arXiv subjects

Lennart M. Reimann

Publications and source records attributed to Lennart M. Reimann.

15 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Optimizing Binary and Ternary Neural Network Inference on RRAM Crossbars using CIM-Explorer

Using Resistive Random Access Memory (RRAM) crossbars in Computing-in-Memory (CIM) architectures offers a promising solution to overcome the von Neumann bottleneck. Due to non-idealities like cell variability, RRAM crossbars are often operated in binary mode, utilizing only two states: Low Resistive State (LRS) and High Resistive State (HRS). Binary Neural Networks (BNNs) and Ternary Neural Networks (TNNs) are well-suited for this hardware due to their efficient mapping. Existing software projects for RRAM-based CIM typically focus on only one aspect: compilation, simulation, or Design Space Exploration (DSE). Moreover, they often rely on classical 8 bit quantization. To address these limitations, we introduce CIM-Explorer, a modular toolkit for optimizing BNN and TNN inference on RRAM crossbars. CIM-Explorer includes an end-to-end compiler stack, multiple mapping options, and simulators, enabling a DSE flow for accuracy estimation across different crossbar parameters and mappings. CIM-Explorer can accompany the entire design process, from early accuracy estimation for specific crossbar parameters, to selecting an appropriate mapping, and compiling BNNs and TNNs for a finalized crossbar chip. In DSE case studies, we demonstrate the expected accuracy for various mappings and crossbar parameters. CIM-Explorer can be found on GitHub.

cs.ET↗

arXiv2026

Introducing Instruction-Accurate Simulators for Performance Estimation of Autotuning Workloads

Accelerating Machine Learning (ML) workloads requires efficient methods due to their large optimization space. Autotuning has emerged as an effective approach for systematically evaluating variations of implementations. Traditionally, autotuning requires the workloads to be executed on the target hardware (HW). We present an interface that allows executing autotuning workloads on simulators. This approach offers high scalability when the availability of the target HW is limited, as many simulations can be run in parallel on any accessible HW. Additionally, we evaluate the feasibility of using fast instruction-accurate simulators for autotuning. We train various predictors to forecast the performance of ML workload implementations on the target HW based on simulation statistics. Our results demonstrate that the tuned predictors are highly effective. The best workload implementation in terms of actual run time on the target HW is always within the top 3 % of predictions for the tested x86, ARM, and RISC-V-based architectures. In the best case, this approach outperforms native execution on the target HW for embedded architectures when running as few as three samples on three simulators in parallel.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2025

Automatic Microarchitecture-Aware Custom Instruction Design for RISC-V Processors

An Application-Specific Instruction Set Processor(ASIP) is a specialized microprocessor that provides a trade-off between the programmability of a General Purpose Processor (GPP) and the performance and energy-efficiency of dedicated hardware accelerators. ASIPs are often derived from off-the-shelf GPPs extended by custom instructions tailored towards a specific software workload. One of the most important challenges of designing an ASIP is to find said custom instructions that help to increase performance without being too costly in terms of area and power consumption. To date, solving this challenge is relatively labor-intensive and typically performed manually. Addressing the lack of automation, we present Custom Instruction Designer for RISC-V Extensions (CIDRE), a front-to-back tool for ASIP design. CIDRE automatically analyzes hotspots in RISC-V applications and generates custom instruction suggestions with a corresponding nML description. The nML description can be used with other electronic design automation tools to accurately assess the cost and benefits of the found suggestions. In a RISC-V benchmark study, we were able to accelerate embedded benchmarks from Embench and MiBench by up to 2.47x with less than 24% area increase. The entire process was conducted completely automatically.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2025

