arXiv subjects

Lennart Heim

Publications and source records attributed to Lennart Heim.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Designing Incident Reporting Systems for Harms from General-Purpose AI

We introduce a conceptual framework and provide considerations for the institutional design of AI incident reporting systems, i.e., processes for collecting information about safety- and rights-related events caused by general-purpose AI. As general-purpose AI systems are increasingly adopted, they are causing more real-world harms and displaying the potential to cause significantly more dangerous incidents - events that did or could have caused harm to individuals, property, or the environment. Through a literature review, we develop a framework for understanding the institutional design of AI incident reporting systems, which includes seven dimensions: policy goal, actors submitting and receiving reports, type of incidents reported, level of risk materialization, enforcement of reporting, anonymity of reporters, and post-reporting actions. We then examine nine case studies of incident reporting in safety-critical industries to extract design considerations for AI incident reporting in the United States. We discuss, among other factors, differences in systems operated by regulatory vs. non-regulatory government agencies, near miss reporting, the roles of mandatory reporting thresholds and voluntary reporting channels, how to enable safety learning after reporting, sharing incident information, and clarifying legal frameworks for reporting. Our aim is to inform researchers and policymakers about when particular design choices might be more or less appropriate for AI incident reporting.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment

The risks of frontier AI may require international cooperation, which in turn may require verification: checking that all parties follow agreed-on rules. For instance, states might need to verify that powerful AI models are widely deployed only after their risks to international security have been evaluated and deemed manageable. However, research on AI verification could benefit from greater clarity and detail. To address this, this report provides an in-depth overview of AI verification, intended for both policy professionals and technical researchers. We present novel conceptual frameworks, detailed implementation options, and key R&D challenges. These draw on existing literature, expert interviews, and original analysis, all within the scope of confidentially overseeing AI development and deployment that uses thousands of high-end AI chips. We find that states could eventually verify compliance by using six largely independent verification approaches with substantial redundancy: (1) built-in security features in AI chips; (2-3) separate monitoring devices attached to AI chips; and (4-6) personnel-based mechanisms, such as whistleblower programs. While promising, these approaches require guardrails to protect against abuse and power concentration, and many of these technologies have yet to be built or stress-tested. To enable states to confidently verify compliance with rules on large-scale AI development and deployment, the R&D challenges we list need significant progress.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Third-party compliance reviews for frontier AI safety frameworks

Safety frameworks have emerged as a best practice for managing risks from frontier artificial intelligence (AI) systems. However, it may be difficult for stakeholders to know if companies are adhering to their frameworks. This paper explores a potential solution: third-party compliance reviews. During a third-party compliance review, an independent external party assesses whether a frontier AI company is complying with its safety framework. First, we discuss the main benefits and challenges of such reviews. On the one hand, they can increase compliance with safety frameworks and provide assurance to internal and external stakeholders. On the other hand, they can create information security risks, impose additional cost burdens, and cause reputational damage, but these challenges can be partially mitigated by drawing on best practices from other industries. Next, we answer practical questions about third-party compliance reviews, namely: (1) Who could conduct the review? (2) What information sources could the reviewer consider? (3) How could compliance with the safety framework be assessed? (4) What information about the review could be disclosed externally? (5) How could the findings guide development and deployment actions? (6) When could the reviews be conducted? For each question, we evaluate a set of plausible options. Finally, we suggest "minimalist", "more ambitious", and "comprehensive" approaches for each question that a frontier AI company could adopt.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Trends in AI Supercomputers

Frontier AI development relies on powerful AI supercomputers, yet analysis of these systems is limited. We create a dataset of 500 AI supercomputers from 2019 to 2025 and analyze key trends in performance, power needs, hardware cost, ownership, and global distribution. We find that the computational performance of AI supercomputers has doubled every nine months, while hardware acquisition cost and power needs both doubled every year. The leading system in March 2025, xAI's Colossus, used 200,000 AI chips, had a hardware cost of \$7B, and required 300 MW of power, as much as 250,000 households. As AI supercomputers evolved from tools for science to industrial machines, companies rapidly expanded their share of total AI supercomputer performance, while the share of governments and academia diminished. Globally, the United States accounts for about 75% of total performance in our dataset, with China in second place at 15%. If the observed trends continue, the leading AI supercomputer in 2030 will achieve $2\times10^{22}$ 16-bit FLOP/s, use two million AI chips, have a hardware cost of \$200 billion, and require 9 GW of power. Our analysis provides visibility into the AI supercomputer landscape, allowing policymakers to assess key AI trends like resource needs, ownership, and national competitiveness.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Open Problems in Technical AI Governance

