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Leandro Gorno

Publications and source records attributed to Leandro Gorno.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Existence of Richter-Peleg Representation for General Preferences

We characterize the binary relations that admit a Richter-Peleg representation, imposing neither completeness nor transitivity. A relation admits such a representation if and only if it is strongly acyclic and its transitive closure is separable, where separability means embeddability in a preorder possessing a countable separating stratification-a countable family of pairwise disjoint subsets, none containing a strictly ranked pair, that resolves every strict comparison. Separating stratifications generalize Debreu's order-density condition, and for complete preorders our theorem reduces to Debreu's. The embedding clause is the exact price of the stratification structure: indispensable in general, as a Richter-Peleg representable partial order admitting no countable separating stratification shows, but unnecessary whenever the representation is continuous and the lower contour sets are connected, which covers many standard incomplete preferences in economics. By providing existence, our results operationalize the optimization theory of White (1980), which we also extend by delivering the set of maximal elements of each subset with a single Richter-Peleg representation and no completeness assumption. As a second application, we show that the impossibility theorem of Basu and Mitra (2003) on intergenerational equity is exactly a failure of separability.

econ.TH↗

Connected Incomplete Preferences

This paper explores a new class of incomplete preferences -- termed ``connected preferences'' -- in which maximal domains of comparability are topologically connected. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for continuous preferences to be connected. We also characterize their maximal domains of comparability. Our results extend classical findings in decision theory by linking topological properties of the choice space with the structure of preferences, offering a novel perspective on incompleteness in economic models.

econ.TH↗

A Maximum Theorem for Incomplete Preferences

We extend Berge's Maximum Theorem to allow for incomplete preferences. We first provide a simple version of the Maximum Theorem for convex feasible sets and a fixed preference. Then, we show that if, in addition to the traditional continuity assumptions, a new continuity property for the domains of comparability holds, the limits of maximal elements along a sequence of decision problems are maximal elements in the limit problem. While this new continuity property for the domains of comparability is not generally necessary for optimality to be preserved by limits, we provide conditions under which it is necessary and sufficient.

econ.TH↗

Learning from Manipulable Signals

We study a dynamic stopping game between a principal and an agent. The agent is privately informed about his type. The principal learns about the agent's type from a noisy performance measure, which can be manipulated by the agent via a costly and hidden action. We fully characterize the unique Markov equilibrium of this game. We find that terminations/market crashes are often preceded by a spike in (expected) performance. Our model also predicts that, due to endogenous signal manipulation, too much transparency can inhibit learning. As the players get arbitrarily patient, the principal elicits no useful information from the observed signal.

econ.TH↗