Leveraging SystemC-TLM-based Virtual Prototypes for Embedded Software Fuzzing

SystemC-based virtual prototypes have emerged as widely adopted tools to test software ahead of hardware availability, reducing the time-to-market and improving software reliability. Recently, fuzzing has become a popular method for automated software testing due to its ability to quickly identify corner-case errors. However, its application to embedded software is still limited. Simulator tools can help bridge this gap by providing a more powerful and controlled execution environment for testing. Existing solutions, however, often tightly couple fuzzers with built-in simulators that lack support for hardware peripherals and offer limited flexibility, restricting their ability to test embedded software. To address these limitations, we present a framework that allows the integration of American-Fuzzy-Lop-based fuzzers and SystemC-based simulators. The framework provides a harness to decouple the adopted fuzzer and simulator. In addition, it intercepts peripheral accesses and queries the fuzzer for values, effectively linking peripheral behavior to the fuzzer. This solution enables flexible interchangeability of peripherals within the simulation environment and supports the interfacing of different SystemC-based virtual prototypes. The flexibility of the proposed solution is demonstrated by integrating the harness with different simulators and by testing various softwares.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2025

The Impact of Logic Locking on Confidentiality: An Automated Evaluation

Logic locking secures hardware designs in untrusted foundries by incorporating key-driven gates to obscure the original blueprint. While this method safeguards the integrated circuit from malicious alterations during fabrication, its influence on data confidentiality during runtime has been ignored. In this study, we employ path sensitization to formally examine the impact of logic locking on confidentiality. By applying three representative logic locking mechanisms on open-source cryptographic benchmarks, we utilize an automatic test pattern generation framework to evaluate the effect of locking on cryptographic encryption keys and sensitive data signals. Our analysis reveals that logic locking can inadvertently cause sensitive data leakage when incorrect logic locking keys are used. We show that a single malicious logic locking key can expose over 70% of an encryption key. If an adversary gains control over other inputs, the entire encryption key can be compromised. This research uncovers a significant security vulnerability in logic locking and emphasizes the need for comprehensive security assessments that extend beyond key-recovery attacks.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Exploiting the Lock: Leveraging MiG-V's Logic Locking for Secret-Data Extraction

The MiG-V was designed for high-security applications and is the first commercially available logic-locked RISC-V processor on the market. In this context logic locking was used to protect the RISC-V processor design during the untrusted manufacturing process by using key-driven logic gates to obfuscate the original design. Although this method defends against malicious modifications, such as hardware Trojans, logic locking's impact on the RISC-V processor's data confidentiality during runtime has not been thoroughly examined. In this study, we evaluate the impact of logic locking on data confidentiality. By altering the logic locking key of the MiG-V while running SSL cryptographic algorithms, we identify data leakages resulting from the exploitation of the logic locking hardware. We show that changing a single bit of the logic locking key can expose 100% of the cryptographic encryption key. This research reveals a critical security flaw in logic locking, highlighting the need for comprehensive security assessments beyond logic locking key-recovery attacks.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

QTFlow: Quantitative Timing-Sensitive Information Flow for Security-Aware Hardware Design on RTL

In contemporary Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools, security often takes a backseat to the primary goals of power, performance, and area optimization. Commonly, the security analysis is conducted by hand, leading to vulnerabilities in the design remaining unnoticed. Security-aware EDA tools assist the designer in the identification and removal of security threats while keeping performance and area in mind. Cutting-edge methods employ information flow analysis to identify inadvertent information leaks in design structures. Current information leakage detection methods use quantitative information flow analysis to quantify the leaks. However, handling sequential circuits poses challenges for state-of-the-art techniques due to their time-agnostic nature, overlooking timing channels, and introducing false positives. To address this, we introduce QTFlow, a timing-sensitive framework for quantifying hardware information leakages during the design phase. Illustrating its effectiveness on open-source benchmarks, QTFlow autonomously identifies timing channels and diminishes all false positives arising from time-agnostic analysis when contrasted with current state-of-the-art techniques.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

