arXiv subjects

Leif Hancox-Li

Publications and source records attributed to Leif Hancox-Li.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Stop treating `AGI' as the north-star goal of AI research

The AI research community plays a vital role in shaping the scientific, engineering, and societal goals of AI research. In this position paper, we argue that focusing on the highly contested topic of `artificial general intelligence' (`AGI') undermines our ability to choose effective goals. We identify six key traps -- obstacles to productive goal setting -- that are aggravated by AGI discourse: Illusion of Consensus, Supercharging Bad Science, Presuming Value-Neutrality, Goal Lottery, Generality Debt, and Normalized Exclusion. To avoid these traps, we argue that the AI research community needs to (1) prioritize specificity in engineering and societal goals, (2) center pluralism about multiple worthwhile approaches to multiple valuable goals, and (3) foster innovation through greater inclusion of disciplines and communities. Therefore, the AI research community needs to stop treating `AGI' as the north-star goal of AI research.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

Is ETHICS about ethics? Evaluating the ETHICS benchmark

ETHICS is probably the most-cited dataset for testing the ethical capabilities of language models. Drawing on moral theory, psychology, and prompt evaluation, we interrogate the validity of the ETHICS benchmark. Adding to prior work, our findings suggest that having a clear understanding of ethics and how it relates to empirical phenomena is key to the validity of ethics evaluations for AI.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

Unsocial Intelligence: an Investigation of the Assumptions of AGI Discourse

Dreams of machines rivaling human intelligence have shaped the field of AI since its inception. Yet, the very meaning of human-level AI or artificial general intelligence (AGI) remains elusive and contested. Definitions of AGI embrace a diverse range of incompatible values and assumptions. Contending with the fractured worldviews of AGI discourse is vital for critiques that pursue different values and futures. To that end, we provide a taxonomy of AGI definitions, laying the ground for examining the key social, political, and ethical assumptions they make. We highlight instances in which these definitions frame AGI or human-level AI as a technical topic and expose the value-laden choices being implicitly made. Drawing on feminist, STS, and social science scholarship on the political and social character of intelligence in both humans and machines, we propose contextual, democratic, and participatory paths to imagining future forms of machine intelligence. The development of future forms of AI must involve explicit attention to the values it encodes, the people it includes or excludes, and a commitment to epistemic justice.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2023

The Disagreement Problem in Faithfulness Metrics

The field of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) aims to explain how black-box machine learning models work. Much of the work centers around the holy grail of providing post-hoc feature attributions to any model architecture. While the pace of innovation around novel methods has slowed down, the question remains of how to choose a method, and how to make it fit for purpose. Recently, efforts around benchmarking XAI methods have suggested metrics for that purpose -- but there are many choices. That bounty of choice still leaves an end user unclear on how to proceed. This paper focuses on comparing metrics with the aim of measuring faithfulness of local explanations on tabular classification problems -- and shows that the current metrics don't agree; leaving users unsure how to choose the most faithful explanations.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Making Intelligence: Ethical Values in IQ and ML Benchmarks

In recent years, ML researchers have wrestled with defining and improving machine learning (ML) benchmarks and datasets. In parallel, some have trained a critical lens on the ethics of dataset creation and ML research. In this position paper, we highlight the entanglement of ethics with seemingly ``technical'' or ``scientific'' decisions about the design of ML benchmarks. Our starting point is the existence of multiple overlooked structural similarities between human intelligence benchmarks and ML benchmarks. Both types of benchmarks set standards for describing, evaluating, and comparing performance on tasks relevant to intelligence -- standards that many scholars of human intelligence have long recognized as value-laden. We use perspectives from feminist philosophy of science on IQ benchmarks and thick concepts in social science to argue that values need to be considered and documented when creating ML benchmarks. It is neither possible nor desirable to avoid this choice by creating value-neutral benchmarks. Finally, we outline practical recommendations for ML benchmark research ethics and ethics review.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Should attention be all we need? The epistemic and ethical implications of unification in machine learning

"Attention is all you need" has become a fundamental precept in machine learning research. Originally designed for machine translation, transformers and the attention mechanisms that underpin them now find success across many problem domains. With the apparent domain-agnostic success of transformers, many researchers are excited that similar model architectures can be successfully deployed across diverse applications in vision, language and beyond. We consider the benefits and risks of these waves of unification on both epistemic and ethical fronts. On the epistemic side, we argue that many of the arguments in favor of unification in the natural sciences fail to transfer over to the machine learning case, or transfer over only under assumptions that might not hold. Unification also introduces epistemic risks related to portability, path dependency, methodological diversity, and increased black-boxing. On the ethical side, we discuss risks emerging from epistemic concerns, further marginalizing underrepresented perspectives, the centralization of power, and having fewer models across more domains of application

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Epistemic values in feature importance methods: Lessons from feminist epistemology

As the public seeks greater accountability and transparency from machine learning algorithms, the research literature on methods to explain algorithms and their outputs has rapidly expanded. Feature importance methods form a popular class of explanation methods. In this paper, we apply the lens of feminist epistemology to recent feature importance research. We investigate what epistemic values are implicitly embedded in feature importance methods and how or whether they are in conflict with feminist epistemology. We offer some suggestions on how to conduct research on explanations that respects feminist epistemic values, taking into account the importance of social context, the epistemic privileges of subjugated knowers, and adopting more interactional ways of knowing.

cs.CY↗