AI progress is creating a growing range of risks and opportunities, but it is often unclear how they should be navigated. In many cases, the barriers and uncertainties faced are at least partly technical. Technical AI governance, referring to technical analysis and tools for supporting the effective governance of AI, seeks to address such challenges. It can help to (a) identify areas where intervention is needed, (b) identify and assess the efficacy of potential governance actions, and (c) enhance governance options by designing mechanisms for enforcement, incentivization, or compliance. In this paper, we explain what technical AI governance is, why it is important, and present a taxonomy and incomplete catalog of its open problems. This paper is intended as a resource for technical researchers or research funders looking to contribute to AI governance.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Societal Adaptation to Advanced AI

Existing strategies for managing risks from advanced AI systems often focus on affecting what AI systems are developed and how they diffuse. However, this approach becomes less feasible as the number of developers of advanced AI grows, and impedes beneficial use-cases as well as harmful ones. In response, we urge a complementary approach: increasing societal adaptation to advanced AI, that is, reducing the expected negative impacts from a given level of diffusion of a given AI capability. We introduce a conceptual framework which helps identify adaptive interventions that avoid, defend against and remedy potentially harmful uses of AI systems, illustrated with examples in election manipulation, cyberterrorism, and loss of control to AI decision-makers. We discuss a three-step cycle that society can implement to adapt to AI. Increasing society's ability to implement this cycle builds its resilience to advanced AI. We conclude with concrete recommendations for governments, industry, and third-parties.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

IDs for AI Systems

AI systems are increasingly pervasive, yet information needed to decide whether and how to engage with them may not exist or be accessible. A user may not be able to verify whether a system has certain safety certifications. An investigator may not know whom to investigate when a system causes an incident. It may not be clear whom to contact to shut down a malfunctioning system. Across a number of domains, IDs address analogous problems by identifying particular entities (e.g., a particular Boeing 747) and providing information about other entities of the same class (e.g., some or all Boeing 747s). We propose a framework in which IDs are ascribed to instances of AI systems (e.g., a particular chat session with Claude 3), and associated information is accessible to parties seeking to interact with that system. We characterize IDs for AI systems, provide concrete examples where IDs could be useful, argue that there could be significant demand for IDs from key actors, analyze how those actors could incentivize ID adoption, explore a potential implementation of our framework for deployers of AI systems, and highlight limitations and risks. IDs seem most warranted in settings where AI systems could have a large impact upon the world, such as in making financial transactions or contacting real humans. With further study, IDs could help to manage a world where AI systems pervade society.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Training Compute Thresholds: Features and Functions in AI Regulation

Regulators in the US and EU are using thresholds based on training compute--the number of computational operations used in training--to identify general-purpose artificial intelligence (GPAI) models that may pose risks of large-scale societal harm. We argue that training compute currently is the most suitable metric to identify GPAI models that deserve regulatory oversight and further scrutiny. Training compute correlates with model capabilities and risks, is quantifiable, can be measured early in the AI lifecycle, and can be verified by external actors, among other advantageous features. These features make compute thresholds considerably more suitable than other proposed metrics to serve as an initial filter to trigger additional regulatory requirements and scrutiny. However, training compute is an imperfect proxy for risk. As such, compute thresholds should not be used in isolation to determine appropriate mitigation measures. Instead, they should be used to detect potentially risky GPAI models that warrant regulatory oversight, such as through notification requirements, and further scrutiny, such as via model evaluations and risk assessments, the results of which may inform which mitigation measures are appropriate. In fact, this appears largely consistent with how compute thresholds are used today. As GPAI technology and market structures evolve, regulators should update compute thresholds and complement them with other metrics into regulatory review processes.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

Will we run out of data? Limits of LLM scaling based on human-generated data

We investigate the potential constraints on LLM scaling posed by the availability of public human-generated text data. We forecast the growing demand for training data based on current trends and estimate the total stock of public human text data. Our findings indicate that if current LLM development trends continue, models will be trained on datasets roughly equal in size to the available stock of public human text data between 2026 and 2032, or slightly earlier if models are overtrained. We explore how progress in language modeling can continue when human-generated text datasets cannot be scaled any further. We argue that synthetic data generation, transfer learning from data-rich domains, and data efficiency improvements might support further progress.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Visibility into AI Agents

