that fully offloading -- even when feasible -- does not always give the expected speedups. Starting from the observation that this is due to changes the offloads make -- by moving tasks from the application/CPU closer to the network/link layer -- we argue that to further accelerate offloads, we need to make offloads reversible by unloading them -- moving back part of the offloaded tasks. Unloading comes with a set of challenges that we start answering in this paper by focusing on (offloaded) RDMA writes: which part of the write operation does it make sense to unload? how do we dynamically decide which writes to execute on the unload or offload path to improve performance? how do we maintain compatibility between the two paths? Our current prototype shows the potential of unloading by accelerating RDMA writes by up to 31%.

cs.NI

Is Crunching Public Data the Right Approach to Detect BGP Hijacks?

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) remains a fragile pillar of Internet routing. BGP hijacks still occurr daily. While full deployment of Route Origin Validation (ROV) is ongoing, attackers have already adapted, launching post-ROV attacks such as forged-origin hijacks. To detect these, recent approaches like DFOH [Holterbach et al., USENIX NSDI '24] and BEAM [Chen et al., USENIX Security '24] apply machine learning (ML) to analyze data from globally distributed BGP monitors, assuming anomalies will stand out against historical patterns. However, this assumption overlooks a key threat: BGP monitors themselves can be misled by adversaries injecting bogus routes. This paper shows that state-of-the-art hijack detection systems like DFOH and BEAM are vulnerable to data poisoning. Using large-scale BGP simulations, we show that attackers can evade detection with just a handful of crafted announcements beyond the actual hijack. These announcements are indeed sufficient to corrupt the knowledge base used by ML-based defenses and distort the metrics they rely on. Our results highlight a worrying weakness of relying solely on public BGP data.

cs.CR

The Effects of iBGP Convergence

Analyzing violations of forwarding properties is a classic networking problem. However, existing work is either tailored to the steady state -- and not to transient states during iBGP convergence -- or does analyze transient violations but with inaccurate proxies, like control-plane convergence, or without precise control over the different impact factors. We address this gap with a measurement framework that controllably and accurately measures transient violation times in realistic network deployments. The framework relies on a programmable switch to flexibly emulate diverse topologies and gain traffic visibility at all links -- enabling accurately inferring violation times of any forwarding property. Using the framework, we analyze 50 network scenarios on a topology with 12 real routers, and show how factors like the network configuration and BGP event affect transient violation times. Further, we shed light on less-known aspects of BGP convergence, including that transient violations can start before the trigger event, or that keeping a backup route advertised at all times can increase violation times.

cs.NI

Proxion: Uncovering Hidden Proxy Smart Contracts for Finding Collision Vulnerabilities in Ethereum

The proxy design pattern allows Ethereum smart contracts to be simultaneously immutable and upgradeable, in which an original contract is split into a proxy contract containing the data storage and a logic contract containing the implementation logic. This architecture is known to have security issues, namely function collisions and storage collisions between the proxy and logic contracts, and has been exploited in real-world incidents to steal users' millions of dollars worth of digital assets. In response to this concern, several previous works have sought to identify proxy contracts in Ethereum and detect their collisions. However, they all fell short due to their limited coverage, often restricting analysis to only contracts with available source code or past transactions. To bridge this gap, we present Proxion, an automated cross-contract analyzer that identifies all proxy smart contracts and their collisions in Ethereum. What sets Proxion apart is its ability to analyze hidden smart contracts that lack both source code and past transactions. Equipped with various techniques to enhance efficiency and accuracy, Proxion outperforms the state-of-the-art tools, notably identifying millions more proxy contracts and thousands of unreported collisions. We apply Proxion to analyze over 36 million alive contracts from 2015 to 2023, revealing that 54.2% of them are proxy contracts, and about 1.5 million contracts exhibit at least one collision issue.

cs.CR

FitNets: An Adaptive Framework to Learn Accurate Traffic Distributions

Learning precise distributions of traffic features (e.g., burst sizes, packet inter-arrival time) is still a largely unsolved problem despite being critical for management tasks such as capacity planning or anomaly detection. A key limitation nowadays is the lack of feedback between the control plane and the data plane. Programmable data planes offer the opportunity to create systems that let data- and control plane to work together, compensating their respective shortcomings. We present FitNets, an adaptive network monitoring system leveraging feedback between the data- and the control plane to learn accurate traffic distributions. In the control plane, FitNets relies on Kernel Density Estimators which allow to provably learn distributions of any shape. In the data plane, FitNets tests the accuracy of the learned distributions while dynamically adapting data collection to the observed distribution fitness, prioritizing under-fitted features. We have implemented FitNets in Python and P4 (including on commercially available programmable switches) and tested it on real and synthetic traffic traces. FitNets is practical: it is able to estimate hundreds of distributions from up to 60 millions samples per second, while providing accurate error estimates and adapting to complex traffic patterns.