SoftFlow: Automated HW-SW Confidentiality Verification for Embedded Processors

Despite its ever-increasing impact, security is not considered as a design objective in commercial electronic design automation (EDA) tools. This results in vulnerabilities being overlooked during the software-hardware design process. Specifically, vulnerabilities that allow leakage of sensitive data might stay unnoticed by standard testing, as the leakage itself might not result in evident functional changes. Therefore, EDA tools are needed to elaborate the confidentiality of sensitive data during the design process. However, state-of-the-art implementations either solely consider the hardware or restrict the expressiveness of the security properties that must be proven. Consequently, more proficient tools are required to assist in the software and hardware design. To address this issue, we propose SoftFlow, an EDA tool that allows determining whether a given software exploits existing leakage paths in hardware. Based on our analysis, the leakage paths can be retained if proven not to be exploited by software. This is desirable if the removal significantly impacts the design's performance or functionality, or if the path cannot be removed as the chip is already manufactured. We demonstrate the feasibility of SoftFlow by identifying vulnerabilities in OpenSSL cryptographic C programs, and redesigning them to avoid leakage of cryptographic keys in a RISC-V architecture.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

Automated Information Flow Analysis for Integrated Computing-in-Memory Modules

Novel non-volatile memory (NVM) technologies offer high-speed and high-density data storage. In addition, they overcome the von Neumann bottleneck by enabling computing-in-memory (CIM). Various computer architectures have been proposed to integrate CIM blocks in their design, forming a mixed-signal system to combine the computational benefits of CIM with the robustness of conventional CMOS. Novel electronic design automation (EDA) tools are necessary to design and manufacture these so-called neuromorphic systems. Furthermore, EDA tools must consider the impact of security vulnerabilities, as hardware security attacks have increased in recent years. Existing information flow analysis (IFA) frameworks offer an automated tool-suite to uphold the confidentiality property for sensitive data during the design of hardware. However, currently available mixed-signal EDA tools are not capable of analyzing the information flow of neuromorphic systems. To illustrate the shortcomings, we develop information flow protocols for NVMs that can be easily integrated in the already existing tool-suites. We show the limitation of the state-of-the-art by analyzing the flow from sensitive signals through multiple memristive crossbar structures to potential untrusted components and outputs. Finally, we provide a thorough discussion of the merits and flaws of the mixed-signal IFA frameworks on neuromorphic systems.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Quantitative Information Flow for Hardware: Advancing the Attack Landscape

Security still remains an afterthought in modern Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools, which solely focus on enhancing performance and reducing the chip size. Typically, the security analysis is conducted by hand, leading to vulnerabilities in the design remaining unnoticed. Security-aware EDA tools assist the designer in the identification and removal of security threats while keeping performance and area in mind. State-of-the-art approaches utilize information flow analysis to spot unintended information leakages in design structures. However, the classification of such threats is binary, resulting in negligible leakages being listed as well. A novel quantitative analysis allows the application of a metric to determine a numeric value for a leakage. Nonetheless, current approximations to quantify the leakage are still prone to overlooking leakages. The mathematical model 2D-QModel introduced in this work aims to overcome this shortcoming. Additionally, as previous work only includes a limited threat model, multiple threat models can be applied using the provided approach. Open-source benchmarks are used to show the capabilities of 2D-QModel to identify hardware Trojans in the design while ignoring insignificant leakages.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

QFlow: Quantitative Information Flow for Security-Aware Hardware Design in Verilog

The enormous amount of code required to design modern hardware implementations often leads to critical vulnerabilities being overlooked. Especially vulnerabilities that compromise the confidentiality of sensitive data, such as cryptographic keys, have a major impact on the trustworthiness of an entire system. Information flow analysis can elaborate whether information from sensitive signals flows towards outputs or untrusted components of the system. But most of these analytical strategies rely on the non-interference property, stating that the untrusted targets must not be influenced by the source's data, which is shown to be too inflexible for many applications. To address this issue, there are approaches to quantify the information flow between components such that insignificant leakage can be neglected. Due to the high computational complexity of this quantification, approximations are needed, which introduce mispredictions. To tackle those limitations, we reformulate the approximations. Further, we propose a tool QFlow with a higher detection rate than previous tools. It can be used by non-experienced users to identify data leakages in hardware designs, thus facilitating a security-aware design process.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

Logic Locking at the Frontiers of Machine Learning: A Survey on Developments and Opportunities