Increased delegation of commercial, scientific, governmental, and personal activities to AI agents -- systems capable of pursuing complex goals with limited supervision -- may exacerbate existing societal risks and introduce new risks. Understanding and mitigating these risks involves critically evaluating existing governance structures, revising and adapting these structures where needed, and ensuring accountability of key stakeholders. Information about where, why, how, and by whom certain AI agents are used, which we refer to as visibility, is critical to these objectives. In this paper, we assess three categories of measures to increase visibility into AI agents: agent identifiers, real-time monitoring, and activity logging. For each, we outline potential implementations that vary in intrusiveness and informativeness. We analyze how the measures apply across a spectrum of centralized through decentralized deployment contexts, accounting for various actors in the supply chain including hardware and software service providers. Finally, we discuss the implications of our measures for privacy and concentration of power. Further work into understanding the measures and mitigating their negative impacts can help to build a foundation for the governance of AI agents.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

Responsible Reporting for Frontier AI Development

Mitigating the risks from frontier AI systems requires up-to-date and reliable information about those systems. Organizations that develop and deploy frontier systems have significant access to such information. By reporting safety-critical information to actors in government, industry, and civil society, these organizations could improve visibility into new and emerging risks posed by frontier systems. Equipped with this information, developers could make better informed decisions on risk management, while policymakers could design more targeted and robust regulatory infrastructure. We outline the key features of responsible reporting and propose mechanisms for implementing them in practice.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

Governing Through the Cloud: The Intermediary Role of Compute Providers in AI Regulation

As jurisdictions around the world take their first steps toward regulating the most powerful AI systems, such as the EU AI Act and the US Executive Order 14110, there is a growing need for effective enforcement mechanisms that can verify compliance and respond to violations. We argue that compute providers should have legal obligations and ethical responsibilities associated with AI development and deployment, both to provide secure infrastructure and to serve as intermediaries for AI regulation. Compute providers can play an essential role in a regulatory ecosystem via four key capacities: as securers, safeguarding AI systems and critical infrastructure; as record keepers, enhancing visibility for policymakers; as verifiers of customer activities, ensuring oversight; and as enforcers, taking actions against rule violations. We analyze the technical feasibility of performing these functions in a targeted and privacy-conscious manner and present a range of technical instruments. In particular, we describe how non-confidential information, to which compute providers largely already have access, can provide two key governance-relevant properties of a computational workload: its type-e.g., large-scale training or inference-and the amount of compute it has consumed. Using AI Executive Order 14110 as a case study, we outline how the US is beginning to implement record keeping requirements for compute providers. We also explore how verification and enforcement roles could be added to establish a comprehensive AI compute oversight scheme. We argue that internationalization will be key to effective implementation, and highlight the critical challenge of balancing confidentiality and privacy with risk mitigation as the role of compute providers in AI regulation expands.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

Increased Compute Efficiency and the Diffusion of AI Capabilities

Training advanced AI models requires large investments in computational resources, or compute. Yet, as hardware innovation reduces the price of compute and algorithmic advances make its use more efficient, the cost of training an AI model to a given performance falls over time - a concept we describe as increasing compute efficiency. We find that while an access effect increases the number of actors who can train models to a given performance over time, a performance effect simultaneously increases the performance available to each actor. This potentially enables large compute investors to pioneer new capabilities, maintaining a performance advantage even as capabilities diffuse. Since large compute investors tend to develop new capabilities first, it will be particularly important that they share information about their AI models, evaluate them for emerging risks, and, more generally, make responsible development and release decisions. Further, as compute efficiency increases, governments will need to prepare for a world where dangerous AI capabilities are widely available - for instance, by developing defenses against harmful AI models or by actively intervening in the diffusion of particularly dangerous capabilities.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence

Computing power, or "compute," is crucial for the development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities. As a result, governments and companies have started to leverage compute as a means to govern AI. For example, governments are investing in domestic compute capacity, controlling the flow of compute to competing countries, and subsidizing compute access to certain sectors. However, these efforts only scratch the surface of how compute can be used to govern AI development and deployment. Relative to other key inputs to AI (data and algorithms), AI-relevant compute is a particularly effective point of intervention: it is detectable, excludable, and quantifiable, and is produced via an extremely concentrated supply chain. These characteristics, alongside the singular importance of compute for cutting-edge AI models, suggest that governing compute can contribute to achieving common policy objectives, such as ensuring the safety and beneficial use of AI. More precisely, policymakers could use compute to facilitate regulatory visibility of AI, allocate resources to promote beneficial outcomes, and enforce restrictions against irresponsible or malicious AI development and usage. However, while compute-based policies and technologies have the potential to assist in these areas, there is significant variation in their readiness for implementation. Some ideas are currently being piloted, while others are hindered by the need for fundamental research. Furthermore, naive or poorly scoped approaches to compute governance carry significant risks in areas like privacy, economic impacts, and centralization of power. We end by suggesting guardrails to minimize these risks from compute governance.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

The Compute Divide in Machine Learning: A Threat to Academic Contribution and Scrutiny?

