arXiv subjects

Leah Hope Ajmani

Publications and source records attributed to Leah Hope Ajmani.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Thought Experiments for Conceptual Work: A New Application of a (Very) Old Method

In this paper, we propose thought experiments (TEs) as a crucial method for Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) researchers to engage in conceptual work. As an interdisciplinary field, HCI often uses concepts as the fundamental building blocks for larger theories. However, the conceptual commitments we make in this process carry normative consequences. TEs are a well-established philosophical method, whereby a hypothetical but tractable scenario logically progresses to a conclusion. We outline TEs as an interrogative method that brings conceptualizations to their normative implications through logical moves. We illustrate the value of thought experiments through two examples: (1) original thought experiments to critique stakeholders in Value-Sensitive Design and (2) Helen Nissenbaum's use of thought experiments to generate contextual integrity. We discuss how TEs precisely anticipate the potential harms of technologies, allowing HCI to operationalize current calls for increased scrutiny of research ethics and broader implications.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2025

Seeking Late Night Life Lines: Experiences of Conversational AI Use in Mental Health Crisis

Online, people often recount their experiences turning to conversational AI agents (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude, Copilot) for mental health support -- going so far as to replace their therapists. These anecdotes suggest that AI agents have great potential to offer accessible mental health support. However, it's unclear how to meet this potential in extreme mental health crisis use cases. In this work, we explore the first-person experience of turning to a conversational AI agent in a mental health crisis. From a testimonial survey (n = 53) of lived experiences, we find that people use AI agents to fill the in-between spaces of human support; they turn to AI due to lack of access to mental health professionals or fears of burdening others. At the same time, our interviews with mental health experts (n = 16) suggest that human-human connection is an essential positive action when managing a mental health crisis. Using the stages of change model, our results suggest that a responsible AI crisis intervention is one that increases the user's preparedness to take a positive action while de-escalating any intended negative action. We discuss the implications of designing conversational AI agents as bridges towards human-human connection rather than ends in themselves.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2025

Secondary Stakeholders in AI: Fighting for, Brokering, and Navigating Agency

As AI technologies become more human-facing, there have been numerous calls to adapt participatory approaches to AI development -- spurring the idea of participatory AI. However, these calls often focus only on primary stakeholders, such as end-users, and not secondary stakeholders. This paper seeks to translate the ideals of participatory AI to a broader population of secondary AI stakeholders through semi-structured interviews. We theorize that meaningful participation involves three participatory ideals: (1) informedness, (2) consent, and (3) agency. We also explore how secondary stakeholders realize these ideals by traversing a complicated problem space. Like walking up the rungs of a ladder, these ideals build on one another. We introduce three stakeholder archetypes: the reluctant data contributor, the unsupported activist, and the well-intentioned practitioner, who must navigate systemic barriers to achieving agentic AI relationships. We envision an AI future where secondary stakeholders are able to meaningfully participate with the AI systems they influence and are influenced by.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2025

Moving Towards Epistemic Autonomy: A Paradigm Shift for Centering Participant Knowledge

Justice, epistemology, and marginalization are rich areas of study in HCI. And yet, we repeatedly find platforms and algorithms that push communities further into the margins. In this paper, we propose epistemic autonomy -- one's ability to govern knowledge about themselves -- as a necessary HCI paradigm for working with marginalized communities. We establish epistemic autonomy by applying the transfeminine principle of autonomy to the problem of epistemic injustice. To articulate the harm of violating one's epistemic autonomy, we present six stories from two trans women: (1) a transfem online administrator and (2) a transfem researcher. We then synthesize our definition of epistemic autonomy in research into a research paradigm. Finally, we present two variants of common HCI methods, autoethnography and asynchronous remote communities, that stem from these beliefs. We discuss how CHI is uniquely situated to champion this paradigm and, thereby, the epistemic autonomy of our research participants.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2024

Whose Knowledge is Valued?: Epistemic Injustice in CSCW Applications

Social computing scholars have long known that people do not interact with knowledge in straightforward ways, especially in digital environments. While policies around knowledge are essential for targeting misinformation, they are value-laden; in choosing how to present information, we undermine non-traditional -- often non-Western -- ways of knowing. Epistemic injustice is the systemic exclusion of certain people and methods from the knowledge canon. Epistemic injustice chips away at one's testimony and vocabulary until they are stripped of their due right to know and understand. In this paper, we articulate how epistemic injustice in sociotechnical applications leads to material harm. Inspired by a hybrid collaborative autoethnography of 14 CSCW practitioners, we present three cases of epistemic injustice in sociotechnical applications: online transgender healthcare, identity sensemaking on r/bisexual, and Indigenous ways of knowing on r/AskHistorians. We further explore signature tensions across our autoethnographic materials and relate them to previous CSCW research areas and personal non-technological experiences. We argue that epistemic injustice can serve as a unifying and intersectional lens for CSCW research by surfacing dimensions of epistemic community and power. Finally, we present a call to action of three changes the CSCW community should make to move toward its own goals of research justice. We call for CSCW researchers to center individual experiences, bolster communities, and remediate issues of epistemic power as a means towards epistemic justice. In sum, we recount, synthesize, and propose solutions for the various forms of epistemic injustice that CSCW sites of study -- including CSCW itself -- propagate.

cs.HC↗