In the past decade, a lot of progress has been made in the design and evaluation of logic locking; a premier technique to safeguard the integrity of integrated circuits throughout the electronics supply chain. However, the widespread proliferation of machine learning has recently introduced a new pathway to evaluating logic locking schemes. This paper summarizes the recent developments in logic locking attacks and countermeasures at the frontiers of contemporary machine learning models. Based on the presented work, the key takeaways, opportunities, and challenges are highlighted to offer recommendations for the design of next-generation logic locking.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

Deceptive Logic Locking for Hardware Integrity Protection against Machine Learning Attacks

Logic locking has emerged as a prominent key-driven technique to protect the integrity of integrated circuits. However, novel machine-learning-based attacks have recently been introduced to challenge the security foundations of locking schemes. These attacks are able to recover a significant percentage of the key without having access to an activated circuit. This paper address this issue through two focal points. First, we present a theoretical model to test locking schemes for key-related structural leakage that can be exploited by machine learning. Second, based on the theoretical model, we introduce D-MUX: a deceptive multiplexer-based logic-locking scheme that is resilient against structure-exploiting machine learning attacks. Through the design of D-MUX, we uncover a major fallacy in existing multiplexer-based locking schemes in the form of a structural-analysis attack. Finally, an extensive cost evaluation of D-MUX is presented. To the best of our knowledge, D-MUX is the first machine-learning-resilient locking scheme capable of protecting against all known learning-based attacks. Hereby, the presented work offers a starting point for the design and evaluation of future-generation logic locking in the era of machine learning.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

ANDROMEDA: An FPGA Based RISC-V MPSoC Exploration Framework

With the growing demands of consumer electronic products, the computational requirements are increasing exponentially. Due to the applications' computational needs, the computer architects are trying to pack as many cores as possible on a single die for accelerated execution of the application program codes. In a multiprocessor system-on-chip (MPSoC), striking a balance among the number of cores, memory subsystems, and network-on-chip parameters is essential to attain the desired performance. In this paper, we present ANDROMEDA, a RISC-V based framework that allows us to explore the different configurations of an MPSoC and observe the performance penalties and gains. We emulate the various configurations of MPSoC on the Synopsys HAPS-80D Dual FPGA platform. Using STREAM, matrix multiply, and N-body simulations as benchmarks, we demonstrate our framework's efficacy in quickly identifying the right parameters for efficient execution of these benchmarks.

cs.AR↗

arXiv2020

Challenging the Security of Logic Locking Schemes in the Era of Deep Learning: A Neuroevolutionary Approach

Logic locking is a prominent technique to protect the integrity of hardware designs throughout the integrated circuit design and fabrication flow. However, in recent years, the security of locking schemes has been thoroughly challenged by the introduction of various deobfuscation attacks. As in most research branches, deep learning is being introduced in the domain of logic locking as well. Therefore, in this paper we present SnapShot: a novel attack on logic locking that is the first of its kind to utilize artificial neural networks to directly predict a key bit value from a locked synthesized gate-level netlist without using a golden reference. Hereby, the attack uses a simpler yet more flexible learning model compared to existing work. Two different approaches are evaluated. The first approach is based on a simple feedforward fully connected neural network. The second approach utilizes genetic algorithms to evolve more complex convolutional neural network architectures specialized for the given task. The attack flow offers a generic and customizable framework for attacking locking schemes using machine learning techniques. We perform an extensive evaluation of SnapShot for two realistic attack scenarios, comprising both reference benchmark circuits as well as silicon-proven RISC-V core modules. The evaluation results show that SnapShot achieves an average key prediction accuracy of 82.60% for the selected attack scenario, with a significant performance increase of 10.49 percentage points compared to the state of the art. Moreover, SnapShot outperforms the existing technique on all evaluated benchmarks. The results indicate that the security foundation of common logic locking schemes is build on questionable assumptions. The conclusions of the evaluation offer insights into the challenges of designing future logic locking schemes that are resilient to machine learning attacks.

cs.CR↗