There are pronounced differences in the extent to which industrial and academic AI labs use computing resources. We provide a data-driven survey of the role of the compute divide in shaping machine learning research. We show that a compute divide has coincided with a reduced representation of academic-only research teams in compute intensive research topics, especially foundation models. We argue that, academia will likely play a smaller role in advancing the associated techniques, providing critical evaluation and scrutiny, and in the diffusion of such models. Concurrent with this change in research focus, there is a noticeable shift in academic research towards embracing open source, pre-trained models developed within the industry. To address the challenges arising from this trend, especially reduced scrutiny of influential models, we recommend approaches aimed at thoughtfully expanding academic insights. Nationally-sponsored computing infrastructure coupled with open science initiatives could judiciously boost academic compute access, prioritizing research on interpretability, safety and security. Structured access programs and third-party auditing may also allow measured external evaluation of industry systems.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2023

Compute at Scale: A Broad Investigation into the Data Center Industry

This report characterizes the data center industry and its importance for AI development. Data centers are industrial facilities that efficiently provide compute at scale and thus constitute the engine rooms of today's digital economy. As large-scale AI training and inference become increasingly computationally expensive, they are dominantly executed from this designated infrastructure. Key features of data centers include large-scale compute clusters that require extensive cooling and consume large amounts of power, the need for fast connectivity both within the data center and to the internet, and an emphasis on security and reliability. The global industry is valued at approximately $250B and is expected to double over the next seven years. There are likely about 500 large (above 10 MW) data centers globally, with the US, Europe, and China constituting the most important markets. The report further covers important actors, business models, main inputs, and typical locations of data centers.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2023

Oversight for Frontier AI through a Know-Your-Customer Scheme for Compute Providers

To address security and safety risks stemming from highly capable artificial intelligence (AI) models, we propose that the US government should ensure compute providers implement Know-Your-Customer (KYC) schemes. Compute - the computational power and infrastructure required to train and run these AI models - is emerging as a node for oversight. KYC, a standard developed by the banking sector to identify and verify client identity, could provide a mechanism for greater public oversight of frontier AI development and close loopholes in existing export controls. Such a scheme has the potential to identify and warn stakeholders of potentially problematic and/or sudden advancements in AI capabilities, build government capacity for AI regulation, and allow for the development and implementation of more nuanced and targeted export controls. Unlike the strategy of limiting access to AI chip purchases, regulating the digital access to compute offers more precise controls, allowing regulatory control over compute quantities, as well as the flexibility to suspend access at any time. To enact a KYC scheme, the US government will need to work closely with industry to (1) establish a dynamic threshold of compute that effectively captures high-risk frontier model development, while minimizing imposition on developers not engaged in frontier AI; (2) set requirements and guidance for compute providers to keep records and report high-risk entities; (3) establish government capacity that allows for co-design, implementation, administration and enforcement of the scheme; and (4) engage internationally to promote international alignment with the scheme and support its long-term efficacy. While the scheme will not address all AI risks, it complements proposed solutions by allowing for a more precise and flexible approach to controlling the development of frontier AI models and unwanted AI proliferation.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2023

International Governance of Civilian AI: A Jurisdictional Certification Approach

This report describes trade-offs in the design of international governance arrangements for civilian artificial intelligence (AI) and presents one approach in detail. This approach represents the extension of a standards, licensing, and liability regime to the global level. We propose that states establish an International AI Organization (IAIO) to certify state jurisdictions (not firms or AI projects) for compliance with international oversight standards. States can give force to these international standards by adopting regulations prohibiting the import of goods whose supply chains embody AI from non-IAIO-certified jurisdictions. This borrows attributes from models of existing international organizations, such as the International Civilian Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). States can also adopt multilateral controls on the export of AI product inputs, such as specialized hardware, to non-certified jurisdictions. Indeed, both the import and export standards could be required for certification. As international actors reach consensus on risks of and minimum standards for advanced AI, a jurisdictional certification regime could mitigate a broad range of potential harms, including threats to public safety.

cs.AI↗