cs.NI

On Sample Selection for Continual Learning: a Video Streaming Case Study

Machine learning (ML) is a powerful tool to model the complexity of communication networks. As networks evolve, we cannot only train once and deploy. Retraining models, known as continual learning, is necessary. Yet, to date, there is no established methodology to answer the key questions: With which samples to retrain? When should we retrain? We address these questions with the sample selection system Memento, which maintains a training set with the "most useful" samples to maximize sample space coverage. Memento particularly benefits rare patterns -- the notoriously long "tail" in networking -- and allows assessing rationally when retraining may help, i.e., when the coverage changes. We deployed Memento on Puffer, the live-TV streaming project, and achieved a 14% reduction of stall time, 3.5x the improvement of random sample selection. Finally, Memento does not depend on a specific model architecture; it is likely to yield benefits in other ML-based networking applications.

cs.NI

Canary: Congestion-Aware In-Network Allreduce Using Dynamic Trees

The allreduce operation is an essential building block for many distributed applications, ranging from the training of deep learning models to scientific computing. In an allreduce operation, data from multiple hosts is aggregated together and then broadcasted to each host participating in the operation. Allreduce performance can be improved by a factor of two by aggregating the data directly in the network. Switches aggregate data coming from multiple ports before forwarding the partially aggregated result to the next hop. In all existing solutions, each switch needs to know the ports from which it will receive the data to aggregate. However, this forces packets to traverse a predefined set of switches, making these solutions prone to congestion. For this reason, we design Canary, the first congestion-aware in-network allreduce algorithm. Canary uses load balancing algorithms to forward packets on the least congested paths. Because switches do not know from which ports they will receive the data to aggregate, they use timeouts to aggregate the data in a best-effort way. We develop a P4 Canary prototype and evaluate it on a Tofino switch. We then validate Canary through simulations on large networks, showing performance improvements up to 40% compared to the state-of-the-art.

cs.DC

Everything Matters in Programmable Packet Scheduling

Programmable packet scheduling allows the deployment of scheduling algorithms into existing switches without need for hardware redesign. Scheduling algorithms are programmed by tagging packets with ranks, indicating their desired priority. Programmable schedulers then execute these algorithms by serving packets in the order described in their ranks. The ideal programmable scheduler is a Push-In First-Out (PIFO) queue, which achieves perfect packet sorting by pushing packets into arbitrary positions in the queue, while only draining packets from the head. Unfortunately, implementing PIFO queues in hardware is challenging due to the need to arbitrarily sort packets at line rate based on their ranks. In the last years, various techniques have been proposed, approximating PIFO behaviors using the available resources of existing data planes. While promising, approaches to date only approximate one of the characteristic behaviors of PIFO queues (i.e., its scheduling behavior, or its admission control). We propose PACKS, the first programmable scheduler that fully approximates PIFO queues on all their behaviors. PACKS does so by smartly using a set of strict-priority queues. It uses packet-rank information and queue-occupancy levels at enqueue to decide: whether to admit packets to the scheduler, and how to map admitted packets to the different queues. We fully implement PACKS in P4 and evaluate it on real workloads. We show that PACKS: better-approximates PIFO than state-of-the-art approaches and scales. We also show that PACKS runs at line rate on existing hardware (Intel Tofino).

cs.NI

Oscilloscope: Detecting BGP Hijacks in the Data Plane

The lack of security of the Internet routing protocol (BGP) has allowed attackers to divert Internet traffic and consequently perpetrate service disruptions, monetary frauds, and even citizen surveillance for decades. State-of-the-art defenses rely on geo-distributed BGP monitors to detect rogue BGP announcements. As we show, though, attackers can easily evade detection by engineering their announcements. This paper presents Oscilloscope, an approach to accurately detect BGP hijacks by relying on real-time traffic analysis. As hijacks inevitably change the characteristics of the diverted traffic, the key idea is to track these changes in real time and flag them. The main challenge is that "normal" Internet events (e.g., network reconfigurations, link failures, load balancing) also change the underlying traffic characteristics - and they are way more frequent than hijacks. Naive traffic analyses would hence lead to too many false positives. We observe that hijacks typically target a subset of the prefixes announced by Internet service providers and only divert a subset of their traffic. In contrast, normal events lead to more uniform changes across prefixes and traffic. Oscilloscope uses this observation to filter out non-hijack events by checking whether they affect multiple related prefixes or not. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates that Oscilloscope quickly and accurately detects hijacks in realistic traffic traces containing hundreds of events.

