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Lawrence W. Abrams

Publications and source records attributed to Lawrence W. Abrams.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

A Discovery Plan for Pharmacy Benefit Managers Collusion

The Federal Trade Commission has recently filed an administrative complaint against the Big 3 pharmacy benefit managers claiming they engaged in unfair conduct in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. They never used the word collusion in the complaint and chose not to sue under The Sherman Act, Section 1. We view this as a novel case of market design collusion rather than a case of price collusion. The Big 3 PBMs are conceptualized as auctioneers soliciting rebate bids off unit list prices in exchange for favored positions on formularies. We will show how the fairness standard of the FTC Act can be made operational by judging fairness against economic theories of good auction design. Discovery is focused on finding explicit communication among the Big 3 PBMs in 2012 to change the so-called winner s determination equation of this auction, adding high gross rebates as a basis for formulary position assignments. On the other hand, we will argue that a case based on a bevy of anecdotes comparing only net unit prices will fail due to complexities in the winners determination equation.

econ.GN

Clarifying Trinko as Precedent in EHR and AI Memory Duty to Deal Cases: A New Institutional Economics Approach

By clarifying the bases for the Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 2004 opinion, we hope to reduce two distinct errors. The false positive error is citing Trinko as precedent when it is not. This error is so prevalent it has earned the nickname of Trinko Creep. The false negative error is not citing Trinko when it should be. We argue that this error will be growing in the future as Trinko should be precedent in cases involving regulated access rights to sensitive consumer data in electronic health records and Agentic AI Long Term Memory.

econ.GN

A Pharmacy Benefit Manager Insurance Business Model

It is time to move on from attempts to make the pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) reseller business model more transparent. Time and time again the Big 3 PBMs have developed opaque alternatives to piece-meal 100% pass-through mandates. Time and time again PBMs have demonstrated expertise in finding loopholes in state government disclosure laws. The purpose of this paper is to provide quantitative estimates of two transparent insurance business models as a solution to the PBM agency issue. The key parameter used is an 8% gross profit margin figure disclosed by the Big 3 PBMs themselves. Based on reported drug trend delivered to plans, we use a $1,200 to $1,500 per member per year (PMPY) as the range for this key performance indicator (KPI). We propose that discussions of PBM insurance business models start with the following figures: (1) a fixed premium model with medical loss ratio ranging from 92% to 85%; (2) a fee-for-service model ranging from $96 to $180 PMPY with risk sharing of deviations from a contracted PMPY delivered drug spend.

econ.GN

The Market Design for Formulary Positions

The exchange of rebates for formulary positions is conceptualized as a multi-round combinatorial position auction. This paper develops a linear assignment model of the winners' determination equation of this auction where the bases are net unit prices after unit rebates and expected demand.

econ.GN