arXiv subjects

Leonardo Baggiani

Publications and source records attributed to Leonardo Baggiani.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Competition between DEXs through Dynamic Fees

We find an approximate Nash equilibrium in a game between decentralized exchanges (DEXs) that compete for order flow by setting dynamic trading fees. We characterize the equilibrium via a coupled system of partial differential equations and derive tractable approximate closed-form expressions for the equilibrium fees. Our analysis shows that the two-regime structure found in monopoly models persists under competition: pools alternate between raising fees to deter arbitrage and lowering fees to attract noise trading and increase volatility. Under competition, however, the switching boundary shifts from the oracle price to a weighted average of the oracle and competitors' exchange rates. Our numerical experiments show that, holding total liquidity fixed, an increase in the number of competing DEXs reduces execution slippage for strategic liquidity takers and lowers fee revenue per DEX. Finally, the effect on noise traders' slippage depends on market activity: they are worse off in low-activity markets but better off in high-activity ones.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2025

The Interplay between Utility and Risk in Portfolio Selection

We revisit the problem of portfolio selection, where an investor maximizes utility subject to a risk constraint. Our framework is very general and accommodates a wide range of utility and risk functionals, including non-concave utilities such as S-shaped utilities from prospect theory and non-convex risk measures such as Value at Risk. Our main contribution is a novel and complete characterization of well-posedness for utility-risk portfolio selection in one period that takes the interplay between the utility and the risk objectives fully into account. We show that under mild regularity conditions the minimal necessary and sufficient condition for well-posedness is given by a very simple either-or criterion: either the utility functional or the risk functional need to satisfy the axiom of sensitivity to large losses. This allows to easily describe well-posedness or ill-posedness for many utility-risk pairs, which we illustrate by a large number of examples. In the special case of expected utility maximization without a risk constraint (but including non-concave utilities), we show that well-posedness is fully characterised by the asymptotic loss-gain ratio, a simple and interpretable quantity that describes the investor's asymptotic relative weighting of large losses versus large gains.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2025

Optimal Dynamic Fees in Automated Market Makers

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are emerging as a popular decentralised trading platform. In this work, we determine the optimal dynamic fees in a constant function market maker. We find approximate closed-form solutions to the control problem and study the optimal fee structure. We find that there are two distinct fee regimes: one in which the AMM imposes higher fees to deter arbitrageurs, and another where fees are lowered to increase volatility and attract noise traders. Our results also show that dynamic fees that are linear in inventory and are sensitive to changes in the external price are a good approximation of the optimal fee structure and thus constitute suitable candidates when designing fees for AMMs.

q-fin.TR↗