arXiv subjects

Leyi Sheng

Publications and source records attributed to Leyi Sheng.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

PixJail: Self-Evolving Paper-to-Pipeline Reproduction for Text-to-Image Jailbreak Evaluation

As Text-to-Image (T2I) jailbreak techniques evolve rapidly, existing benchmarks and reproduction workflows often struggle to keep pace. More importantly, T2I jailbreak evaluation is not a single prompt-level test, but a pipeline-level problem shaped by multiple stages, including prompt transformation, image generation, safety filtering, and multimodal judging. This makes results across papers difficult to reliably reproduce and fairly compare. To bridge this gap, we propose PixJail, a self-evolving paper-to-pipeline agent framework for reproducible T2I jailbreak evaluation. Given a T2I jailbreak paper and optional reference code, PixJail rapidly constructs a paper-specific attack module and a runnable evaluation pipeline under a unified contract, while faithfully reproducing the original experimental results. PixJail further maintains a memory bank that stores paper digests, attack evolution patterns, reusable templates, failure cases, and versioned artifacts, enabling future reproduction efforts to reuse prior experience. We reproduce eleven representative T2I jailbreak methods, including both code-available and code-unavailable papers. Under their original settings, our framework accurately recovers prior results with minimal error (2.1\% average, 0\% median). We hope that PixJail can serve as a unified foundation for future T2I jailbreak reproduction and evaluation, significantly reducing manual effort.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Stego Battlefield: Evaluating Image Steganography Attacks and Steganalysis Defenses

Image steganography is widely used to protect user privacy and enable covert communication. However, it can also be abused by the adversary as a covert channel to bypass content moderation, disseminate harmful semantics, and even hide malicious instructions in images to elicit dangerous outputs from large models, posing a practical security risk that continues to evolve. To address the lack of a unified and systematic evaluation framework, we propose SADBench, a systematic benchmark that assesses the adversary's ability to inject harmful secrets via steganography and the defender's ability to detect such threats through steganalysis. Crucially, SADBench comprises $4$ core tasks, namely steganography attack capability evaluation, steganalysis defense capability evaluation, efficiency evaluation, and transferability evaluation. It evaluates both image-payload and text-payload steganography across diverse cover distributions, utilizing harmful visual semantics and toxic instructions to simulate malicious attacks. Across a broad set of attacks and detectors, SADBench reveals that (i) INN and autoencoder-based methods demonstrate superior stability compared to other architectures, (ii) in-domain detection is near-perfect and cheaper than generation, (iii) a critical asymmetry exists in transferability where attacks robustly generalize to new distributions while detectors fail to adapt, and (iv) real-world threats persist on social media, where payloads either survive minimal compression or effectively adapt to aggressive compression via simulated training. Overall, SADBench establishes a systematic, reproducible, and extensible framework to quantify risks, paving the way for measurable and security-driven advancements in steganography defense.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

IPV-Bench: Benchmarking Image Protection Methods under Diverse Image-to-Video Generation Scenarios

Image-to-video (I2V) generation models can be misused to animate a single image into a convincing fake video, motivating perturbation-based image protection methods that aim to disrupt such generation. Yet these methods remain difficult to compare: they are reported under inconsistent metrics and generation settings, are often validated only on the single generator they were optimized against, and are evaluated on narrow, single-domain image sets that do not reflect real misuse. To address these challenges, we introduce IPV-Bench (Image Protection against Video generation), the first systematic benchmark for image protection in I2V generation scenarios. IPV-Bench couples a unified protocol that jointly scores protection effectiveness, visual fidelity, and robustness to preprocessing attacks together with IPV-500, a prompt-paired dataset spanning five misuse-relevant domains. Based on this benchmark, we evaluate five representative protection methods across four I2V models covering distinct architectures and both open-source and commercial systems. Extensive experiments show a consistently sobering picture: image protection and video disruption trade off against each other, most methods fail to disrupt generation beyond noise, protection rarely transfers across generators, and the few effective cases are broken by simple preprocessing. We further find that image content governs the perceptual cost of protection but not its benefit: no image domain offers an easier target. Overall, IPV-Bench provides a rigorous, reproducible, and extensible foundation for developing protection methods that work in practice.

cs.CV↗