arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Lauro Langosco.
This work identifies 18 foundational challenges in assuring the alignment and safety of large language models (LLMs). These challenges are organized into three different categories: scientific understanding of LLMs, development and deployment methods, and sociotechnical challenges. Based on the identified challenges, we pose $200+$ concrete research questions.
Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a technique for training AI systems to align with human goals. RLHF has emerged as the central method used to finetune state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs). Despite this popularity, there has been relatively little public work systematizing its flaws. In this paper, we (1) survey open problems and fundamental limitations of RLHF and related methods; (2) overview techniques to understand, improve, and complement RLHF in practice; and (3) propose auditing and disclosure standards to improve societal oversight of RLHF systems. Our work emphasizes the limitations of RLHF and highlights the importance of a multi-faceted approach to the development of safer AI systems.
Research in Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, and Ethics (FATE) has established many sources and forms of algorithmic harm, in domains as diverse as health care, finance, policing, and recommendations. Much work remains to be done to mitigate the serious harms of these systems, particularly those disproportionately affecting marginalized communities. Despite these ongoing harms, new systems are being developed and deployed which threaten the perpetuation of the same harms and the creation of novel ones. In response, the FATE community has emphasized the importance of anticipating harms. Our work focuses on the anticipation of harms from increasingly agentic systems. Rather than providing a definition of agency as a binary property, we identify 4 key characteristics which, particularly in combination, tend to increase the agency of a given algorithmic system: underspecification, directness of impact, goal-directedness, and long-term planning. We also discuss important harms which arise from increasing agency -- notably, these include systemic and/or long-range impacts, often on marginalized stakeholders. We emphasize that recognizing agency of algorithmic systems does not absolve or shift the human responsibility for algorithmic harms. Rather, we use the term agency to highlight the increasingly evident fact that ML systems are not fully under human control. Our work explores increasingly agentic algorithmic systems in three parts. First, we explain the notion of an increase in agency for algorithmic systems in the context of diverse perspectives on agency across disciplines. Second, we argue for the need to anticipate harms from increasingly agentic systems. Third, we discuss important harms from increasingly agentic systems and ways forward for addressing them. We conclude by reflecting on implications of our work for anticipating algorithmic harms from emerging systems.
A principled understanding of generalization in deep learning may require unifying disparate observations under a single conceptual framework. Previous work has studied \emph{grokking}, a training dynamic in which a sustained period of near-perfect training performance and near-chance test performance is eventually followed by generalization, as well as the superficially similar \emph{double descent}. These topics have so far been studied in isolation. We hypothesize that grokking and double descent can be understood as instances of the same learning dynamics within a framework of pattern learning speeds. We propose that this framework also applies when varying model capacity instead of optimization steps, and provide the first demonstration of model-wise grokking.
We study goal misgeneralization, a type of out-of-distribution generalization failure in reinforcement learning (RL). Goal misgeneralization failures occur when an RL agent retains its capabilities out-of-distribution yet pursues the wrong goal. For instance, an agent might continue to competently avoid obstacles, but navigate to the wrong place. In contrast, previous works have typically focused on capability generalization failures, where an agent fails to do anything sensible at test time. We formalize this distinction between capability and goal generalization, provide the first empirical demonstrations of goal misgeneralization, and present a partial characterization of its causes.