arXiv subjects

Li-Hsien Sun

Publications and source records attributed to Li-Hsien Sun.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Change-point estimation for Weibull time series with copula-based Markov models

We study offline change-point estimation for time series data exhibiting nonlinear serial dependence. To address this problem, we propose a copula-based Markov chain model with Weibull marginal distributions, which is suitable for modeling nonnegative data such as event times and volatility measures. Nonlinear dependence is incorporated through the Clayton and Joe copulas, allowing the model to capture asymmetric lower-tail and upper-tail dependence structures, respectively. We derive the corresponding likelihood function and estimate the change point and model parameters using maximum likelihood estimation implemented through the Newton--Raphson algorithm. Confidence intervals are constructed via a parametric bootstrap Monte Carlo procedure. Extensive numerical studies are conducted to evaluate the finite-sample performance and robustness of the proposed method under different dependence structures and copula misspecification scenarios. The results demonstrate that the proposed estimators perform well in terms of RMSE and relative error, particularly for the estimation of the change point. An empirical application to the VIX index during the COVID-19 pandemic further illustrates the practical usefulness of the proposed approach in detecting structural changes in both the marginal distributions and serial dependence structure.

stat.ME↗

arXiv2025

Mean field social optimization: feedback person-by-person optimality and the dynamic programming equation

We consider mean field social optimization in nonlinear diffusion models. By dynamic programming with a representative agent employing cooperative optimizer selection, we derive a new Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman (HJB) equation to be called the master equation of the value function. Under some regularity conditions, we establish $\epsilon$-person-by-person optimality of the master equation-based control laws, which may be viewed as a necessary condition for nearly attaining the social optimum. A major challenge in the analysis is to obtain tight estimates, within an error of $O(1/N)$, of the social cost having order $O(N)$. This will be accomplished by multi-scale analysis via constructing two auxiliary master equations. We illustrate explicit solutions of the master equations for the linear-quadratic (LQ) case, and give an application to systemic risk.

math.OC↗

arXiv2024

Detecting Structural Shifts and Estimating Change-Points in Interval-Based Time Series

This paper addresses the open problem of conducting change-point analysis for interval-valued time series data using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) framework. Motivated by financial time series, we analyze data that includes daily opening (O), up (U), low (L), and closing (C) values, rather than just a closing value as traditionally used. To tackle this, we propose a fundamental model based on stochastic differential equations, which also serves as a transformation of other widely used models, such as the log-transformed geometric Brownian motion model. We derive the joint distribution for these interval-valued observations using the reflection principle and Girsanov's theorem. The MLE is obtained by optimizing the log-likelihood function through first and second-order derivative calculations, utilizing the Newton-Raphson algorithm. We further propose a novel parametric bootstrap method to compute confidence intervals, addressing challenges related to temporal dependency and interval-based data relationships. The performance of the model is evaluated through extensive simulations and real data analysis using S&P500 returns during the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War. The results demonstrate that the proposed OULC model consistently outperforms the traditional OC model, offering more accurate and reliable change-point detection and parameter estimates.

stat.ME↗

arXiv2023

Partial Information in a Mean-Variance Portfolio Selection Game

This paper considers finitely many investors who perform mean-variance portfolio selection under relative performance criteria. That is, each investor is concerned about not only her terminal wealth, but how it compares to the average terminal wealth of all investors. At the inter-personal level, each investor selects a trading strategy in response to others' strategies. This selected strategy additionally needs to yield an equilibrium intra-personally, so as to resolve time inconsistency among the investor's current and future selves (triggered by the mean-variance objective). A Nash equilibrium we look for is thus a tuple of trading strategies under which every investor achieves her intra-personal equilibrium simultaneously. We derive such a Nash equilibrium explicitly in the idealized case of full information (i.e., the dynamics of the underlying stock is perfectly known) and semi-explicitly in the realistic case of partial information (i.e., the stock evolution is observed, but the expected return of the stock is not precisely known). The formula under partial information consists of the myopic trading and intertemporal hedging terms, both of which depend on an additional state process that serves to filter the true expected return and whose influence on trading is captured by a degenerate Cauchy problem. Our results identify that relative performance criteria can induce downward self-reinforcement of investors' wealth--if every investor suffers a wealth decline simultaneously, then everyone's wealth tends to decline further. This phenomenon, as numerical examples show, is negligible under full information but pronounced under partial information.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2019

