arXiv subjects

Li-Xin Zhong

Publications and source records attributed to Li-Xin Zhong.

25 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2010

Time scales of epidemic spread and risk perception on adaptive networks

Incorporating dynamic contact networks and delayed awareness into a contagion model with memory, we study the spreading patterns of infectious diseases in connected populations. It is found that the spread of an infectious disease is not only related to the past exposures of an individual to the infected but also to the time scales of risk perception reflected in the social network adaptation. The epidemic threshold $p_{c}$ is found to decrease with the rise of the time scale parameter s and the memory length T, they satisfy the equation $p_{c} =\frac{1}{T}+ \frac{ωT}{ a^s(1-e^{-ωT^2/a^s})}$. Both the lifetime of the epidemic and the topological property of the evolved network are considered. The standard deviation $σ_{d}$ of the degree distribution increases with the rise of the absorbing time $t_{c}$, a power-law relation $σ_{d}=mt_{c}^γ$ is found.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2010

Cooperation in the snowdrift game on directed small-world networks under self-questioning and noisy conditions

Cooperation in the evolutionary snowdrift game with a self-questioning updating mechanism is studied on annealed and quenched small-world networks with directed couplings. Around the payoff parameter value $r=0.5$, we find a size-invariant symmetrical cooperation effect. While generally suppressing cooperation for $r>0.5$ payoffs, rewired networks facilitated cooperative behavior for $r<0.5$. Fair amounts of noise were found to break the observed symmetry and further weaken cooperation at relatively large values of $r$. However, in the absence of noise, the self-questioning mechanism recovers symmetrical behavior and elevates altruism even under large-reward conditions. Our results suggest that an updating mechanism of this type is necessary to stabilize cooperation in a spatially structured environment which is otherwise detrimental to cooperative behavior, especially at high cost-to-benefit ratios. Additionally, we employ component and local stability analyses to better understand the nature of the manifested dynamics.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2010

Memory effect and multifractality of cross-correlations in financial markets

An average instantaneous cross-correlation function is introduced to quantify the interaction of the financial market of a specific time. Based on the daily data of the American and Chinese stock markets, memory effect of the average instantaneous cross-correlations is investigated over different price return time intervals. Long-range time-correlations are revealed, and are found to persist up to a month-order magnitude of the price return time interval. Multifractal nature is investigated by a multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis.

q-fin.ST↗

arXiv2009

Effects of attachment preferences on coevolution of opinions and networks

In the coevolution of network structures and opinion formation, we investigate the effects of a mixed population with distinctive relinking preferences on both the convergence time and the network structures. It has been found that a heterogeneous network structure is easier to be reached with more high-degree-preferential(HDP) nodes. There exists high correlation between the convergence time and the network heterogeneity. The heterogeneous degree distribution caused by preferential attachment accelerates the convergence to a consensus state and the shortened convergence time inhibits the occurrence of the following disquieting situation that occurs in a continuously evolving network: with preferential attachment and long-time evolvement, most of the nodes would become separated and only a few leaders would have immediate neighbors. Analytical calculations based on mean field theory reveal that both the transition point ptr and the consensus time tc depend upon the standard deviation of the degree distribution.ptr increases while tc decreases with the rise of it.Functions of ptr and tc are found.Theoretical analyses are in accordance with simulation data.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2006

Networking Effects on Cooperation in Evolutionary Snowdrift Game

The effects of networking on the extent of cooperation emerging in a competitive setting are studied. The evolutionary snowdrift game, which represents a realistic alternative to the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma, is studied in the Watts-Strogatz network that spans the regular, small-world, and random networks through random re-wiring. Over a wide range of payoffs, a re-wired network is found to suppress cooperation when compared with a well-mixed or fully connected system. Two extinction payoffs, that characterize the emergence of a homogeneous steady state, are identified. It is found that, unlike in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the standard deviation of the degree distribution is the dominant network property that governs the extinction payoffs.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2006

Evolutionary snowdrift game with loners

The effects of an additional strategy or character called loner in the snowdrift game are studied in a well-mixed population or fully-connected network and in a square lattice. The snowdrift game, which is a possible alternative to the prisoner's dilemma game in studying cooperative phenomena in competing populations, consists of two types of strategies, C (cooperators) and D (defectors). In a fully-connected network, it is found that either C lives with D or the loners take over the whole population. In a square lattice, three possible situations are found: a uniform C-population, C lives with D, and the coexistence of all three characters. The presence of loners is found to enhance cooperation in a square lattice by enhancing the payoff of cooperators. The results are discussed in terms of the effects in restricting a player to compete only with his nearest neighbors in a square lattice, as opposed to competing with all players in a fully-connected network.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2004

Effects of Contrarians in the Minority Game

We study the effects of the presence of contrarians in an agent-based model of competing populations. Contrarians are common in societies. These contrarians are agents who deliberately prefer to hold an opinion that is contrary to the prevailing idea of the commons or normal agents. Contrarians are introduced within the context of the Minority Game (MG), which is a binary model for an evolving and adaptive population of agents competing for a limited resource. Results of numerical simulations reveal that the average success rate among the agents depends non-monotonically on the fraction $a_{c}$ of contrarians. For small $a_{c}$, the contrarians systematically outperform the normal agents by avoiding the crowd effect and enhance the overall success rate. For high $a_{c}$, the anti-persistent nature of the MG is disturbed and the few normal agents outperform the contrarians. Qualitative discussion and analytic results for the small $a_{c}$ and high $a_{c}$ regimes are also presented, and the crossover behavior between the two regimes is discussed.

cond-mat.mtrl-sci↗