cs.NI

Learning to Configure Computer Networks with Neural Algorithmic Reasoning

We present a new method for scaling automatic configuration of computer networks. The key idea is to relax the computationally hard search problem of finding a configuration that satisfies a given specification into an approximate objective amenable to learning-based techniques. Based on this idea, we train a neural algorithmic model which learns to generate configurations likely to (fully or partially) satisfy a given specification under existing routing protocols. By relaxing the rigid satisfaction guarantees, our approach (i) enables greater flexibility: it is protocol-agnostic, enables cross-protocol reasoning, and does not depend on hardcoded rules; and (ii) finds configurations for much larger computer networks than previously possible. Our learned synthesizer is up to 490x faster than state-of-the-art SMT-based methods, while producing configurations which on average satisfy more than 93% of the provided requirements.

cs.NI

A new hope for network model generalization

Generalizing machine learning (ML) models for network traffic dynamics tends to be considered a lost cause. Hence for every new task, we design new models and train them on model-specific datasets closely mimicking the deployment environments. Yet, an ML architecture called_Transformer_ has enabled previously unimaginable generalization in other domains. Nowadays, one can download a model pre-trained on massive datasets and only fine-tune it for a specific task and context with comparatively little time and data. These fine-tuned models are now state-of-the-art for many benchmarks. We believe this progress could translate to networking and propose a Network Traffic Transformer (NTT), a transformer adapted to learn network dynamics from packet traces. Our initial results are promising: NTT seems able to generalize to new prediction tasks and environments. This study suggests there is still hope for generalization, though it calls for a lot of future research.

cs.NI

pForest: In-Network Inference with Random Forests

When classifying network traffic, a key challenge is deciding when to perform the classification, i.e., after how many packets. Too early, and the decision basis is too thin to classify a flow confidently; too late, and the tardy labeling delays crucial actions (e.g., shutting down an attack) and invests computational resources for too long (e.g., tracking and storing features). Moreover, the optimal decision timing varies across flows. We present pForest, a system for "As Soon As Possible" (ASAP) in-network classification according to supervised machine learning models on top of programmable data planes. pForest automatically classifies each flow as soon as its label is sufficiently established, not sooner, not later. A key challenge behind pForest is finding a strategy for dynamically adapting the features and the classification logic during the lifetime of a flow. pForest solves this problem by: (i) training random forest models tailored to different phases of a flow; and (ii) dynamically switching between these models in real time, on a per-packet basis. pForest models are tuned to fit the constraints of programmable switches (e.g., no floating points, no loops, and limited memory) while providing a high accuracy. We implemented a prototype of pForest in Python (training) and P4 (inference). Our evaluation shows that pForest can classify traffic ASAP for hundreds of thousands of flows, with a classification score that is on-par with software-based solutions.

cs.NI

Order P4-66: Characterizing and mitigating surreptitious programmable network device exploitation

Substantial efforts are invested in improving network security, but the threat landscape is rapidly evolving, particularly with the recent interest in programmable network hardware. We explore a new security threat, from an attacker who has gained control of such devices. While it should be obvious that such attackers can trivially cause substantial damage, the challenge and novelty are in doing so while preventing quick diagnosis by the operator. We find that compromised programmable devices can easily degrade networked applications by orders of magnitude, while evading diagnosis by even the most sophisticated network diagnosis methods in deployment. Two key observations yield this result: (a) targeting a small number of packets is often enough to cause disproportionate performance degradation; and (b) new programmable hardware is an effective enabler of careful, selective targeting of packets. Our results also point to recommendations for minimizing the damage from such attacks, ranging from known, easy to implement techniques like encryption and redundant requests, to more complex considerations that would potentially limit some intended uses of programmable hardware. For data center contexts, we also discuss application-aware monitoring and response as a potential mitigation.

cs.CR