Systemic Risk and Heterogeneous Mean Field Type Interbank Network

We study the system of heterogeneous interbank lending and borrowing based on the relative average of log-capitalization given by the linear combination of the average within groups and the ensemble average and describe the evolution of log-capitalization by a system of coupled diffusions. The model incorporates a game feature with homogeneity within groups and heterogeneity between groups where banks search for the optimal lending or borrowing strategies through minimizing the heterogeneous linear quadratic costs in order to avoid to approach the default barrier. Due to the complicity of the lending and borrowing system, the closed-loop Nash equilibria and the open-loop Nash equilibria are both driven by the coupled Riccati equations. The existence of the equilibria in the two-group case where the number of banks are sufficiently large is guaranteed by the solvability for the coupled Riccati equations as the number of banks goes to infinity in each group. The equilibria are consisted of the mean-reverting term identical to the one group game and the group average owing to heterogeneity. In addition, the corresponding heterogeneous mean filed game with the arbitrary number of groups is also discussed. The existence of the $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in the general $d$ heterogeneous groups is also verified. Finally, in the financial implication, we observe the Nash equilibria governed by the mean-reverting term and the linear combination of the ensemble averages of individual groups and study the influence of the relative parameters on the liquidity rate through the numerical analysis.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2019

Expected exponential utility maximization of insurers with a general diffusion factor model : The complete market case

In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal investment by an insurer. The insurer invests in a market consisting of a bank account and $m$ risky assets. The mean returns and volatilities of the risky assets depend nonlinearly on economic factors that are formulated as the solutions of general stochastic differential equations. The wealth of the insurer is described by a Cram\'er--Lundberg process, and the insurer preferences are exponential. Adapting a dynamic programming approach, we derive Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman (HJB) equation. And, we prove the unique solvability of HJB equation. In addition, the optimal strategy is also obtained using the coupled forward and backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). Finally, proving the verification theorem, we construct the optimal strategy.

q-fin.PM↗

arXiv2018

Portfolio Optimization with Delay Factor Models

We propose an optimal portfolio problem in the incomplete market where the underlying assets depend on economic factors with delayed effects, such models can describe the short term forecasting and the interaction with time lag among different financial markets. The delay phenomenon can be recognized as the integral type and the pointwise type. The optimal strategy is identified through maximizing the power utility. Due to the delay leading to the non-Markovian structure, the conventional Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) approach is no longer applicable. By using the stochastic maximum principle, we argue that the optimal strategy can be characterized by the solutions of a decoupled quadratic forward-backward stochastic differential equations(QFBSDEs). The optimality is verified via the super-martingale argument. The existence and uniqueness of the solution to the QFBSDEs are established. In addition, if the market is complete, we also provide a martingale based method to solve our portfolio optimization problem, and investigate its connection with the proposed FBSDE approach. Finally, two particular cases are analyzed where the corresponding FBSDEs can be solved explicitly.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2016

Systemic Risk and Interbank Lending

We propose a simple model of the banking system incorporating a game feature where the evolution of monetary reserve is modeled as a system of coupled Feller diffusions. The Markov Nash equilibrium generated through minimizing the linear quadratic cost subject to Cox-Ingersoll-Ross type processes creates liquidity and deposit rate. The adding liquidity leads to a flocking effect but the deposit rate diminishes the growth rate of the total monetary reserve causing a large number of bank defaults. In addition, the corresponding Mean Field Game and the infinite time horizon stochastic game with the discount factor are also discussed.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2016

Systemic Risk and Stochastic Games with Delay

We propose a model of inter-bank lending and borrowing which takes into account clearing debt obligations. The evolution of log-monetary reserves of $N$ banks is described by coupled diffusions driven by controls with delay in their drifts. Banks are minimizing their finite-horizon objective functions which take into account a quadratic cost for lending or borrowing and a linear incentive to borrow if the reserve is low or lend if the reserve is high relative to the average capitalization of the system. As such, our problem is an $N$-player linear-quadratic stochastic differential game with delay. An open-loop Nash equilibrium is obtained using a system of fully coupled forward and advanced backward stochastic differential equations. We then describe how the delay affects liquidity and systemic risk characterized by a large number of defaults. We also derive a close-loop Nash equilibrium using an HJB approach.

q-fin.MF↗

arXiv2013

Mean Field Games and Systemic Risk

We propose a simple model of inter-bank borrowing and lending where the evolution of the log-monetary reserves of $N$ banks is described by a system of diffusion processes coupled through their drifts in such a way that stability of the system depends on the rate of inter-bank borrowing and lending. Systemic risk is characterized by a large number of banks reaching a default threshold by a given time horizon. Our model incorporates a game feature where each bank controls its rate of borrowing/lending to a central bank. The optimization reflects the desire of each bank to borrow from the central bank when its monetary reserve falls below a critical level or lend if it rises above this critical level which is chosen here as the average monetary reserve. Borrowing from or lending to the central bank is also subject to a quadratic cost at a rate which can be fixed by the regulator. We solve explicitly for Nash equilibria with finitely many players, and we show that in this model the central bank acts as a clearing house, adding liquidity to the system without affecting its systemic risk. We also study the corresponding Mean Field Game in the limit of large number of banks in the presence of a common noise.

q-fin.PR↗